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FOREWORD
JENNY ARWADEt & JIM FREEMANtt
In recent years, a remarkable consensus has developed in the United
States, among political leaders from across the ideological spectrum as
well as the general public, that our justice system is dramatically over-
sized.' There is now broad recognition that over the last few decades, the
United States has invested excessive resources on a narrow set of "tough-
on-crime" strategies to address not only public safety issues but also public
health concerns such as the effects of poverty, mental illness, and drug
2
use.
As described in the report The $3.4 Trillion Mistake: The Cost of
Mass Incarceration and Criminalization, and How Justice Reinvestment
Can Build a Better Future for All, the U.S. already had an expansive jus-
tice system in the early 1980s.3 For example, if police, corrections, judi-
cial/legal, and immigration enforcement expenditures are combined, the
United States totaled $90 billion in justice spending in 1982 (note that all
justice spending figures have been adjusted for inflation and presented in
t Jenny Arwade is Co-Executive Director of Chicago-based Communities United (CU),
which brings together young people and adult allies to advance social change and systems transfor-
mation through a racial justice framework. CU's approach is centered on the creation of intentional
healing and justice spaces, transformative civic engagement and leadership development approaches,
and the development of broad-based alliances. Jenny has sixteen years of organizing experience during
which time she has supported young people and adult allies in dismantling the school-to-prison pipe-
line, addressing mass incarceration and advancing community-led justice reinvestment efforts, and
promoting health and housing equity. Jenny is a graduate of Princeton University, serves as Vice Board
Chair of the Edward W. Hazen Foundation, and is a field representative on the Board of Advisors for
the Funders Collaborative on Youth Organizing.
tf Jim Freeman is the Founder and Executive Director of Grassroots Action Support Team,
which assists community-based organizations and coalitions in their efforts to create large-scale, trans-
formative social change around key social, racial, gender, and economic justice issues. He assists
grassroots-led efforts to address mass incarceration, promote justice reinvestment, and dismantle the
school-to-prison pipeline, among other issues. Freeman was formerly a Senior Attorney at Advance-
ment Project where he directed the Ending the Schoolhouse-to-Jailhouse Track project. He is a grad-
uate of Harvard Law School and the University of Notre Dame and has been an Adjunct Professor of
Law at the Georgetown University Law Center and the University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
I. See, e.g., Alex Altman, Koch Brother Teams Up with Liberals on Criminal Justice Reform,
TIME (Jan. 29, 2015), http://time.com/3686797/charles-koch-criminal-justice; Russell Berman, The
Moment for Criminal-Justice Reform?, ATLANTIC (July 10, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/poli-
tics/archive/2015/07/congress-obama-criminal-justice-reform/398045.
2. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., THE GROWTH OF
INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 15-16 (Jeremy
Travis et al. eds., 2014); Criminal Justice Facts, SENT'G PROJECT, http://www.sentencingpro-
ject.org/criminal-justice-facts (last visited Jan. 28, 2017).
3. CMTYS. UNITED ET AL., THE $3.4 TRILLION MISTAKE: THE COST OF MASS INCARCERATION
AND CRIMINALIZATION, AND HOW JUSTICE REINVESTMENT CAN BUILD A BETTER FUTURE FOR ALL
7 (2016), http://www.reinvest4justice.org/report [hereinafter THE $3.4 TRILLION MISTAKE].
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2016 dollars).4 Indeed, our incarcerated population then, 621,885, would
still rank as fourth highest in the world today, behind only China, Russia,
and Brazil.5 Nevertheless, we continued to aggressively expand both the
size and role of our justice system. Thus, by 2012, total justice spending
had increased by 229% to nearly $297 billion. 6 Cumulatively, over the
thirty-year period from 1983 to 2012, we spent $3.4 trillion more on the
justice system than we would have if spending had remained steady since
1982.7
Alongside the growth in spending has been a dramatic increase in the
number of people who are under the control of the justice system. As of
2013, there were nearly eight million adults and youth behind bars or
within the probation and parole systems in the United States.8 In other
words, one in forty U.S. residents was either in prison, in jail, on probation
or parole, or otherwise under control of the justice system.9 For Black and
4. JUSTICE MGMT. Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUDGET TREND DATA: FROM 1975
THROUGH THE PRESIDENT'S 2003 REQUEST TO THE CONGRESS 105 (2002), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/archive/j md/1975_2002/2002/pdf/BudgetTrand.pdf (citing immigration enforcement spend-
ing for 1982-2002); TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
JUSTICE EXPENDITURES AND EMPLOYMENT, FY 1982-2007, at 2 (2011), https://www.bjs.gov/con-
tent/pub/pdf/jee8207st.pdf (citing police, corrections, and judicial and legal services expenditures).
The figures were adjusted to 2016 dollars using the CPI conversion tables produced by Professor Rob-
ert Sahr. Individual Year Conversion Factor Tables, OR. ST. U., http://liberalarts.oregon-
state.edu/spp/polisci/faculty-staff/robert-sahr/inflation-conversion-factors-years- 1774-estimated-
2024-dollars-recent-years/individual-year-conversion-factor-table-0 (last visited Feb. 11, 2017). Note
that some civil judicial functions are included in the judicial/legal category (for example, state appel-
late and supreme courts hear both civil and criminal cases, and those expenditures were not differen-
tiated by the Bureau of Justice Statistics). However, the Bureau of Justice Statistics figures do not take
into account many additional spending areas. See CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & RUTH DELANEY, VERA
INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PRICE OF PRISONS: WHAT INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS 2 (Jules Ver-
done ed., 2012), http://archive.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/price-of-prisons-up-
dated-version-021914.pdf.
5. Highest to Lowest - Prison Population Total, WORLD PRISON BRIEF, http://prisonstud-
ies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison-population-total?fieldregion taxonomy-tid=All (last visited Jan.
29, 2017).
6. THE $3.4 TRILLION MISTAKE, supra note 3, at 7.
7. Id
8. LAUREN E. GLAZE & DANIELLE KAEBLE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013, at 1 (2014),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus I 3.pdf (counting adults living under supervision by proba-
tion or parole and those in local, state, and federal detention facilities); ERINN J. HERBERMAN &
THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROBATION AND
PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013, at 1 (rev. 2015), https://www.bjs.gov/con-
tent/pub/pdf/ppusl3.pdf (counting adults in probation, parole, or any other post-prison supervision
(note that Oklahoma did not report 2103 probation data and thus its 2012 data was used)); JOHN F.
SIMANSKI, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2013, at 1 (2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publica-
tions/ois enforcement ar 2013.pdf (counting detained aliens); EZACJRP: Year of Census by Sex for
United States, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojst-
atbb/ezacjrp/asp/display.asp (last visited Feb. 11 2017) (counting juveniles detained, committed, or
supervised in 2013).
9. Data: National Population Totals Tables: 2010-2015, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/data/tables/2015/demo/popest/nation-total.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
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Latino residents, it was approximately one in eighteen and one in thirty-
four, respectively, compared to one in fifty-five White residents."o
However, despite all of the additional resources devoted to the ex-
pansion of the justice system, it is not at all clear that this approach has
been effective at promoting public safety." Indeed, there is substantial ev-
idence demonstrating that the harms caused by this approach have far ex-
ceeded whatever benefits have been realized.12 That is especially true
within the communities of color where law enforcement resources have
become highly concentrated.'3 Moreover, the evidence suggests that the
policies that have produced mass incarceration and criminalization are far
less effective than other options available to us.14
Fortunately, some progress has been made in addressing this misal-
location of resources.'5 In recent years, several "justice reinvestment" ini-
tiatives have been successful in beginning to "right-size" and reprioritize
our justice system, and reallocate resources to address other community
10. THE $3.4 TRILLION MISTAKE, supra note 3, at 3.
11. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., supra note 2, at 16; RYAN S.
KING ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCERATION AND CRIME: A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP 8
(2005), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Incarceration-and-Crime-A-
Complex-Relationship.pdf.
12. See sources cited supra note 3. See generally About, VERA INST. JUST.,
https://www.vera.org/about (last visited Feb. 11, 2017); About the CSG Justice Center, COUNCIL ST.
GOVERNMENTS JUST. CTR., https://csgjusticecenter.org/about-jc (last visited Feb. 11, 2017); About the
Justice Policy Center, URB. INST., http://www.urban.org/policy-centers/justice-policy-center/sound-
strategies-combating-crime-and-promoting-public-safety (last visited Feb. 11, 2017); About Us,
SENT'G PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/about-us (last visited Feb. 11, 2017); Mass Incar-
ceration, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/mass-incarceration (last visited Feb. I1, 2017); Public
Safety Performance Project, PEW CHARITABLE TR., http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/projects/public-
safety-performance-project/about (last visited Feb. 11, 2017).
13. THE $3.4 TRILLION MISTAKE, supra note 3, at 10-13; see also Intro, CHICAGO'S MILLION
DOLLAR BLOCKS, http://chicagosmilliondollarblocks.com/#section-1 (last visited Feb. 11, 2017);
Publications, JUST. MAPPING CTR. (Oct. 5, 2010), http://www.justicemapping.org/archive/cate-
gory/news.
14. CONNIE RICE ET AL., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, A CALL TO ACTION: LOS ANGELES' QUEST
TO ACHIEVE COMMUNITY SAFETY 3 (Mike Areyan et al. eds., 2013), http://www.advancementpro-
ject.org/resources/entry/a-call-to-action-los-angeles-quest-to-achieve-community-safety; JAMES
AUSTIN ET AL., ENDING MASS INCARCERATION: CHARTING A NEW JUSTICE REINVESTMENT 2-3, 17-
18 (2014), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Ending-Mass-Incarcera-
tion-Charting-a-New-Justice-Reinvestment.pdf; WILLIAM CHRISTESON ET AL., FIGHT CRIME: INVEST
IN KIDS, PROVEN INVESTMENTS IN KIDS WILL REDUCE CRIME AND VIOLENCE (2014), https://strong-
nation.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/37/3293c393-2978-4bc6-aa2-9d8fb62430cf.pdf; COUNCIL OF
ECON. ADVISORS, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON INCARCERATION AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 52-54 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/page/files/20160423_ceaincarcerationcriminal justice.pdf; KiM GILHULY ET AL.,
HUMAN IMPACT PARTNERS, REHABILITATING CORRECTIONS IN CALIFORNIA: THE HEALTH IMPACTS
OF PROPOSITION 47, at 3-5 (2014), http://www.humanimpact.org/downloads/hia-full-report; SARAH
LYONS & NASTASSIA WALSH, JUSTICE POLICY INST., MONEY WELL SPENT: How POSITIVE SOCIAL
INVESTMENTS WILL REDUCE INCARCERATION RATES, IMPROVE PUBLIC SAFETY, AND PROMOTE THE
WELL-BEING OF COMMUNITIES 54-58 (2010), http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/10-
09_REPMoneyWellSpent_PS-DC-AC-JJ.pdfP see sources cited supra note 3; see also President
Barack Obama, Weekly Address: Building a Fairer and More Effective Criminal Justice System,
WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 23, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/photos-and-
video/video/2016/04/23/weekly-address-building-fairer-and-more-effective-criminal-justice.
15. See, e.g., THE $3.4 TRILLION MISTAKE, supra note 3, at 19.
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needs.16 However, despite this undeniable progress, it is vital that these
initial steps be kept in perspective. The advances made thus far represent
only a tiny fraction of the overall distance that must be traveled if we are
to address our oversized justice system while actively building safer and
healthier communities across the country.17
To cover the rest of that distance, we submit that there are four es-
sential steps that must be taken:
1. Justice reinvestment initiatives must be pursued at the federal,
state, and local levels.
Of the nearly $297 billion spent nationally on the justice system in
2012, local budgets accounted for 45% of the total, state budgets com-
prised another 30%, and federal spending contributed 25%.'8 All three ar-
eas have expanded dramatically over the past few decades and will require
attention if we are to effectively reform our justice system.19
2. Future justice reinvestment initiatives should address all areas
of excessive justice spending.
Previous justice reinvestment initiatives have focused almost exclu-
sively on reducing corrections spending.20 However, that represents only
29% of what the United States spent on the justice system in 2012.21 Suc-
cessful justice reinvestment will require a comprehensive approach that
also addresses over-spending on police (45%), judicial/legal functions
(20%), and the fastest-growing component of the justice system: immigra-
tion enforcement (6%).22
3. Justice reinvestment initiatives should prioritize the meaning-
ful involvement of the communities that have been most af-
fected by mass incarceration and criminalization.
Justice reinvestment efforts can have profound "on-the-ground" con-
sequences, yet one of the key weaknesses of many existing efforts is the
lack of participation by individuals and organizations from the most af-
fected communities.23 Creating more inclusive processes, with ample op-
portunities for meaningful grassroots involvement, is critical to ensuring
that justice reinvestment efforts are able to accurately diagnose the most
critical community needs and esign appropriate and community-specific
solutions.
16. Id. at 18-19.
17. Id. at 19.
18. Id. at 9.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 11.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 5; AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 19.
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4. A substantial portion of the savings realized should be rein-
vested, not in other areas of the justice system, but rather in ad-
dressing the root causes of unsafe and unhealthy communities,
particularly in the communities that have been most affected by
mass incarceration and criminalization.
To date, many justice reinvestment efforts have not produced sub-
stantial reinvestment, and many of the funds that have been reinvested
24
have gone toward other programs within the justice system. As such,
they neglect the harm caused by decades of mass incarceration and crimi-
nalization policies as well as the root causes of crime and violence.
To create safe communities, we must of course be able to respond
effectively to violence and crime. But the most effective response to such
actions need not involve the justice system, and our understanding of pub-
lic safety should not begin nor end with the justice system.25 We must rec-
ognize that communities cannot be safe if:
* There are not enough good jobs and affordable housing opportu-
nities for the people who need them;
* Children are not being provided with high-quality educational
opportunities, wraparound supports, and access to good after-
school and employment opportunities when needed;
* There are significant unmet mental, physical, and behavioral
health needs;
* They are facing the threats posed by environmental degradation
and climate change; and
* There is deep social, economic, and political inequality within
them.26
Addressing these basic needs will result in far less crime and violence
and far fewer people entering the criminal justice system, yet we have con-
tinually neglected these other key components of safety.27 However, if we
are truly to end the devastating cycle of crime and incarceration that con-
tinues to plague communities all across the country, we must stop using
so many of our resources to merely respond to crime and the symptoms of
unhealthy communities and instead focus more on preventing crime and
addressing its root causes.
There are many who will be resistant to the type of robust and com-
prehensive justice reinvestment initiatives described above. In particular,
24. THE $3.4 TRILLION MISTAKE, supra note 3, at 19.





many policymakers will be reluctant to support the substantial reallocation
of resources from the justice system to meeting other acute needs, espe-
cially within the communities of color that have been most affected by
overinvestment in the justice system. What they must recognize is that we
are already making massive investments in those communities. However,
instead of investing appropriately in the education, employment, or health
of individuals from those communities, we have been allocating far too
-28many of our resources to their criminalization and incarceration.
So we face a choice. Do we continue to invest public dollars in de-
structive mass incarceration strategies that overwhelmingly affect our
most vulnerable and marginalized residents? Or do we seek a new path
forward that is focused on making positive investments in the long-term
health and safety of our children, families, and communities?
It is our hope that the articles that follow can help to chart such a path.
28. Id. at 20.
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PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE IN PRISON: USING HEALTHCARE
ECONOMICS TO IMPROVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
W. DAVID BALL
ABSTRACT
For much of the last seventy-plus years, healthcare providers in the
United States have been paid under the fee-for-service system, where pro-
viders are reimbursed for procedures performed, not outcomes obtained.
The result has been a system that incentivizes resource consumption, not
health improvements. Healthcare economists and policymakers have re-
acted by proposing a number of policies designed to control costs without
sacrificing quality. One approach is to reimburse providers on the basis of
health outcomes obtained. Under a pay-for-performance strategy, provid-
ers are incentivized to deliver healthcare in ways that are both efficacious
and efficient. This means providers are no longer paid for simply doing a
given "something" but, rather, are paid for doing "something effective."
The criminal justice system is plagued by many of the same distorted
individual and organizational incentives seen in health care. In all but a
handful of jurisdictions, states wholly subsidize commitments to prison-
the fee-for-service model of doing "something"-without tying any of
these subsidies to outcomes obtained in prison. This means prison is paid
for even if it is neither effective nor efficient. An outcome-oriented, pay-
for-performance framework borrowed from healthcare economics might,
if applied to criminal justice, improve its efficacy and efficiency.
This Article focuses on the similarities between health care and crim-
inal justice, the ways in which an outcome orientation might provide a
useful framework for controlling criminal justice costs without sacrificing
public safety, and the suggestion that we begin considering sentencing
choices within that framework.
t Many thanks to participants at the Stanford Criminal Justice Roundtable, the "Rationing
Criminal Justice" Panel at the 2016 Law & Society Conference, the Southwest Criminal Law Work-
shop, and the Santa Clara scholarship series for their insightful comments. I wish to particularly thank
Rachel Barkow, Jack Chin, Sharon Dolovich, Donald Dripps, Deep Gulasekaram, Carissa Hessick,
Sam Kamin, Pam Karlan, Maximo Langer, Justin Marceau, Tracey Meares, Erin Murphy, Michelle
Oberman, Daniel Richman, David Sklansky, David Sloss, Avani Sood, Bob Weisberg, Jeff Wu, and
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This is what I gathered. That in that country if a man falls into ill
health, or catches any disorder, or fails bodily in any way before he is
seventy years old, he is tried before a jury of his countrymen, and if
convicted is held up to public scorn and sentenced more or less se-
verely as the case may be. There are subdivisions of illnesses into
crimes and misdemeanours as with offences amongst ourselves ....
But if a man forges a cheque, or sets his house on fire, or robs with
violence from the person, or does any other such things as are criminal
in our own country, he is either taken to a hospital and most carefully
tended at the public expense, or if he is in good circumstances, he lets
it be known to all his friends that he is suffering from a severe fit of
immorality, just as we do when we are ill, and they come and visit him
with great solicitude, and inquire with interest how it all came about,
what symptoms first showed themselves, and so forth,-questions
which he will answer with perfect unreserve; for bad conduct, though
considered no less deplorable than illness with ourselves, and as un-
questionably indicating something seriously wrong with the individual




Healthcare economists have written extensively about the perverse
incentives of fee-for-service reimbursement, where healthcare providers
are reimbursed for each medical service rendered.2 Fee-for-service re-
wards quantity, not quality-providers get paid for doing something, not
for doing something well. In fact, under fee-for-service, a hospital's inef-
fective treatment resulting in a patient rehospitalization could be a finan-
cial gain to the hospital despite being a bad outcome for the patient. The
I. SAMUEL BUTLER, EREWHON 49 (Xist Publ'g 2015) (1872).
2. See infra Part I.
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hospital could be paid for the additional treatments its own ineffectiveness
made necessary.
One proposed alternative to fee-for-service is performance-based re-
imbursement, where providers are reimbursed based on patient outcomes.
This Article employs Professor Michael Porter's formulation of pay-for-
performance, value creation, where value is measured in terms of health
care outcomes per dollar spent.3 Porter's formulation has the advantage of
combining efficacy and efficiency in a single measure. It measures both
whether something improves health and whether it does so using the few-
est resources possible. Health is promoted without making it subservient
to cost control; value cannot be created simply by saving money if those
savings result in worse health outcomes. At the same time, parsimony is
embedded; ceteris paribus, treatments which use the fewest resources are
preferred. Under a value-based system, a hospital is paid for results, not
processes. For example, if a heart surgery were performed and the hospital
subsequently had to readmit the patient, it would pay the resulting ex-
penses itself. If the hospital's doctor performed the surgery and the patient
were healed, it would break even or make a little money. But if it treated
the condition effectively through other, lower-cost means (including ef-
fective aftercare), it would keep the surplus itself.
Much of the existing economic analysis of criminal justice has fo-
cused on the economic incentives of criminals, not on the structural rela-
tionships and organizational incentives of "providers" in the criminal jus-
tice system (e.g., law enforcement, prosecutors, correctional facilities, and
probation and parole). Looking at the incentives of providers in the system
might help to explain why the cost and scope of criminal justice have ex-
ploded in a manner similar to the way healthcare costs have exploded un-
der fee-for-service reimbursement regimes. As in fee-for-service, criminal
justice providers face few cost constraints on their menu of interventions.
The government subsidizes particular responses, such as prison, in the
name of public safety without demanding evidence that these responses
work. Just as a readmitted cardiac patient under fee-for-service imposes
no financial hardship on providers who failed to cure her, so too does a
recidivist impose no financial losses on the institutions that failed to re-
form him. On the contrary, prison budgets tend to get bigger as prison
populations increase, even when those increases are the result of ineffec-
tive (or non-existent) rehabilitation programs. Given these similarities,
perhaps it is time to consider replacing our existing subsidy-for-service
criminal justice approach with funding based on performance.
Such an approach would have several advantages: providing eco-
nomic incentives for non-carceral (and non-criminal) alternatives, promot-
ing the development of evidence-based practices that are less resource-
intensive, and providing incentives to adopt the state-of-the-art in criminal
3. See infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
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justice policies. At the very least, it would require agencies to justify their
existing practices on efficacy and efficiency grounds-a justification that,
in our era of mass incarceration, will likely be found wanting.
This Article is both a thought experiment about how criminal justice
might be funded and a potentially useful source of lessons for those inter-
ested in reforming the system. Defining health outcomes is an ongoing
process that has encountered political, organizational, and theoretical ob-
stacles. Getting constituencies to agree on measures, getting organizations
to implement them, and even deciding what health means and which data
are best associated with it has been a long and difficult process-and yet
progress has been made.4 I do not, in any way, mean to suggest hat build-
ing an outcome-based system of criminal justice centered around improv-
ing public safety will be any easier or quicker. But I also know that health
outcomes were once seen as impossibly and hopelessly vague, while now
they are utilized in funding health care. In this Article, I will not-and
could not-come up with precise, operational definitions of public safety
that will apply to all or even most situations. At the very least, imposing a
standard by fiat would fail to get the practitioner buy-in necessary to make
an outcome orientation work. Nevertheless, there are lessons to be learned
from the health care experience, and the framework has clear benefits.
This Article builds on work-including some of my own-about the
decentralized nature of criminal justice and the concomitant cost-passing
and externalities among criminal justice agencies.5 It suggests new ways
to harmonize social welfare with the welfare of individual organizations.
The main thrust of the argument is to actually give weight to the invocation
of criminal justice goals-in this case, public safety-by making sure that
what criminal justice agencies are doing achieves that goal in the most
resource-efficient way. This means that the least-expensive alternative that
gets the same public safety result should be adopted, or else those agencies
which decide to pursue other options will have to pay the difference in
cost. One can readily imagine some policy changes that might result. Some
problems might not be worth any criminal sanctions at all, as the risk-
needs-responsiveness principle has taught us.6 Mentally ill offenders get
worse, at great expense, in prisons and jails;7 under pay-for-performance
4. See infra Part II, Section IV.A.
5. See infra Part III.
6. See D.A. Andrews, James Bonta & R.D. Hoge, Classification for Effective Rehabilitation:
Rediscovering Psychology, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 19, 20 (1990) ("Higher levels of service are
reserved for higher risk cases ... . [L]ower risk cases do as well or better with minimal as opposed to
more intensive service."); see also Christopher T. Lowenkamp & Edward J. Latessa, Understanding
the Risk Principle: How and Why Correctional Interventions Can Harm Low-Risk Offenders, TOPICS
COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS, 2004, at 3, 3 ("[W]e see intensive treatments and supervision leading to
no effect or increased recidivism for low-risk offenders.").
7. See E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., MORE MENTALLY ILL PERSONS ARE IN JAILS AND PRISONS
THAN HOSPITALS: A SURVEY OF THE STATES 9-11 (2010), http://www.treatmentadvoca-
cycenter.org/storage/documents/final jails_v hospital ssrudy.pdf (finding that mentally ill inmates
are more likely to stay longer, commit suicide, and be abused, while incurring greater costs).
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they might be removed from the criminal justice system entirely. Lengthy
criminal sentences might not be worth the cost (both human and financial)
in terms of what they add to public safety and could be shortened.
The approach taken in this Article differs from my prior work in the
way it treats incarceration. At the time of sentencing, prison is almost
always treated as an undifferentiated mass. I propose instead that prison
and other dispositions in a given system be individuated, where individual
institutions begin to specialize in various subpopulations with particular
risks and needs. This means that a system would no longer consider that
prison time and jail time are fungible, where sentencing is just an assign-
ment to be "treated" generally. Instead, sentences would be tailored to in-
dividual needs, with individual treatment programs in individual institu-
tions. This would move beyond the current conception of "tailoring" cus-
todial sentences, which, at most, considers only how much time in a ge-
neric prison or jail an offender should get.9
There are a few assumptions that underlie this analysis. First, this Ar-
ticle does not assume that "nothing works" in rehabilitating criminals, a
phrase often attributed to Robert Martinson, albeit one he did not write,
and one which flies in the face of recent criminological research.o The
Article does not take a position on any particular rehabilitative program
but is, instead, concerned with how to improve the uptake of the most ro-
bust and promising approaches to offender treatment, whatever they may
be. Just as medical techniques continue to improve, so too will the treat-
ment of offenders. A system that provides financial incentives for the de-
velopment and dissemination of the most effective programs need not be
locked into a particular theory or method. Second, this Article assumes
that data is better than intuition about "what is right" or "what works," and
because people often make claims about what criminal justice is, what it
does, or how the justice-involved anticipate or react to it, I want to test
these claims with the best techniques we have, even if they are not infalli-
ble. Intuition is subject to implicit biases that are both harder to detect and
correct than those embedded in actuarial instruments-provided, of
course, that those instruments are open to public scrutiny (which is not
always the case). Given the overwhelmingly racialized nature of American
criminal justice, the greater potential transparency of actuarialism could
allow us to more easily diagnose problems and adjust policies.
8. See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245, 249-50 (2005) (discussing tailoring
in terms of sentence length and matching offense and offender facts to the federal sentencing guide-
lines); see also Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 100-01 (2007) (discussing tailoring in
Booker and only referring to time sentenced).
10. See Robert Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35
PUB. INT. 22, 48-50 (1974). For a discussion of Martinson's legacy and a rejoinder to the idea that
"nothing works" is still the criminological state of the art, see Francis T. Cullen et al., Nothing Works




This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I outlines the similarities be-
tween the healthcare and criminal justice systems, emphasizing how fee-
for-service reimbursement tends to promote overuse, not effective and ef-
ficient use. Part II briefly summarizes what value-based healthcare eco-
nomics is, and how it promises to control costs in healthcare without sac-
rificing health outcomes. Part III sketches out the ways in which a focus
on value provides new possibilities for a law and economics analysis of
criminal justice systems, while building on the policy and analytical work
already being done. Part IV lays out possible new models for the funding
and administration of criminal justice, building on some of my own prior
work as well as that of others. Part V discusses some shortcomings of this
approach and attempts to address them.
I. A TALE OF Two SYSTEMS
The model of medical care provision and reimbursement in the
United States after World War II is notable for its complexity, perverse
incentives, and uniqueness among industrialized countries. There is noth-
ing logically or legally necessary about it. Universal healthcare was con-
sidered beginning with the New Deal, but efforts to adopt it failed due to
opposition from the American Medical Association (among other fac-
tors).11 Employer-provided health insurance filled the gap, gained traction
as the federal government froze private-sector wages (but not private-sec-
tor benefits, including health benefits), and became solidified with favor-
able tax treatment after the end of World War 11.12 The healthcare "system"
that resulted was far from systematic in terms of who pays and who is paid.
It is a complex amalgamation of government-run and private for-profit and
non-profit providers, paid for by private and public health insurance (the
latter starting with Medicaid and Medicare), with medical care provided
by a mix of independent doctors, practice groups, Healthcare Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs), and Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs).13
Different parts of the system have coordination problems across health
provider and insurance networks, specialists, emergency medicine, long-
term care, and the like. There has always been a need for more data-and
more incentives to study that data-on what works.14 Doctors are not nec-
essarily expected to get feedback about what eventually happens to their
11. David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United States-Origins
and Implications, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 82, 82-83 (2006).
12. Id. at 83-84.
13. Julie Barnes, Moving Away from Fee-for-Service, ATLANTIC (May 7, 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/05/moving-away-from-fee-for-service/256755.
14. For a review of the subject, as well as an introduction to the Cochrane Collaboration, an
international clearinghouse for "what works" in medicine, see John N. Lavis et al., Working Within
and Beyond the Cochrane Collaboration to Make Systematic Reviews More Useful to Healthcare
Managers and Policy Makers, 1 HEALTHCARE POL'Y 21, 23-32 (2006).
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patients because those problems are often passed on to other "down-
stream" institutions and doctors.5
Fee-for-service reimbursement was, until recently, the dominant sys-
tem for reimbursing healthcare providers.'6 Fee-for-service pays providers
per procedure-whether a doctor's visit, MRI, blood test, or other proce-
dure-as long as it follows generally established protocols. 17 The problem
with fee-for-service is that it incentivizes additional procedures and inter-
ventions.' Providers are paid for doing something whether or not it leads
to demonstrated improvements. Even as health is invoked, there is little
financial pressure to improve health since reimbursements are not made
on that basis. In other words, providers are not paid for doing something
that works, just for doing something at all-and, in fact, sometimes more
interventions result in worse outcomes.19 It is hard to control costs under
this system: one critic described the "perverse incentives" in the U.S.
healthcare system as "producing what they are designed to deliver: cost
inflation, inefficiency, and inequity."20
Under the fee-for-service system, participants have incentives at odds
with each other. Consumers want health care but do not bear the full cost
of consuming it (even with co-payments).2' Providers are paid per service,
giving them no financial incentives to do less or even to know what a pro-
cedure costs. Insurers cover the costs that result, but they have no real con-
trol over them. The result is that costs balloon. There is little investment
on the front end of prevention, there is rationing of one kind or another
(price or services offered), and the drive to cut costs is met with justifiable
resistance by a population that views health as beyond the purview of dol-
lars and cents. One of the enduring questions is which group-if any-is
really steering health policy. Is the ultimate decision maker the insurer,
who pays? The doctor, who treats? And who benefits? The patient, who is
healed? Society, who is made safe from communicable diseases?
15. Michael E. Porter, A Strategy for Health Care Reform-Toward a Value-Based System, 361
NEW ENG. J. MED. 109, 110-11 (2009).
16. John T. Preskitt, Health Care Reimbursement: Clemens to Clinton, 21 BAYLOR U. MED.
CTR. PROC. 40, 40-44 (2008).
17. See Robert A. Berenson & Eugene C. Rich, US Approaches to Physician Payment: The
Deconstruction ofPrimary Care, 25 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 613, 613 (2010).
18. Hendrik Schmitz, Practice Budgets and the Patient Mix of Physicians-The Effect of a Re-
muneration System Reform on Health Care Utilization, 32 J. HEALTH ECON. 1240, 1240 (2013)
("[T]his literature mainly finds that doctors provide more services in fee-for-service systems . . . .").
19. Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Op-ed, Are Good Doctors Bad for Your Health?, N.Y. TIMES Nov. 21,
2015, at SR7. For the systemic effects of overprescribing antibiotics, see Sarah Childress, Dr. Arjun
Srinivasan: We've Reached "the End of Antibiotics, Period," PBS: FRONTLINE (Oct. 22, 2013),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/dr-arjun-srinivasan-weve-reached-the-end-of-antibiotics-
period.
20. Alan Maynard, Health Reform: Reinventing the Wheel, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 12, 2006),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2006/10/12/health-reform-reinventing-the-wheel.
21. For a suitably consumer-focused treatment of the problem, see Leslie Goldman, How Much
Is This Gonna Cost Me, Doc?, 0 MAG., July 2015, at 72, 72.
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It is well known that the U.S. health care system is exceptional (alt-
hough not in a good way), and the country has recently made significant
22changes under the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare). All along, how-
ever, attempts to change the system have been met with fierce resistance
by insiders who fear lost rents or lost discretion to treat patients as they
see fit.23 In many instances, the very idea that medical care could be sub-
ject to cost-effectiveness analysis by outsiders was rejected. Only doctors
knew what was medically necessary, and they had to be given complete
freedom to pursue what was best for the patient.24
The model of criminal justice provision and reimbursement in the
United States is also notable for its complexity, perverse incentives, and
uniqueness among industrialized countries. There is nothing logically or
legally necessary about it. States did not originally pay for prisons, and
there were no state prisons at the time of the founding.25 The economics
of prison provision used to be different: governments got (or at least
thought they would get) revenues from prison labor, and this meant that
control over carceral populations was an economic benefit, not a loss.
State-provided prisons became the norm under different economic circum-
stances and remained even when the value of prison labor vanished. The
criminal justice "system" that resulted was far from systematic in terms of
who pays for it and who controls access to it. It is a complex amalgamation
of government-run and private for-profit prisons, local jails, and treatment
facilities, paid for by state, local, and federal funds. Each part of the system
has effects on the workload and efficiency of other parts, but there is little
coordination among them (with the exception of the few states with uni-
26fled corrections systems). If prisons do a good job rehabilitating, it means
less work for police. If police arrest marginal criminals, it places more
stress on courts and jails. The system as a whole passes costs from agency
to agency and fails, in many cases, to treat the offender in a consistent and
22. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
23. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 23-28 (1982) (dis-
cussing doctor esistance to change generally); id. at 252-54 (discussing doctor esistance within the
progressive era); id. at 271 (discussing doctor resistance during the New Deal); id. at 280 (discussing
the introduction of "socialized medicine"); see also Sven Steinmo & Jon Watts, It's the Institutions,
Stupid! Why Comprehensive National Health Insurance Always Fails in America, 20 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 329, 330-35 (1995) (identifying structural reasons in the U.S. political system as well as
resistance from medical professionals).
24. STARR, supra note 23, at 26-28.
25. This treatment largely reproduced that of a prior article. See W. David Ball, Why State Pris-
ons?, 33 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 75, 89 (2014) [hereinafter Ball, Why State Prisons?]. For a California-
specific treatment, see W. David Ball, "A False Idea ofEconomy": Costs, Counties, and the Origins
ofthe Calfornia Correctional System, 664 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 26, 28-31 (2016)
[hereinafter Ball, A False Idea]. For a lengthier treatment on the origins of state prisons (one which
does not focus on political economy), see generally REBECCA M. MCLENNAN, THE CRISIS OF
IMPRISONMENT: PROTEST, POLITICS, AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN PENAL STATE, 1776-1941
(2008).
26. . For background on unified corrections, see generally BARBARA KRAUTH, NAT'L INST. OF
CORR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE JAIL FUNCTION WITHIN STATE UNIFIED
CORRECTIONS SYSTEMS (1997), http://static.nicic.gov/Library/014024.pdf.
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coordinated manner. There is little data on what works, and few incentives
to study what data there is.27 District Attorneys (DAs) and judges are under
no pressure to get feedback about what eventually happens to individual
criminals in their cases because those problems are passed on to other
downstream institutions and practitioners. Even as public safety is in-
voked, there is little financial pressure to improve public safety since re-
imbursements are not made on that basis (though perhaps actors face some
political pressure, an element of the equation discussed at length in the
literature).2 8
Under the prison subsidy system, participants have incentives at odds
with each other. Local taxpayers want public safety but do not bear the full
cost of consuming prison beds (even though they pay for police and, some-
times, local courts). DAs and judges are not required to consider the cost
of sentencing outcomes (except in states like Missouri)29 and in no case
must they systematically consider whether the cost paid is either an effi-
cient or efficacious use of resources. The value of prison is assumed to be
greater than zero, but its costs are not borne by the local officials whose
decisions drive prison admissions. More interventions or prison time does
not always improve criminal justice outcomes-they can make them
worse.30 The state government covers the prison costs that result, but it has
little control over prison utilization (in part because the legislature contin-
ually expands the penal code, as William Stuntz has observed).3 1 The re-
sult is that costs balloon. There is too little investment on the front end of
prevention, there is rationing of one kind or another (overcrowding or pro-
gramming and treatment), but the drive to cut costs is met with justifiable
resistance by the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, which prohibits
cruel and unusual punishment.32 Again, one of the enduring questions is
which group-if any-is really steering criminal justice policy. Is the ul-
timate decision maker the legislature, who writes expansive penal codes?
The DA or judge, who charges and sentences? And who benefits? The
inmate, who is incarcerated? The public, who is made safe from crime?
The victim, who is vindicated?3 3
27. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Samuel R. Wiseman, The Criminal Justice
Black Box, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2017).
28. For a skeptical view on the efficacy of prosecutorial elections, see Ronald F. Wright, How
Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 583 (2009).
29. Chad Flanders, Cost as a Sentencing Factor: Missouri's Experiment, 77 Mo. L. REV. 391,
391 (2012).
30. Francis T. Cullen, Cheryl Lero Jonson & Daniel S. Nagin, Prisons Do Not Reduce Recidi-
vism: The High Cost ofIgnoring Science, 91 PRISON J. 48S, 50S-51 S (Supp. 2011).
31. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 519
(2001).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
33. Not all crimes have victims in a tangible sense-who is the victim in a consensual drug sale
or in resisting arrest? Moreover, victims do not drive decisions-the prosecutor does. In some cases,
for example, prosecutors seek the death penalty over the objections of surviving family members. See,
e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Declaring Life at the Crossroads ofDeath: Victims'Anti-Death Penalty Views
and Prosecutors' Charging Decisions, 18 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 41, 43-45 (1999).
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It is well-known that the U.S. penal system is exceptional, and not in
a good way. As with medicine, attempts to change the system have been
met with fierce resistance by insiders who fear lost rents (e.g., prison
guards) or lost discretion to treat crime as they see fit. In many instances,
the very idea that criminal law could be subject to cost effectiveness anal-
ysis by outsiders is rejected. Only prosecutors know what is best for public
safety, and they need to be given complete freedom to pursue what is best
for society. DAs are, in many ways, the entire system, able to charge under
expansive penal codes and rive bargains; John Pfaff has made a convinc-
ing argument that changes in prosecutorial charging patterns helped drive
increases in incarceration from 1994 to 2008.34
To say that the criminal justice and healthcare systems are similar is
not to say that crime and disease are identical. Crime and disease share
some similarities, but also have important differences. But one need not
address crime when one is talking about incarceration; crime is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for incarceration.35 Crime goes unreported, un-
solved, and unprosecuted. Poor health also goes undetected, undiagnosed,
36and untreated. Crime is seen as much more a result of human agency than
is disease-choices about engaging in activities that are criminal as well
as choices about which activities will be deemed criminal-although some
lifestyle choices, such as smoking, increase risks of disease and some con-
ditions, such as female hysteria in the 19th century, were the result of
which behaviors society deemed abnormal or worthy of treatment.3 7 Some
might say that crime is always bad and health is always good, but consider
whether using the criminal justice system as a form of social control is
universally acknowledged to be desirable, or whether extending the life of
a terminally ill patient through treatments with many unpleasant side ef-
fects is desirable.3 8
34. See John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
1239, 1241 (2012); see also Daniel P. Kessler & Anne Morrison Piehl, The Role ofDiscretion in the
Criminal Justice System, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256, 258 (1998) (examining sentencing evidence in
California to conclude that prosecutors seek to maximize prosecution).
35. See, e.g., W. David Ball, Tough on Crime (on the State's Dime): How Violent Crime Does
Not Drive California Counties' Incarceration Rates-and Why It Should, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 987,
994, 1035-49 (2012) (noting reported crime rates in California counties explain only three percent of
the variance in new felon admissions).
36. Nate Silver makes this point in his book. NATE SILVER, THE SIGNAL AND THE NOISE: WHY
So MANY PREDICTIONS FAIL-BUT SOME DON'T 217-19 (2012). Silver states that disease reports
tend to increase with news about he disease, citing one expert's opinion that the statistical signs that
swine flu was spreading rapidly "may have come from people reporting symptoms to their doctors
which they might otherwise have ignored." Id. at 219. In other words, knowledge about disease de-
pends on perceptions of disease. In the next paragraph, Silver explicitly likens the situation to crime
reporting: if the police report an increased number of burglaries in a neighborhood, is that because
they are being more vigilant and are catching crimes that they had missed before, or have [they] made
it easier to report them? Or is it because the neighborhood is becoming more dangerous? Id.
37. Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, The Hysterical Woman: Sex Roles and Role Conflict in 19th-
Century America, 39 Soc. RES. 652, 652-55 (1972).
38. To cite an example from the lives of economists (and the psychologists who influenced
them), Richard Thaler recounts that psychologist Amos Tversky decided not to seek cancer treatments
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Our understanding of disease is ultimately driven in part by what is
successful in treating it, and our ability to design successful treatments is
similarly affected by our understanding of disease. So perhaps the reason
medical analogy might seem strange is only because we are in the "four
humours" stage of our understanding.39 We treat crime in a uniform fash-
ion because we do not understand it, and we do not understand it because
we have not experimented with treating different crimes and criminals in
different ways.
II. THE VALUE CREATION MODEL
In healthcare, fee-for-service has been challenged by pay-for-perfor-
mance, a term that describes a system in which providers are paid for im-
proving health outcomes by whatever means the provider chooses.40 In
pay-for-performance, providers are no longer paid by the procedure, but
by the case, and they have freedom to treat cases according to their judg-
ment, with two limits: they are budgetarily limited from doing too much,
and they are limited by malpractice from doing too little (or doing some-
thing harmful). Pay-for-performance is designed to improve efficiency,
and one recent study found that "financial incentives significantly influ-
ence physicians' supply of health care" and that value-based payments
"hold the promise of curbing costs without jeopardizing quality." 4 1 These
incentives are designed so that doctors will only order those interventions
that are, at the margin, necessary to treat the patient. Doctors should be
less inclined to order unnecessary interventions than under fee-for-service,
which reimburses the interventions even if they are not demonstrably tied
to the outcome.
Pay-for-performance is part of a lengthy project that is still very much
in progress, a project that seeks to improve the quality of doctors and their
at the end of his life: "[R]uining his final months with pointless treatments that would make him very
sick and at best extend his life by a few weeks was not a tempting option." RICHARD H. THALER,
MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, at xiv (2015). Medicine more generally
has had to grapple with what "health" exactly means, as is seen in, e.g., the concept of quality-adjusted
life years (more life of lower-quality might be less desirable than a shorter life of higher quality).
Abraham Mehrez & Amiram Gafni, Quality-Adjusted Life Years, Utility Theory, and Healthy-Years
Equivalents, 9 MED. DECISION MAKING 142,142-43 (1989).
39. GUIDO MAJNO, THE HEALING HAND: MAN AND WOUND IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 178
(1975).
40. Health care costs are also controlled by capitation systems whereby large organizations will
be paid a certain per-person amount for a large population on the theory that the individual health
differences (and financial risks) of each member of the population will even out. See Meredith B.
Rosenthal, Beyond Pay for Performance-Emerging Models of Provider-Payment Reform, 359 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1197, 1198-99 (2008). 1 do not address this model in this article but note this only to
complete the view of recent trends in healthcare economics.
41. Jeffrey Clemens & Joshua D. Gottleib, Do Physicians'Financial Incentives Affect Medical
Treatment and Patient Health?, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 1320, 1347 (2014). Contra Marina N. Bolot-





treatments. This project has taken a long time, in part, because both the
healthcare system and disease itself are complex, and measuring quality
and outcomes is difficult. Part of the explanation is also that it is very dif-
ficult to make major changes in the healthcare system without running into
intense opposition from doctors and other players in the system-a prob-
lem that would certainly also be true of attempts to change criminal justice
along the lines proposed. Pay-for-performance has built on earlier attempts
to standardize medical treatment, measure quality of care, and audit pro-
viders and institutions,43 part of the professionalization of medicine so me-
ticulously detailed in Paul Starr's The Social Transformation ofAmerican
Medicine.44
Though quality improvements have been taking place at least since
the 1870s,45 one early example of the more recent pay-for-performance
trend was the emergence of Diagnosis-related Groups (DRGs).4 DRGs
classify patient conditions and tie them to Medicare and Medicaid reim-
bursement. If a patient needs a hip replaced, for example, his treatment is
billed according to that DRG, and the provider is paid a set amount to treat
the condition. DRGs give providers incentives in the average case to fol-
low some form of the state of the art, on which the DRG payment is based,
while simultaneously offering incentives to adopt new techniques that are
as effective but cheaper in order to save the difference between the cost of
the procedure and the amount of reimbursement.
In a series of articles47 and a book,4 8 Michael Porter (and, occasion-
ally, co-authors) refined the idea of pay-for-performance, identifying the
42. For a recent history that focuses on the beginning of the quality movement in the 1980s
using a framework that, like this article, combines economics and "what works" and ultimately em-
ploys a "value-for-money competition," see Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles of Man-
aged Competition, 12 HEALTH AFF. 24, 25-28, 38-39 (Supp. 1 1993).
43. Malpractice cases have already created some penalties for grossly substandard quality. The
focus of this article is on incentives to improve quality. The Eighth Amendment, like malpractice,
penalizes grossly substandard interventions, but it does not promote quality improvements beyond the
minimum. For the most influential early theoretical work on quality in healthcare, see Avedis Dona-
bedian, Evaluating the Quality of Medical Care, 44 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 166, 166-70
(1966).
44. STARR, supra note 23, at 37-40. Pay-for-performance has also proceeded in parallel with
certain structural changes, such as the increased uptake of vertical integration in the provision of
healthcare (via HMOs and the like), which seeks to save money by focusing on prevention, coordinat-
ing care, and internalizing inter-departmental externalities. This Article focuses only on the concept
of pay-for-performance; an analysis of greater structural integration will be left to another article.
45. Id. at 102-06 (discussing reforms to medical education and the re-imposition medical li-
censing).
46. Robert B. Fetter et al., Case Mix Definition by Diagnosis-Related Groups, 18 MED. CARE,
at i, 3 (Supp. 2 1980).
47. See, e.g., Robert S. Kaplan & Michael E. Porter, How to Solve the Cost Crisis in Health
Care, 89 HARV. Bus. REV. 46, 49-50, 58-61 (2011); Porter, supra note 15, at 109-10; Michael E.
Porter & Elizabeth Olmstead Teisberg, Redefining Competition i  Health Care, 82 HARv. Bus. REV.
64, 66, 75-76 (2004); Michael E. Porter & Thomas H. Lee, The Strategy That Will Fix Health Care,
91 HARV. Bus. REV. 50, 51-53 (2013); Michael E. Porter, What Is Value in Health Care?, 363 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2477, 2477-78 (2010) [hereinafter Porter, What Is Value].
48. MICHAEL E. PORTER & ELIZABETH OLMSTED TEISBERG, REDEFINING HEALTH CARE:
CREATING VALUE-BASED COMPETITION ON RESULTS 6-9 (2006).
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key problem in health care as a lack of value creation. He criticized some
pay-for-performance schemes as encouraging cost control without neces-
sarily maintaining or improving health. For example, a provider reim-
bursed for a DRG procedure might cut corners, not just costs. Paying on
the basis of the state-of-the-art without measuring whether the intervention
worked does not incentivize effective healthcare. Porter argues that value
is created only when patients get healthier, when costs decrease, or both.49
One cannot focus only on outcomes or cost-one must focus on both. The
healthcare system can only evaluate outcomes by following the patient's
progress from beginning to end, even if she passes from one doctor in one
department o another doctor (or several others).
The value concept rejects a simple focus on cost cutting because if
cost cutting comes at the expense of health outcomes, no value is added.51
At its most radical, pay-for-performance calls for a restructuring of the
healthcare system; at the other end of the spectrum, pay-for-performance
simply encourages existing procedures to be done more effectively and
efficiently (including, sometimes, not at all). There is still considerable
autonomy within the system for doctors to pursue different treatments.52
The incentives built in to the system-the "pay" in pay-for-performance-
mean that evidence-based i eas, ones that can demonstrate real improve-
ments in health outcomes, are favored. It also means that improvements
can be disseminated more rapidly because there is a financial disincentive
to continue ineffective or inefficient practices.
Pay-for-performance can be implemented in several ways, with a fo-
cus on particular treatments, on institutions, or on overall allocation of re-
sources to maximize social welfare (by, e.g., focusing on prevention in-
stead of treatment in the emergency room).5 3 One pay-for-performance
49. Porter is not the only one to have latched on to this idea-the Jackson Hole Initiatives, for
example, also proposed accountability on health outcomes and cost-but I prefer his formulation be-
cause it combines efficacy and efficiency in a concise phrase. See, e.g., Paul M. Ellwood, Alain C.
Enthoven & Lynn Etheredge, The Jackson Hole Initiatives for a Twenty-First Century American
Health Care System, I HEALTH ECON. 149, 149-50 (1992); see also Randall P. Ellis & Thomas G.
McGuire, Provider Behavior Under Prospective Reimbursement, 5 J. HEALTH ECON. 129, 148-49
(1986) (concluding that a mixed lump sum and fee for service system would encourage better out-
comes while controlling costs).
50. Porter, supra note 15, at 110.
51. The individual case is not always the sole focus of pay-for-performance-sometimes pay-
for-performance looks at the population level. Accountable Care Organizations, for example, are paid
bonuses if they are able to treat their patient populations at a lower cost than public medical programs
would have, presumably by promoting prevention over responsive treatment. Since this policy is more
aligned with prevention and restructuring of care rather than care improvements, I will not discuss it
in detail but for more see, for example, Alison Ritchie et al., Shifting Reimbursement Models: The
Risks and Rewards for Primary Care, MED. ECoN. (Apr. 8, 2014), http://medicaleconomics.modem-
medicine.com/medical-economics/content/tags/aca/shifting-reimbursement-models-risks-and-re-
wards-primary-care.
52. Indeed, one pair of doctors wrote to endorse the Affordable Care Act on the basis that it
might enhance physician autonomy. Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Steven D. Pearson, Physician Autonomy
andHealth Care Reform, 307 [J]AMA 367, 367-68 (2012).
53. For a general overview, see Rosenthal, supra note 40, at 1199.
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scheme that has recently been deployed by Medicare and Medicaid is hos-
pital readmission penalties for certain procedures-the heart surgery ex-
ample mentioned in the introduction.54 Hospitals get reduced payments for
excessive readmissions following heart attacks, heart failure, and pneumo-
nia.55 Excessive readmissions are defined as the risk-adjusted rate of read-
mission within thirty days relative to the national average. A hospital now
has an incentive to promote surgical aftercare, a patient-outcome-centered
approach that will lead to better results without incurring additional ex-
pensive hospital stays. These bonuses are a net gain to all parties: the pa-
tient is healthier and the cost savings can potentially be split between the
government and the provider. Another pay-for-performance scheme pays
for chronic conditions that cannot be cured, such as diabetes.5 6 The out-
comes evaluated in this instance include management of symptoms, qual-
ity of life, survival times, and cost of treatment.
Performance-based programs have to be adjusted; different types of
cases employ different incentives and metrics. The end goal in the cardiac
readmission example is a return to health; the end goal with chronic con-
ditions like diabetes is maintaining quality of life (or slowing its decline).
The former has outcomes that are easier to quantify (readmission within a
certain time), the latter outcomes are much harder to quantify (quality of
life per unit of cost). This points out an operational problem with pay-for-
performance. The goal of measuring and rewarding value for money can
be the same, but the means of getting there are often different.
While this vagueness is undoubtedly a weakness when viewed from
one perspective, it also, like many legal terms (e.g., "reasonable"), has the
advantage of being flexible enough to encompass a variety of situations.
Different definitions of health will have to be hashed out for different sets
of cases. Asking what outcome to measure in a given case assuredly in-
volves decisions about the particular measurement, but, crucially, it does
not question the centrality of measuring and evaluating itself. The act of
54. See supra Introduction. Hospital readmissions are a focus because they are both "prevalent
and costly" among Medicare patients. Stephen F. Jencks, Mark V. Williams & Eric A. Coleman, Re-
hospitalizations Among Patients in the Medicare Fee-for-Service Program, 360 NEY ENG. J. MED.
1418, 1418 (2009).
55. Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), CMS.GOv, https://www.cms.gov/medi-
care/medicare-fee-for-service-payment/acuteinpatientpps/readmissions-reduction-program.html (last
modified Apr. 18, 2016, 5:08 PM).
56. Porter & Lee, supra note 47, at 55 (discussing "patients with complex chronic conditions
such as diabetes, or disabled elderly patients"). Note that there are often issues with comorbidity in
chronic conditions: patients often have more than one disease, and the treatment for someone suffering
from more than one condition is not always a matter of combining the individual treatments. The
regime can change entirely. For a study that evaluates long-term care for comorbid chronic conditions,
see Wayne J. Katon et al., Collaborative Care for Patients with Depression and Chronic Illnesses,
363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2611, 2611-12 (2010).
57. The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute was established to fund studies on ef-
fective treatments and then to disseminate information and training based on those studies. PATIENT-
CENTERED OUTCOMES RESEARCH INST., 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2015),
http://www.pcori.org/sites/default/files/PCORI-Annual-Report-2015.pdf.
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negotiating what outcomes to measure and how to measure them cannot
be made once and set permanently for all cases because each case presents
different challenges.58 Having the goal of improving outcomes per unit of
cost spent provides a criterion for improvement, some kind of yardstick,
even if the units of measurement on that yardstick (mortality, health, time
to recover, pain) might be different. Even if it were possible to set uniform
outcomes from on high for all cases, it would not be desirable because
those governed by pay-for-performance need to buy into the quality meas-
urements selected or they will not effectively implement them.
Finally, an outcome orientation also needs to consider who the target
audience for a given incentive is.59 Is it hospitals, as they make their deci-
sions about capital purchases or staffing of departments? Doctors, as they
prescribe treatment? Insurers, as they decide what to cover and how much
to pay for it? Individuals, as they choose treatments? Pay-for-performance
is flexible enough to appeal to all of them. Hospitals can free up resources
by treating conditions in ways that are cheaper but as effective. Insurance
companies can improve fiscal health through lower-cost treatments and
lower demand as health improves. Individuals benefit by suffering less.
Doctors benefit through greater autonomy.
Any attempt to move towards a pay-for-performance system has cer-
tain prerequisites built into it.60 First, providers need to know information
about cost structure, which involves learning about staff costs, staff time
per intervention, drug costs, and time spent waiting for open rooms or open
slots in a schedule. Providers need to dig deep into their procedures and
understand where potential efficiencies can be exploited. Second, reim-
bursement must be based on a standardized measure of health outcomes.
Some of this is definitional on the part of the initial diagnoses-which hip
replacements are garden variety and which present other factors that will
make them either easier or more difficult to treat. Some of this also de-
pends on the ways in which health outcomes are defined-time to recov-
ery, pain and suffering, or mortality. Third, outcomes need to be stored in
an apples-to-apples data format for easy comparison across institutions
and patient populations in order to measure the value created by a partic-
ular intervention or institution. Fourth, the healthcare system needs to
move beyond the viewpoint of the provider (whether an institution or a
department within that institution) and take a more holistic approach to the
health of an individual. What combination of action will improve the pa-
tient's health the most? This means avoiding cost-shifting from one de-
partment or organization to another and focusing, instead, on the total cost
of treatment. Such a focus might reveal that outpatient procedures are just
58. Factors include the costs of measuring a particular outcome, the feasibility of measuring
that outcome, and issues concerning precision and inter-rater reliability.
59. Laura A. Petersen et al., Does Pay-for-Performance Improve the Quality of Health Care?,
145 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 265, 265 (2006).
60. See Kaplan & Porter, supra note 47, at 52-58.
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as effective as inpatient procedures, or that phone calls rather than nurse
visits are effective forms of aftercare. More-and more intrusive-is not
always better, even in terms of efficacy.61 An efficiency focus pushes in-
stitutions to act on what they learn about efficacy, whereas fee-for-service
pays institutions to ignore what they learn-if they bother to learn any-
thing.62
There are many criticisms of pay-for-performance, focusing primar-
ily on the difficulties of defining and measuring outcomes. Because these
criticisms also apply in a criminal justice context, and because criminal
63justice is the focus of this Article, I will address them in Part IV.A.
III. CURRENT APPROACHES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE ECONOMICS
The general shortcomings of the medical fee-for-service model help
explain similar problems in the criminal justice context. A pay-for-perfor-
mance approach might provide similar potential solutions. Comparing
criminal justice and healthcare economics comports with a long line of
viewing prisons themselves through the lens of medicine. Nineteenth cen-
tury prison reformers were on board with the centralization of prisons un-
der state control because they thought it would make them more profes-
sional and rehabilitative.64 Wardens expressly invoked medical metaphors
to advocate on behalf of indeterminate sentences, saying that they alone
knew when an offender was cured. Health care also happens to be the cen-
terpiece of the most significant prison case in a generation, Brown v.
Plata,'6 though Plata is about minimum standards-avoiding carceral
malpractice-rather than incentivizing quality and efficiency improve-
66ments above the minimum. This Article proposes a measured return to
the medical model, albeit one that corrects for certain shortcomings ad-
61. More can also be worse in medicine. Atul Gawande, Foreword: Positive Deviance and
Health Care to RICHARD T. PASCALE ET AL., THE POWER OF POSITIVE DEVIANCE, at ix, xi (2010)
("[S]tudies find that ... where doctors order more frequent tests and procedures, more specialist visits,
and more hospital admissions than the average-the patients do no better, whether measured in terms
of survival, ability to function, or satisfaction with care. If anything, they seem to do worse.").
62. Some changes might imply new types of organizations to better treat certain segments of
the patient population. Porter envisages the creation of integrated practice units (IPUs) for the treat-
ment of certain standard or chronic conditions. Porter & Lee, supra note 47, at 53 (describing IPUs as
organized not by department and service, but "around the patient's medical condition"). By specializ-
ing in, say, diabetes, an IPU can develop expertise that should allow it to treat diabetic patients more
efficiently and effectively than a jack-of-all-trades, master-of-none medical practice could.
63. 1 should also note that Porter's analysis assumes that there is a market for medical providers.
Porter & Teisberg, supra note 47, at 65. Even though hospitals are a mix of for-profit and nonprofit
institutions, they all compete for patients and for insurance dollars. Porter's framework assumes that
more money can be directed to good performers and that positive and negative incentives can be di-
rected at poor performers. Without a shift in funding and resources, the incentives available to promote
value-creation are limited. The same is true for corrections: dollars have to flow to promote value-
creation.
64. For a general background and extensive references to more detailed historical treatments,
see Ball, Why State Prisons?, supra note 25, at 90-92.
65. 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
66. Id. at 500.
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dressed infra in Part V. The historical emphasis on treatment is reintro-
duced with better (but not perfect) social science and much better ability
to crunch the data.
To start, health care and criminal justice are two of the fastest-grow-
67
ing areas of state budget expenditures. There is very little downward cost
pressure in either. Prison, in particular, is free to local decision makers,
except in unified corrections systems.6 9 This means that prison, the most
expensive-and maximally intrusive-treatment is likely to be used even
when it is unnecessary or when less intrusive and expensive alternatives
exist. No prosecutor or judge ever needs to measure the efficacy or effi-
ciency of a prison sentence; providers in the criminal justice system are
not accountable in terms of creating value.70 Various parts of the system
can get blamed for cost overruns or for particular outcomes, but the struc-
ture and operation of the system as a whole are seldom blamed. On the
contrary, the decentralized nature of criminal justice practically encour-
ages the shifting of cost and blame. The prisons blame parole, parole
blames the prisons, the county blames the state, and the state blames the
county.
Even where there is some discussion of total costs of interventions,
these costs do not drive policies. In Missouri, for example, judges are pre-
sented with the costs of various sentencing options, but not their efficacy
or efficiency-the exact kind of misplaced incentives that Porter's value
formulation seeks to avoid.7 1 A judge knows that jail is X dollars and
prison is Ydollars, but she does not know which works better-indeed, the
very question would probably seem strange. Best practices across jurisdic-
tions and departments are diffused slowly, if at all. There are no financial
incentives to improve outcomes; at best, there are incentives to cut costs
without improving outcomes. Even if good policies are deployed, there are
no financial incentives to train people to deploy those policies with fidelity
to their design, to follow up about quality control and, generally, to ensure
67. Solomon Moore, Study Shows High Cost of Criminal Corrections, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,
2009, at Al3.
68. However, for an analysis of the economic downturn on criminal justice systems, see HADAR
AVIRAM, CHEAP ON CRIME: RECESSION-ERA POLITICS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
PUNISHMENT 14-15 (2015). Professor Aviram also points out that this focus on costs could result in
substandard care, what she calls "tough 'n' cheap," a valid complaint about the present system that a
value focus would address. Id at 164.
69. The following paragraph largely replicates the analysis found in W. David Ball, Defunding
State Prisons, 50 CRIM. L. BULL. 1060, 1061-63, 1075-78 (2014).
70. Two proposals in this regard serve as apt examples. See Adam M. Gershowitz, An Informa-
tional Approach to the Mass Imprisonment Problem, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 47, 50 (2008) (proposing pros-
ecutors be regularly informed of the status of prison capacities); Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democ-
racy in Prosecution, 86 WASH. L. REV. 69, 72-73 (2011) (proposing that the costs of prosecution be
made public but using prosecutorial elections as the mechanism for internalizing the externality). But
DAs might not care at all about these costs unless they have to pay for them, either via their budgets
or at the ballot box.
71. Flanders, supra note 29, at 391.
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that the policies are implemented well. Better policies are costs whose ex-
ternal benefits mostly make the jobs of those in other agencies easier. A
prisoner reformed by prison means more work for prison employees but
less work for police. A police officer who successfully defuses a situation
without arresting anyone might make more work for herself even as she
makes less work for the rest of the system.
Even the outcomes that are discussed, such as political claims about
deterrence and the effectiveness of particular sentences, are never put to
the test. The general rule is no data collection, no follow up, no outcome
tracking, and no feedback loops to decision makers such as judges and
DAs.72 This means there is little opportunity to learn, little opportunity to
improve, and little accountability. All sentencing is treated as down-
stream-someone lse's problem. In fact, many law schools, which train
the judges and prosecutors who drive sentencing and charging, teach little
about prisons, even as first-year criminal law classes routinely address the
purpose of punishment.7 3
There is a spate of recent research analyzing the costs and benefits of
various approaches to crime. Darryl Brown outlined the approach in 2004,
discussing cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in detail (using, inter alia, envi-
ronmental law as a comparison) and concluding, in part, that "[o]ffender
treatment . . . has fared well in cost-benefit analyses."74 Brown's analysis
is extensive, analyzing the wide-ranging effects of criminal justice policies
and discussing how prevention is effective and efficient, but his policy
prescriptions focus primarily on how CBA could be incorporated into the
executive branch (prosecution and police). Though he discusses the de-
centralized nature of criminal justice, he does not discuss the implications
of the prison subsidy, nor does he advocate pay-for-performance. A recent
issue of Criminology and Public Policy focused on the use of CBA in
criminal justice, with articles by Patricio Dominguez and Steven Raphael
72. For an overview of the problem that focuses on California, see W. David Ball, E Pluribus
Unum: Data and Operations Integration in the California Criminal Justice System, 21 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 277, 277-78, 280 (2010).
73. Sharon Dolovich, Teaching Prison Law, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 218, 218 (2012) ("It is during
the administration of punishment hat the state's criminal justice power is at its zenith, and at this point
that the laws constraining the exercise of that power become most crucial. Yet it is precisely at this
point that the curriculum in most law schools falls silent.").
74. Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CALIF. L. REv. 323, 351
(2004).
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(providing a comprehensive summary of the issue),7 5 Michael Tonry,76 and
Brandon C. Welsh and David P. Farrington,77 among others.
Criminal justice CBA approaches are not just theoretical; they have
gained traction in the policy realm as well.78 The Washington State Insti-
tute for Public Policy (WSIPP) has long been considered a model program,
analyzing proposed policies in terms of their effectiveness and effi-
ciency.79 WSIPP is now actively distributing its model via a partnership
with the Pew-MacArthur Results First Initiative8 0 and has posted an ex-
haustive technical documentation that breaks down exactly how it models
costs and benefits.8 ' The Vera Institute and the Bureau of Justice Assis-
tance have also partnered to promote CBA in criminal justice and have
produced a series of extremely informative, practitioner-centered publica-
tions.82 The Justice Reinvestment Initiative of the Bureau of Justice Assis-
tance is also working to promote data-driven policies that improve public
75. Patricio Dominguez & Steven Raphael, The Role of the Cost-of-Crime Literature in Bridg-
ing the Gap Between Social Science Research and Policy Making: Potentials and Limitations, 14
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 589, 589 (2015). The authors are particularly concerned about the way
in which the income levels of rich victims might skew the costs of crime and promote unequitable
distributional effects of resources like police, as well as the methodological problems with estimating
the costs of crime by either the contingent valuation or the willingness to pay methods. Id. at 599-600.
76. Michael Tonry, The Fog Around Cost-of-Crime Studies May Finally Be Clearing: Prison-
ers and Their Kids Suffer Too, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 653, 660-62 (2015) (emphasizing
problems with the cost of crime literature, pointing out that the costs of punishment-in terms of
hedonic losses to prisoners and collateral effects on their families-are not included in some of the
most influential cost of crime estimates).
77. Brandon C. Welsh & David P. Farrington, Monetary Value of Early Developmental Crime
Prevention and Its Policy Significance, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 673, 675-76 (2015) (suggest-
ing that if costs of offending are high, many social welfare programs will be justified).
78. For an excellent overview, see CAMERON MCINTOSH & JOBINA Li, AN INTRODUCTION TO
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN CRIME PREVENTION: THE WHY, HOW AND SO WHAT 3-11 (2012),
https://www.publicsafety.gc.calcnt/rsrcs/pbletns/cnmc-nlss/cnmc-nss-eng.pdf. See also PEW-
MACARTHUR RESULTS FIRST INITIATIVE, STATES' USE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: IMPROVING
RESULTS FOR TAXPAYERS 9-12 (2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/legacy/uploaded-
files/pcs assets/2013/pewresultsfirst50statereportpdf.pdf.
79. See, e.g., STEVE Aos, MARNA MILLER & ELIZABETH DRAKE, WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB.
POLICY, EVIDENCE-BASED PUBLIC POLICY OPTIONS To REDUCE FUTURE PRISON CONSTRUCTION,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE COSTS, AND CRIME RATES 2, 8-16 (2006), http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/Report-
File/952/WsippEvidence-Based-Public-Policy-Options-to-Reduce-Future-Prison-Construction-
Criminal-Justice-Costs-and-Crime-RatesFull-Report.pdf.
80. For a report on the New York State experience, see MARC SCHABSES, DIV. OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SERVS., N.Y. STATE, COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEPLOYMENT AND
INITIAL APPLICATION OF THE RESULTS FIRSTCOST BENEFIT MODEL 1 (2013), http://www.criminaljus-
tice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/resultsfirst/rf-technical report cbal_oct2013.pdf.
81. WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, BENEFIT-COST TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION 6-175
(2016), http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/TechnicalDocumentation/WsippBenefitCostTechnicalDocumenta-
tion.pdf.
82. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & JOSHUA RINALDI, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND JUSTICE POLICY TOOLKIT 4 (2014), http://cbkb.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2014/12/cba-justice-policy-toolkit.pdf; CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE,
USING COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR JUSTICE POLICYMAKING 1 (2014), http://cbkb.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2014/04/Using-Cost-Benefit-Analysis-for-Justice-Policymaking.pdf; CARL MATTHIES,
VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, ADVANCING THE QUALITY OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR JUSTICE
PROGRAMS 1 (2014), http://archive.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/advancing-the-
quality-of-cba.pdf; CARL MATTHIES & TINA CHIU, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, PUTTING A VALUE ON
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safety in a cost-effective manner, taking a holistic approach that includes
all parts of the criminal justice system (redistributing from less cost-effec-
tive programs, like prison, towards more cost-effective programs dealing
with prevention) . The Obama Administration rolled out the Police Data
Initiative in 2015,84 the Data-Driven Justice Initiative in 2016,85 and re-
cently published Economic Perspectives on Incarceration and the Crimi-
nal Justice System, summarizing a host of cost-benefit research.86 There
have also been attempts for private entities to fund criminal justice im-
provements using "social impact bonds," with payment contingent on suc-
cessful outcomes.
There is certainly much to admire in the CBA literature and policy.
What is missing, however, is a systematic discussion that goes beyond the
desirability vel non of individual policies. The literature needs a more ho-
listic critique of why diffusion of sensible policies is not more widespread,
a critique that includes the ways in which the incentive structure of crimi-
nal justice-both institutional and budgetary-might contribute to the
problem. Prisons themselves are also inadequately considered as potential
sources of improved public safety.88 The thrust of this Article is not, then,
to replace CBA, but to provide a framework in which prisons and the in-
dividuals who sentence (and charge) offenders have incentives to insist on
best practices at the ground level. CBA will do very little if prison is free
to local decision makers and they have no incentive to pursue the social
good. Ultimately, good policies can only go so far on their merits. How
can the system be structured to encourage wider rollout and diffusion?
The economic literature ngages with the incentives faced within the
system by providers of criminal justice. These articles are a recent discov-
ery on my part and many advance the argument that misalignment is bound
CRIME ANALYSTS: CONSIDERATIONS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT EXECUTIVES 4 (2014),
https://www.bja.gov/Publications/Vera-CrimeAnalysts.pdf.
83. Justice Reinvestment Initiative, OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS, https://www.bja.gov/programs/jus-
ticereinvestment/what isjri.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
84. Megan Smith & Roy L. Austin, Jr., Launching the Police Data Initiative, WHITE HOUSE:
BLOG (May 18, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/05/18/launching-police-
data-initiative.
85. Christopher 1. Haugh, The White House Has a New Data-Driven Criminal-Justice Project,
ATLANTIC (June 30, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/white-house-data-
criminal-justice/489614.
86. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON
INCARCERATION AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.ar-
chives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/CEA%2BCriminal%2BJustice%2BReport.pdf
87. Chris Fox & Kevin Albertson, Payment by Results and Social Impact Bonds in the Criminal
Justice Sector: New Challenges for the Concept ofEvidence-Based Policy, 11 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM.
JUST. 395, 395-400 (2011) (noting advantages of payment by results and difficulties in determining
outcomes).
88. Though Brown discusses the larger framework of criminal justice including issues of diffu-
sion, alternative sentencing, and tailoring programs to needs in community prosecution, his otherwise
outstanding article gives only one paragraph to prison treatment itself. See Brown, supra note 74, at
351. He does discuss alternatives to incarceration later in some detail. Id. at 367-71.
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to happen when the state subsidizes prison while local governments con-
trol who goes there-an argument that predates the same analysis from
Zimring and Hawkins (the "correctional free lunch") I explored in earlier
articles.89 So, while Zimring and Hawkins coined the "correctional free
lunch" phrase, the idea predates them, and these prior formulations de-
serve to be more widely acknowledged in the legal academy. What follows
is my attempt to correct my own errors in this regard. (Many of the argu-
ments discussed below are summarized in Kenneth Avio's excellent 1998
survey of the economic literature, The Economics ofPrisons.)90
In 1983, Robert Gillespie of the University of Illinois observed the
disjuncture between state payment for prison and local control over who
is sent there, proposing, as his solution to the inevitable overcrowding that
results, that the state instead allocate prison bed spaces to counties who
can then sell them to or buy them from other counties as needed.91 Fred
Giertz and Peter Nardulli made similar observations in 1985, describing
the "basic misalignment" between local governments who benefit from
prison and the fact that "these services are provided by state government
at virtually a zero cost to localities."9 2 Giertz and Nardulli suggested a
complete decentralization of the system, where incarceration is provided
by local government and funding is replaced with block grants.93 Nardulli
had earlier developed this idea in 1984 in an article which analyzed county
usage of prisons in Illinois, again starting with the premise that "local pol-
iticians have funded law and order campaigns at state expense."94 Alfred
Blumstein and Richard Larson in 1969 analyzed the disjointed nature of
the criminal justice system, remarking that the independence of agencies
inhibited the effective deployment of interdependent policies, and that
criminal justice organizations failed to get feedback about the downstream
effects of those policies on other agencies.95
89. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 140 (1991).
For my own elaboration on the subject, see Ball, A False Idea, supra note 25, at 27; Ball, supra note
69, at 1061-62; Ball, supra note 35, at 988; Ball, Why State Prisons?, supra note 25, at 77-82.
90. Kenneth L. Avio, The Economics ofPrisons, 6 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 143, 143-44 (1998).
91. Robert W. Gillespie, Allocating Resources to Prison Space: An Economic Approach Incor-
porating Efficiency and Equity 1-6 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Commerce & Bus. Admin., Working Paper
No. 977, 1983).
92. J. Fred Giertz & Peter F. Nardulli, Prison Overcrowding, 46 PUB. CHOICE 71, 71 (1985).
93. Id. at 75-77. For my own treatment, which unintentionally duplicates theirs, see Ball, supra
note 69, at 1072-75. For a similar idea, see Chris Fox & Kevin Albertson, Could Economics Solve the
Prison Crisis?, 57 PROB. J. 263, 276-77 (2010).
94. Peter F. Nardulli, The Misalignment of Penal Responsibilities and State Prison Crises:
Costs, Consequences, and Corrective Actions, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 365, 368 (1984).
95. Alfred Blumstein & Richard Larson, Models of a Total Criminal Justice System, 17
OPERATIONS RES. 199, 199-200 (1969).
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In 1993, Charles Logan wrote an article entitled Criminal Justice
Performance Measures for Prisons, but he focused on processes, not out-
comes, and did so from a retributive perspective.96 He paid little attention
to the decentralization and organizational incentives problems, whereby,
say, poor rehabilitation by prisons might result in increased workloads for
police. Logan's approach is also typical of the other works cited here, in-
cluding my own, in that it assumes that there are no differences-or no
differences that can be measured-among particular institutions' custodial
rehabilitation programs.9 7 The main gains are from early prevention and
diversion. This Article, however, assumes that there are better and worse
prisons and programs and thus, that prisons should be differentiated.
Much of the rest of the economics literature's focus is on "factors that
affect the supply of criminal activities"-that is, what incentives and pol-
icies tend to make people more or less likely to engage in criminal activity
in the first place.9 8 This is also true of the most influential analyses in law
and economics. To cite perhaps the most influential example, Richard Pos-
ner's treatment of the law and economics of criminal law is all about the
supply of crime and the ways in which criminals might respond to the rel-
ative costs of gainful and illicit employment, based on the risks and re-
wards of each.99 In so doing, Posner built upon Gary Becker's seminal
1968 article, Crime and Punishment: an Economic Approach, which itself
is also primarily about the economics of criminal activity. 00 Both Becker
and Posner treat the system as a passive respondent o homo economicus,
rather than something that, through treatment, could actively alter criminal
tendencies one way or another. Incapacitation is taken as the primary
means by which crime can be controlled, subject to the supply elasticity
of other criminals (i.e., the extent to which new criminals enter the market
to replace those sent to prison).10' In general, this approach is an example
of what Thomas Bernard and Robin Engel have criticized as an overly
96. Charles H. Logan, Criminal Justice Performance Measures for Prisons, in PERFORMANCE
MEASURES FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 19, 19-21 (1993) (focusing "more on the satisfaction
of certain standards, values, and constraints than on the production of particular consequences").
97. My analysis has previously focused on prisons versus local dispositions like jails and pro-
bation. See, e.g., Ball, Why State Prisons?, supra note 25, at 76. 1 argued that unless prisons were
demonstrably superior, they should not be subsidized. Id. at 87-88. 1 did not distinguish among pris-
ons, however, and for the purposes of the analysis presented, was agnostic about their capacity to
rehabilitate. Id. at 88.
98. Richard B. Freeman, The Economics of Crime, in 3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS
3529, 3541 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999); see, e.g., Samuel Cameron, The Economics
of Crime Deterrence: A Survey of Theory and Evidence, 41 KYKLOS 301, 301 (1988).
99. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193,
1205-15 (1985).
100. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169,
169 (1968). Frank Easterbrook also uses the prevention/deterrence model in his argument that criminal
procedures are merely price mechanisms in a plea-bargaining market. Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal
Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 289-90 (1983).
101. For a law and economics analysis of how crime moves from jurisdiction to jurisdiction due
to enforcement and policy differences, see Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Feder-
alism, Crime Control, and Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831, 1849-50 (2005).
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narrow theoretical approach to the criminal justice system: too much anal-
ysis is bounded by organizational silos, and too little takes on a broader,
system-wide, cross-agency perspective.02
I propose that reformers should combine cost-benefit analysis that
identifies promising programs with organizational incentives to adopt
them, all within the framework of value creation: improving public safety
outcomes per dollar spent.
IV. CREATING VALUE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
What are the ways in which we might restructure the criminal justice
system-or particular parts of the system-in order to create value? In
Section A, I discuss some practical and theoretical groundwork that must
first be laid. As stated in the introduction, this Article is not model legis-
lation ready to be implemented-it is a map into relatively uncharted ter-
ritory with only the core defining features sketched out. In Section B, I
focus on particular applications in sentencing that could fit into a perfor-
mance-based system. In Section C, I outline the advantages of such a sys-
tem.
A. Measurement Issues, Theoretical and Practical
If the health experience is any indication, the initial move to begin to
categorize similar cases (the criminal equivalent of DRGs) and improve
quality will be a long, iterative process that involves some theoretical work
and a lot of on-the-ground work. In fact, criminal justice might not even
be ready for outcome-based measurements-health care first went through
a series of procedural fixes (qualifications, training, accreditation, profes-
sionalization) from the mid-1850s to the present that parts of the criminal
justice system might still need.103 Measurements in medicine are proposed,
tested, adopted, refined, and sometimes replaced. The question is not
whether a given measurement works in theory, but in practice. Porter, for
example, has been criticized for glossing over the logistical problems of
defining and measuring health outcomes in the real world,104 but Medicare
102. Thomas J. Bernard & Robin Shepard Engel, Conceptualizing Criminal Justice Theory, 18
JUST. Q. 1, 2-3 (2001).
103. STARR, supra note 23, at 22 ("Standardization of training and licensing became the means
for realizing both the search for authority and control of the market."). Michele Deitch and Michael
Mushlin have long argued for some form of correctional oversight to promote and enforce best prac-
tices. See, e.g., Michele Deitch & Michael B. Mushlin, Op-ed, What's Going on in Our Prisons?, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 4, 2016, at A19.
104. See, e.g., Uwe E. Reinhardt, Health Reform: Porter and Teisberg's Utopian Vision,
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 10, 2006), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2006/10/10/health-reform-porter-
and-teisbergs-utopian-vision. There are other criticisms as well. Doctors do not see themselves as con-
tributing to cost overruns. See Alvin Tran, Study: Doctors Look to Others to Play Biggest Role in
Curbing Health Costs, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 23, 2013), http://khn.org/news/study-doctors-
look-to-others-to-play-biggest-role-in-curbing-health-costs. Some doctors see data collection as inter-
fering with medical treatment. Robert M. Wachter, Op-ed, How Measurement Fails Us, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 2016, at SR5. The current data do not support the efficiency of pay-for-performance. Martin
Emmert et al., Economic Evaluation of Pay-for-Performance in Health Care: A Systematic Review,
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and commercial insurers recently did exactly that, agreeing to common
health outcome measurements.05
The problems in health care have analogues in criminal justice, and I
will only identify them here, not solve them. In criminal justice, the notion
of quality may seem difficult to begin to get our heads around, even as
there is growing support for data collection and evidence-based practices.
Stakeholders will need to gather and figure out what quality treatment
means and how we will measure it.106 These definitions cannot be gener-
ated by academic fiat. A careful study of the history of health quality meas-
urements should provide some insights into the political and organiza-
tional dynamics that underlay the gradual shift in health from fee-for-ser-
vice to pay-for-performance. Space and time do not permit me to construct
a detailed history of these changes, but it should certainly be among the
top priorities of a criminal justice performance-based research agenda.
What follows are some problem areas to be addressed. Perhaps they
cannot be resolved at all. But the same has also been said of medicine, and
even if existing measures of health are subject to revision, they are widely
accepted enough to be driving policy (and preferable to a fee-for-service
alternative). They all revolve around a central question: which outcomes?
One initial observation is that outcomes should be measured across
the system, not in terms of the individual, media-generating case. There
will be failure in the system; that does not mean the system has failed.
People die of cancer at the best cancer hospitals; so too might we expect
some degree of criminal justice failure. This means shifting the focus to
success rates, not individual cases; to how the system is doing overall and
at what cost. The examination of sensational individual cases too often
results in "never again, no matter what the cost" policies.0 7
The second observation is that different conditions and treatments
will need to be measured with different metrics. The healthcare economics
literature, for example, does not have an exclusive focus on a single meas-
ure of health but, instead, looks to multiple measures. Porter, for example,
divides health outcomes into three general categories: mortality, recovery,
13 EUR. J. HEALTH ECON. 755, 756 (2012). For an overview of some of the key questions that need to
be answered in order to actualize a pay-for-performance system, see Petersen et al., supra note 59, at
265.
105. Bruce Japsen, Medicare, Commercial Insurers Agree on Uniform Health Quality Measures,
FORBES (Feb. 16, 2016, 11:10 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2016/02/16/white-
house-says-medicare-commercial-insurers-agree-on-health-quality-measures.
106. Again, if healthcare reform is any indication, the attempt to start to measure and hold ac-
countable certain members of the criminal justice system will be met with resistance from DAs, judges,
and others at the power centers of today's criminal justice system. See supra notes 23-24 and accom-
panying text.
107. Matt Taibbi, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: The Shame of Three Strikes Laws, ROLLING
STONE (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/cruel-and-unusual-punishment-
the-shame-of-three-strikes-laws-20130327 (discussing the history of the sensational cases that led to
the passage of Three Strikes in California and reporting the results of polls that showed "[p]eople will
pay for justice, no matter how much it costs").
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and health.108 These might be mapped onto recidivism, modality of treat-
ment, and desistance from crime.
Mortality is the most obvious measure in health; in criminal justice,
that measure is recidivism. A pessimist might rightly conclude that there
is no consensus on what constitutes recidivism.1 09 An optimist might look
at the same set of facts and conclude that a variety of measures could be
used. For example, metrics like arrest for any offense, re-arrest for the
same crime, and return to prison could all be used to measure recidivism.
Again, the minimum requirement is that measurements are agreed to and
that they lend themselves to apples-to-apples comparisons across jurisdic-
tions. It is an open question as to which definition is preferable. Is it total
desistance from crime? A reduction in the number of offenses? A reduc-
tion in offenses by each person or an average reduction across populations
of similar offenders? A reduction in the severity of the types of crime
(moving from violent offenses to property offenses)? Reductions which
control for certain variables (aging out)? These choices might depend on
the type of offender or on which garners the most support from practition-
ers.
The next thing to consider is the modality of treatment through the
lens of efficacy and efficiency. Bentham's utilitarianism, for example, ex-
plicitly takes the prisoner's cost (hedonic and otherwise) of punishment
into account, meaning that, ceteris paribus, the least restrictive alternative
that yields the same result is the most welfare-promoting.' 1o This suggests
that, at least in some cases, the harms caused by the criminal justice system
outweigh any benefits. Net widening, in other words, is both resource in-
tensive and ineffective, and pay-for-performance should help restrain it.
For cases which require some response, pay-for-performance would help
limit the size and scope of the intervention. Prison, for example, is expen-
sive and imposes a variety of collateral harms on a prisoner's family (both
emotional harms on families and children, as well as economic harms due
to a variety of wealth-extracting contracts for telephones, commissary
108. Porter, What Is Value, supra note 47, at 2479-80; see also id. app. I at 1-12 (going into
much greater detail about the value concept); id app. 2 at 1-14 (discussing issues with outcome meas-
urement and how to categorize outcomes into a hierarchy).
109. Robert Weisberg, Meanings and Measures ofRecidivism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 799-800
(2014).
110. Michael Tonry observes that, in Bentham's view, "everyone's happiness-including that of
offenders-counts." Tonry, supra note 76, at 661; see also JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 166 (Leslie B. Adams, Jr. 1986) (1789) ("But all pun-
ishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is evil. Upon the principle of utility, if it ought at all to be
admitted, it ought only to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil.").
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money, etc.)."' Prison might also be criminogenic.112 If So, it is both inef-
ficient and ineffective. But even assuming prison "works," its efficacy
might not be enough to outweigh its inefficiency: we might be able to do
as well with less. These are empirical questions already being studied. My
argument is simply that these questions are important and should be an-
swered; I am not claiming to have the answers myself.
Porter also considers patient experience during the "process of recov-
ery": a successful treatment that is shorter and less painful is more desira-
ble than one that is longer and more painful.' 13 The same should be said of
punishment. We should seek to do the least amount necessary to get re-
sults, and we should explicitly consider suffering. Suffering should be
tested like any other factor; it should be a goal only insofar as it works. If
people can stop being criminals as effectively without suffering, then, un-
less suffering is desirable for its own sake, there is no point to it.114
Finally, where Porter suggests health as the ultimate measure, I would
substitute "desistance from crime" and other pro-social metrics. This
might look different for certain subpopulations. Metrics for homeless of-
fenders might mean hospital days avoided or days without them being as-
saulted. Metrics for the mentally ill might involve medication uptake or
stability of housing. Metrics for drug-using offenders might vary by drug
(heroin users might have one set of metrics, meth users might have an-
other, recidivist drunk-driving offenders might have still others). Again,
the value-creation framework states that any criminal justice interven-
tion-including none-should make people better (or the same) for the
same amount of resources (or less). For the above populations, alternatives
to criminal justice involvement must be considered. There is much evi-
dence to suggest that criminalizing the incidents of homelessness, mental
illness, and drug abuse is not nearly as effective or efficient as the non-
criminal alternatives. A complete analysis, in other words, must consider
whether criminal justice is called for at all. We would not hospitalize
111. For emotional harms, see Joseph Murray, The Effects of Imprisonment on Families and
Children of Prisoners, in THE EFFECTS OF IMPRISONMENT 442, 442-444 (Alison Liebling & Shadd
Maruna eds., 2005). For economic harms, see Daniel Wagner, Prison Bankers Cash in on Captive
Customers, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Sept. 30, 2014, 5:00 AM), https://www.publicinteg-
rity.org/2014/09/30/15761/prison-bankers-cash-captive-customers ("Taken together, the costs im-
posed by [prison banking vendors], phone companies, prison store operators and corrections agencies
make it far more difficult for poor families to escape poverty so long as they have a loved one in the
system.").
112. Cullen, Jonson & Nagin, supra note 30, at 51S (arguing that, for some offenders, prison
might have a criminogenic effect.).
113. Porter, What Is Value, supra note 47, app. 2 at 4.
114. In making this suggestion I take no position on the recent scholarship that explores the
effects of hedonic adaptation on the typical prison experience. See, e.g., John Bronsteen, Christopher
Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Retribution and the Experience ofPunishment, 98 CALIF. L. REV.
1463, 1463-64 (2010). My criticism is not with the way suffering is measured, just with the assump-
tion that suffering itself advances other penological goals such as deterrence, conveying a message of
disapproval, etc. Hedonic adaptation has some empirical basis; the idea that the rational-expectations
hypothesis applies to the justice-involved and that the suffering of prison is part of each prisoner's net
present value calculation has much less.
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someone who arrived at the Emergency Room with a hangnail. We would
tell them to go home. For at least some cases in criminal justice, the same
principle applies.
In addition to goal-based considerations about what outcomes to
measure, there are also program and policy implications. Outcomes should
control for exogenous factors. A macroeconomic downturn resulting in
higher overall unemployment will affect ex-offender unemployment, as
might sector-specific unemployment (such as that for unskilled labor).
Outcomes must also consider the full spectrum of treatment-not just in-
terventions given in prison, but interventions in community supervision-
subject to the principle of parsimony. These variables should be scalar and
avoid the presumption of perfection-measuring better or worse, not suc-
cess or failure. Binary measures will, by and large, measure failure: justice-
involved individuals have below-average educational and economic en-
dowments.1 15 We might therefore consider time in the community before
returns to custody as the measurement, not complete desistance from crime
(assuming that a return to custody is a true measure of criminal activity,
not simply an artifact of detection-which is also a confounding variable
in medicine).'16 In other words, merely lumping in all returns to custody
as failures of equal degree fails to account for the differences between
those who stay out of trouble one day and those who stay out of trouble
much longer.
It is unlikely that there will be a single metric for every case, but it is
nevertheless important to remind ourselves that public safety should be the
organizing principle. Our theories of punishment involve incapacitation,
deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation, but these justifications need to
be tied to their effects on public safety and measured using common defi-
nitions in common data formats. Proponents of particular theories should
have falsifiable tests to determine why and how their theories (and the
mechanisms that apply to them) work, then measure and test those hypoth-
eses. Within the concept of value creation, we will avoid both cost cutting
for its own sake as well as stated claims about efficacy that do not consider
efficiency.
Is "public safety value creation" too vague to be useful? Consider that
the focus on improving health outcomes is now embedded within the
healthcare policy community. There is substantial agreement that costs
and quality must be considered, and the discussion explicitly references
these goals, even as particular measurements of these goals and the means
115. Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration & Social Inequality, 139 DAEDALUS 8, 8-10
(2010).
116. For an example ofjust such an approach, see Peter Schmidt & Ann Dryden Witte, Predict-
ing Criminal Recidivism Using 'Split Population' Survival Time Models, 40 J. ECONOMETRICS 141,
141, 144, 151-55 (1989).
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to achieve them are disputed.'17 The same is not true now of criminal jus-
tice. We seldom consider costs of individual interventions even as we be-
moan the costs in aggregate. We almost never operationalize the idea that
prison treatment programs might meaningfully affect public safety out-
comes. At least agreeing that our criminal justice system should be as ef-
fective as possible for the money we spend on it is an important step. This
step must include asking whether a criminal justice response creates as
much value as treating the problem non-criminally or even doing nothing.
Most of the work will not take place at the level of abstraction that "public
safety value creation" implies. It will instead involve meetings with stake-
holders, policymakers, and consumers and will involve much painstaking,
granular work. But having public safety outcomes as a guiding principle
will tie together the many strands of policy and theoretical work currently
taking place. The alternative is to throw up our hands, avoid the difficult
work, and accept a system that few would or could defend as just, effec-
tive, or economical.
B. Value Creating Policies
In this Section, I will sketch out what policies might arise from a pub-
lic safety value creation framework. A few caveats before the discussion
continues. First, this is a framework, not a particular endorsement of any
one metric or program; it is important to be open to new data and new
studies. The principle of measuring, analyzing, and incentivizing out-
come-oriented programs is a procedure, a formula which isolates the var-
iables but does not necessarily solve for X Second, I assume both that it is
possible to know what works and also possible that something will work-
or at least that something will not work as badly as other things or be as
bad but cheaper. That is, our system can at least be made more efficient,
even if not more effective.
There are also certain conditions that I assume would be built into the
system.' In an outcome-based system, localities would be prevented
from shifting crime and criminals to other jurisdictions-the "one-way bus
ticket" model of crime control. 9 also assume that there would be some
kind of validated risk-needs assessment tool used, subject to some condi-
tions I will discuss infra. Both sending and receiving parties would have
incentives to measure risk: receiving institutions would not want to take
on a harder case-with higher costs and higher risk of poor outcomes-
than they were promised, and sending institutions would want to ensure
that a prisoner's criminogenic needs were met. This would solve the
cream-skimming problem so often seen in the private prison context,
117. Reinhardt, supra note 104 (criticizing the idea that medical conditions are easy to identify,
discrete, and easy to put into "a standard, finite life cycle").
118. The following discussion draws on a prior article. See Ball, supra note 69, at 1061-63.
119. Id at 1086-87.
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where the average cost of a prisoner is equated with the marginal cost of
that prisoner.
A pay-for-performance criminal justice system would first begin with
financial and budgetary reforms that would give decision makers some in-
centives to save money and promote effectiveness. To the extent that lo-
calities were given block grants to approach crime in the manner of their
choosing, these grants would have to be subject to income adjustment,
giving more resources to poorer areas and those with higher crime.120 The
system would need to tailor sentences to the risk factors a given offender
presented. It would make the entire menu of sentencing options look a lot
like probation does now, with some attempt to link offender characteristics
to penological conditions. Finally, pay-for-performance might also in-
clude indeterminate sentencing, whereby offenders were released as soon
as, but not until, they were "better." Within a pay-for-performance frame-
work, however, both prisoners and parole boards would have specific in-
dicia of readiness to return-whether a prisoner addressed his or her un-
derlying diagnosis-rather than generic estimates of threats to society. I
will now discuss each in turn.
Budgets and Data. Under pay-for-performance, budgets would have
to be revamped along performance-oriented lines. I have previously pro-
posed that states no longer fund prison, per se, but that they fund on the
basis of rates of reported violent crime.121 This is a potential restructuring
that would enable greater local freedom of choice in how offenders are
treated, but it is not the only way to encourage pay-for-performance. Fed-
eral funds could be disbursed with the requirement that states adopt out-
come measurement or data collection.122 States could then base funding
streams to localities on certain baseline standards. Depending on the fund-
ing approach used, jurisdictions could conceivably experiment with dif-
ferent approaches to incarceration. Some might invest in mass lockups to
incapacitate-subject to Eighth Amendment limitations. Others might pay
to make people better. Still others might decide that non-criminal re-
sponses are called for. This too would provide valuable feedback on the
efficacy of various approaches-approaches which, it should be noted,
currently take place at the intra-state level but which are opaque to voters
and officials alike.12 3
As for data, the relatively uncontroversial issues that would need to
be implemented to make pay-for-performance viable are, in most cases,
120. Id. at 1082.
121. Id. at 1073.
122. Darryl Brown has also suggested that the federal government fund cost-benefit studies.
Brown, supra note 74, at 353. Though the federal government has less of a financial impact with
criminal justice than it does in medicine-Medicaid and Medicare are significant enough by them-
selves to generate change while JAG grants are not. See Zack Cooper et al., The Price Ain't Right?
Hospital Prices and Health Spending on the Privately Insured 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 21815, 2015) (criticizing studies that rely only on Medicare data while noting that
Medicare covers twenty percent of total health care spending).
123. See Ball, supra note 35, at 994.
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issues that need to be addressed for the system to be effectively managed.
This means collecting data in standard formats, data that includes a suffi-
ciently long time horizon that is also linked to offender behavior in other
jurisdictions. This is not a new idea, and it is one where having the idea is
a small part of the job. Saying that the idea of data collection is uncontro-
versial does not mean its implementation would be; deciding what to
measure and how to measure it is where most of the work would take
place. Implementation would involve effecting institutional and cultural
changes, getting buy-in from practitioners, and hashing out what those
standard measurements and formats would be. Once data is collected, or-
ganizations must use it to drive practices and policies. Change needs to be
ongoing and iterative. Those who subsidize these institutions can tie budg-
ets to best practices, incentivizing the propagation, diffusion, and experi-
mentation needed. Finally, data needs not only to be collected, it needs to
be analyzed and shared. A judge now, for example, really only sees the
results of her decisions when they fail and an offender returns to court.
Judges should, instead, be educated about how their populations per-
formed in aggregate, looking at success and failure rates, survival times,
prosocial indicators, and the like for all of those they deal with, not just
the individuals who return to court for an infraction. They should, moreo-
ver, be encouraged to look not just at successes, but whether their suc-
cesses came with the minimum effective dose of resources. More is not
always better-and, indeed, can sometimes be worse.
Tailoring. The next issue the system would deal with is tailoring.
What is a DRG for criminal justice? In order to measure the outcomes
generated by the intervention-as opposed to the selection effects of a
given population-we must control for variations in the initial condition
of offenders. That is, if remuneration is based upon doing a good job, we
have to be able to distinguish between results that stem from a given pop-
ulation being better than another and a given treatment being better than
another. How do we control for differences between cases and among pop-
ulations? Consider the following individual examples. The crime of arrest
might understate the risk a given individual poses-as, for example, a traf-
fic charge for an organized crime kingpin. The crime of arrest might over-
state the risk an individual poses-as, for example, a battered wife killing
her abusive husband. This is certainly among the thorniest parts of actu-
arialism, as making decisions on risk alone involves non-actuarial deci-
sions about what behavior should be modeled (and how). It is hardly an
answer to say that risk assessment tools might at least do a more accurate
job than the clinical, gut-level assessment of judges and prosecutors. The
larger question, though, of what constitutes a "similar" offense and a "sim-
ilar" offender is vexing and will probably never be conclusively re-
solved.124
124. See Ball, supra note 69, at 1064-70.
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The problem with standardizing diagnoses, an obvious problem for
criminal justice, is not without its analog in medicine. Witness the New
York Times Magazine column "Diagnosis," which presents symptoms and
asks doctors to figure out the cause (or causes).12 5 There are biological
markers for most diseases, but some, like prostate cancer, might actually
turn out to be several different diseases.12 6 Co-morbidity also makes diag-
noses difficult: those who suffer from two or more diseases need to be
treated differently, have different survival rates, and the like.1 27 Co-mor-
bidity is a readily apparent problem in criminal law, given how many of
the justice-involved have mental health or addiction problems.12 8 The issue
of optimal research trial size poses problems in medicine: larger sizes are
more statistically significant, but larger groups are also less tailored, re-
sulting in medical protocols that are demonstrably ineffective for certain
subpopulations on the basis of gender or race.129 The healthcare approach,
then, outlines some typical hazards without necessarily pointing out easy
solutions, but reformers who, say, want to address offenders with co-mor-
bid drug and mental health problems can look to the medical literature for
ideas and approaches.
Some of the discussion about distinguishing and tailoring in criminal
justice has already taken place in the offense/offender literature13 0 and sug-
gests that we could combine criminal history and offender characteristics
at sentencing (though even criminal histories can be problematic on dis-
parate impact grounds, as well as on accuracy and completeness). One
125. See Lisa Sanders, Diagnosis, N.Y. TIMES MAG., http://www.nytimes.com/column/diagno-
sis. "Dr. Lisa Sanders recreates hard-to-solve medical cases" in this column of the magazine. Id.
126. See Charlie Cooper, Prostate Cancer Could Actually Be Five Different Diseases, Say Sci-
entists, INDEPENDENT (July 30, 2015, 00:16), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-
families/health-news/prostate-cancer-could-actually-be-five-different-diseases-say-scientists-
10424973.html. Other than DUI there are not many biological markers for criminal law. Criminol-
ogy's main foray into biological markers was phrenology, which is a continuing stain on the discipline.
See Paul Erickson, The Anthropology ofCharles Caldwell, MD., 72 Isis 252,253-56 (1981) (detailing
the career of an American phrenologist who used biological differences in head shape to support white
supremacist views); Reginald Horsman, Scientific Racism and the American Indian in the Mid-Nine-
teenth Century, 27 AM. Q. 152, 155 (1975) (discussing Caldwell and "scientific" appeals to the racial
inferiority of indigenous people); Nicole Rafter, The Murderous Dutch Fiddler: Criminology, History
and the Problem ofPhrenology, 9 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 65, 68 (2005) (arguing that criminol-
ogists should come to terms with phrenology's role in the development of criminology).
127. For criticism of Porter's ideas on these grounds, see Gail R. Wilensky, Health Reform:
Thinking Big, but Ignoring Big Obstacles, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 16, 2006), http://healthaf-
fairs.org/blog/2006/10/16/health-reform-thinking-big-but-ignoring-big-obstacles/ (noting that
"[p]atients have a nasty habit of having more than one thing wrong with them" and observing that
"multiple chronic conditions account for a disproportionate share" of Medicare spending).
128. "At midyear 2005 more than half of all prison and jail inmates had a mental health prob-
lem .. . ." DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006), https://www.bjs.gov/con-
tent/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf. "In 2002 more than two-thirds ofjail inmates were found to be dependent on
or to abuse alcohol or drugs . . . ." JENNIFER C. KARBERG & DORIS J. JAMES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SUBSTANCE DEPENDENCE, ABUSE, AND TREATMENT OF JAIL
INMATES, 2002, at 1 (2005), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/sdatji02.pdf.
129. Nicholas J. Schork, Time for One-Person Trials, 520 NATURE 609, 609-10 (2015).
130. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender Characteris-
tics in Modern Sentencing Reforms, 58 STAN. L. REV. 277, 287 (2005).
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place to start would be with regular risk-needs assessments (RNAs) as a
non-exclusive foundation for criminal justice programming, with several
caveats. RNAs need to have open algorithms and data so that the means
by which risk scores are calculated can be examined and independently
verified. Defendants should be allowed to challenge the methodologies in
court.'3 RNAs should be normed to subpopulations to ensure that there is
no disparate impact on the basis of race or other suspect classifications.132
They should also be re-validated on local populations every couple of
years. In short, the move towards evidence-based practices requires actual
evidence-evidence that is subject to robust investigation, testing, and
standards of proof. RNAs have to actually be accurate; it is not simply
enough to put a number on risk and take it on faith. One would expect that
as data collection and outcome measurement improve, risk-needs assess-
ment tools would also improve. The problems with risk-needs assess-
ments, however, are dwarfed by the problems with gut decisions of judges
and DAs, which are even less transparent and accountable-and more sub-
ject to bias, explicit or implicit-than RNAs.133
Tailoring should not stop with the diagnosis. It also, of course, should
include treatment. This is where the criminal justice system as a whole
should start to look a lot more like probation and diversion. Some people
are inpatients, some are outpatients, some are nonpatients. Currently we
do have diversion to probation and treatment, but we also just send people
to "prison"-not different kinds of prisons (those decisions are made by
prison officials during classification) or different kinds of programs (those
are also done by the prison system). Tailoring prison terms at sentencing
currently just means "more" or "less." Prison is expensive. We should be
considering what we get for that money. It does not make sense to say
"you are a criminal, you get prison" the same way it would not make sense
for a doctor to say "you are sick, get medical help." Doctors diagnose pa-
tients with particular illnesses and prescribe particular treatments, includ-
ing, sometimes, realizing that the situation will resolve itself. This should
be the goal of the criminal justice system-we should at least scrutinize
fee-for-service subsidies of prison, the most expensive treatment we use.
Tailoring would be a radical change-albeit one that was common during
the Williams v. New York34 era. There are questions of how much dis-
131. See Martinson, supra note 10, at 50.
132. ProPublica reported that a proprietary risk assessment tool used in Florida underestimated
the risk posed by white members of the pretrial population and overestimated the risk posed by Afri-
can-American members. Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PRO PUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing. For a sim-
ilar argument in the sentencing context, see Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scien-
tific Rationalization ofDiscrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 805-08 (2014).
133. For a discussion of implicit bias and its impact on the law generally, see IMPLICIT RACIAL
BIAS ACROSS THE LAW I (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012).
134. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
135. Id. at 244-46.
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cretion a judge should have to find facts (subject to the underlying sen-
tencing statutes and whether they, in turn, implicate Apprendi v. New Jer-
seyl36 and its progeny).137 There are also issues about whether long sen-
tences would ever generate the kind of feedback a judge would need-
presumably judges would die or retire before the end of certain extremely
long sentences. But surely our currently broken system, which simply en-
ables long sentences with no questions asked, is worse. Not asking ques-
tions does not mean such sentences are more effective or parsimonious; it
simply means we have no way to know whether they are effective or par-
simonious.
Which prisons? The value framework could obviously fit into con-
tracts with private prisons, encouraging a focus not just on cost per pris-
oner but paying for treatment of an offender's criminogenic needs. Juris-
dictions could track and pay for outcomes, adjusting for the risk profile of
those who went in. The alternative embeds undesirable outcomes. A pri-
vate prison contract that focuses only on price, for example, creates incen-
tives for private prisons to "cream skim" only the most low-cost prisoners,
meaning those who are younger, physically healthier, and less mentally ill.
A value-creation framework would reduce the reimbursement price of
those prisoners, making sure that the outcome is measured in terms of how
people changed in prison, not just how they were when they went in. The
value framework could also provide incentives to maximize pro-social
outcomes, such as educational attainment in prison,'38 or longitudinal out-
comes such as employment and family relationships. Without some out-
come measurement, contracts that pay a simple per-prisoner-per-day
amount create a potential incentive not to treat prisoners in hopes of en-
suring a future revenue stream from recidivism.139 Others have suggested
different pay-for-performance models, including a prison re-admission
penalty similar to those used in hospitals.140
136. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
137. See id. at 490 ("[A]ny fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."); see also
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,313-14 (2004) (extending the doctrine to state sentencing guide-
lines).
138. See David M. Siegel, Internalizing Private Prison Externalities: Let's Start with the GED,
30 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 101, 109-10 (2016).
139. Kenneth L. Avio, Remuneration Regimes for Private Prisons, 13 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
35,45 (1993); see also Michael G. Anderson, IfYou've Got the Money, I've Got the Time: The Benefits
ofIncentive Contracts with Private Prisons, 34 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 43, 85-88 (2015-2016) (suggest-
ing payments based on drug and mental health treatment, as well as educational, vocational, and life
skills attainment); Anita Mukherjee, Impacts of Private Prison Contracting on Inmate Time Served
and Recidivism 9-10 (Aug. 10, 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Mad-
ison), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2523238 (evaluating empirical evidence
that contractual incentives incentivize private prisons to prolong stays via disciplinary write-ups).
140. Stuart M. Butler, Op-ed, How Hospitals Could Help Cut Prison Recidivism, BROOKINGS




Beyond the private prison option, the state could also treat state-
owned and -administered prisons in a similar manner. State prisons could
specialize in particular populations, charging differential rates to localities
based on prisoners' underlying needs and on the treatments used. Cur-
rently, the system does not generally differentiate among prisons within
the system. But why not make one prison for domestic abusers, another
for addiction-driven behavior, and the like? Programming in prison can
vary: perhaps some will specialize in restorative justice,141 others with an-
imal-based rehabilitation.14 2 Prisons can also differ on the basis of loca-
tion, size, guard training, and theory. Perhaps prisons in the United States
can look internationally for other examples-Scandinavian prisons ap-
proach prisons and prisoners in dramatically different ways.143 Variety in
theory and practice is also a return to the historical origin of state prisons,
when wardens had great leeway to pursue different methods.
Each prison could focus on needs, and those needs could be meas-
ured, treated, and the treatment assessed in terms of how well it worked
and at what cost. Prisons could subsequently move toward best practices,
nudged, in part, by the demands of the localities paying for prison beds.
No longer would we treat all prisons and all prisoners the same. Systems
would, instead, have some idea of what kind of prison and what kinds of
programs would be in operation once someone got there.
Discharge. Sentence lengths could be limited at the time they are im-
posed and potentially extended before release-that is, systems could re-
turn to indeterminate sentencing (those sentences terminating in parole re-
lease). The problem with indeterminate sentences as they are practiced in
some states like California is that the ultimate length of the sentence is
unlimited (e.g., twenty-five years to life).144 There is no incentive for pa-
role boards to release prisoners; their only incentive is to avoid the spec-
tacular failure, not to promote the quiet success.145 Other states have max-
imum limits on indeterminate sentences (e.g., four to eight years, where
release is possible after four years but must be done by year eight).146 A
return to indeterminate sentencing would be a return to the medical model
of imprisonment with a few improvements, notably that there was some
141. See generally HOWARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE (Howard Zehr
ed., 2014).
142. See generally Gennifer Furst, Prison-Based Animal Programs: A National Survey, 86
PRISON J. 407 (2006).
143. See generally John Pratt, Scandinavian Exceptionalism in an Era ofPenal Excess, 48 BRIT.
J. CRIMINOLOGY 119(2007).
144. For a detailed discussion of the California scheme, see W. David Ball, Heinous, Atrocious,
and Cruel: Apprendi, Indeterminate Sentencing, and the Meaning ofPunishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
893, 899-900 (2009).
145. See W. David Ball, Normative Elements ofParole Risk, 22 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 395,
398 (2011).
146. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9756(a)-(b) (2016) (establishing a maximum term of confine-
ment and a minimum term of confinement that is one-half as long; parole may be granted after the
minimum term and the prisoner must be released by the maximum term).
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understanding of what needs an offender had to address to be eligible for
release (e.g., go to prison and work on your vocational skills or anger man-
agement).
Indeterminate sentences in a system that internalized costs and bene-
fits would generate pressure to release safer prisoners and avoid the prob-
lem of life sentences "with the possibility of parole, hold the possibility of
parole." 47 Other parts of the system would be clamoring to use the money
spent on incarceration to promote higher value interventions. Funds not
spent on discretionary years of an indeterminate sentence could be redis-
tributed. For example, local jurisdictions might pay prisons for a certain
amount of time for a given condition (X years for a domestic abuser), with
the potential for earlier release (and cost savings to the carceral institution)
but a delayed performance payment based on survival time without recid-
ivism. States could reimburse localities for a given amount of prison time
that amounts to a valuation of just deserts, and localities could pay for
additional prison time to either vindicate local retributive values or to pro-
mote treatment-and, of course, they would be able to shop around for
prison beds at particular institutions that did a good job. Another option
would be to localize parole boards. Individuals from a given community
would decide when a prisoner was ready to come home, knowing that
prison savings could go to lower taxes or to prevention programs. This
would more accurately balance social costs and benefits.
Indeterminate sentencing was criticized in the mid-1970s for a vari-
ety of reasons. I will not address one of the criticisms-that it did not pro-
mote uniformity of punishment-since one of the main advantages to in-
determinate sentencing is the very fact that punishment can be tailored.
Some of the non-uniformity criticisms were, at their core, about racial dis-
parities in who was released and who was denied. Using risk-needs and
having an outcome-based approach would make release decisions and
their effects on racial subgroups less opaque. If risk assessments amounted
to a policy, rather than the clinical assessment of an individual employee,
they could actually provide those suffering disparate impact with a
stronger claim to sue the agency for violations of constitutional rights un-
der § 1983.148 Parole officials would no longer have unfettered (and un-
guided) discretion; they would actually know what they were looking for
in terms of criminogenic needs to be addressed before release. Prison cap-
itation fees paid by locals could solve for the problem of indefinite reten-
tion-there would be pressure to let prisoners out in order to free up funds
that could be put to use elsewhere. At the very least, it is not as though
determinate sentences have been good for prison population reduction, nor
147. See Ball, supra note 144, at 968-69.
148. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693-94 (1978) ("[A] local government may
not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when
execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose
edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as
an entity is responsible under § 1983.").
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have they proven to be particularly good at reducing recidivism, promot-
ing equity and fairness, or reducing racial disparities.
It is certainly possible that a poorly-administered, poorly-supervised
parole board could impose indefinite detention on the basis of dangerous-
ness. Our present system already has this problem when it comes to sex
offenders (arguably worse, since the nominally "civil" nature of the incar-
ceration means that there are no guarantees about the right to counsel and
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof). 149 The current system
provides very few legal checks on permanent incapacitation on civil
grounds, and pay-for-performance would do nothing to change the legal
requirements. Where it would make a difference is in imposing parsimony.
Our current system demands no proof of indefinite incapacitation in terms
of efficacy or efficiency: it is a blank check. Making the system prove that
it is doing something minimally costly and maximally effective would
make indefinite detention more difficult.
The point here is that implementation could involve a variety of
choices after the sentencing moment in court. It is one thing to have an
imprisonment policy and assume what goes on there is beneficial; it is an-
other thing to incentivize the kind of treatment that the committing juris-
diction wants. No longer would an arbitrary, ex ante, one size fits all term
of years be the sentence, with "whatever happens, happens" as the pre-
scription for those responsible for the prisoner. It would be much more
particular, with specific prescriptions given, not simply "get some drugs
or get some surgery in one of several hospitals," but "go to this clinic and
treat your diabetes with insulin" or "get arthroscopic surgery on your knee
from this doctor."
There is nothing intrinsic about our current system of imprisonment.
There is much that might seem speculative about the pay-for-performance
approach, but, of course, our system as it stands is huge, expensive, and a
disgrace. Mass incarceration is the experiment; trying to unwind it is not.
Historically, these proposals are much closer to the sentiments that pre-
vailed in the mid-19th and mid-20th centuries.1 50 In the mid-19th century,
it was common to pick particular institutions at the time of sentencing,
these institutions were often paid per prisoner, and the institutions had par-
ticular philosophies of rehabilitation. Wardens also wanted to release pris-
oners on an indeterminate schedule with the idea that they could keep pris-
oners until they were cured. These treatments, however, were often
grounded in deeply compromised social science, whether that of Cesare
149. See W. David Ball, The Civil Case at the Heart of Criminal Procedure: In re Winship,
Stigma, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 117, 128-32, 179-80 (2011) (summa-
rizing the procedural protections provided in civil commitment proceedings for sex offenders).
I50. Ball, Why State Prisons?, supra note 25, at 89-93.
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Lombroso's physical indicia of the "born criminal"' 5 ' or the horrific tes-
ticular mutilations of Dr. Leo Stanley at San Quentin.15 2 These are real
concerns; we do not know the blind spots we have except in retrospect.
Perhaps future generations will look with horror on contemporary crimi-
nology. But even if we are blind to better treatments, we should not blind
ourselves to the idea of treatment in general. Put another way, the "nothing
works" philosophy is misnamed. It should be called "nothing works-ex-
cept prison" because it implicitly assumes that prison is worth doing even
if nothing else is. Prison may arguably have something going for it in terms
of efficacy-though the magnitude and even the direction of the effects
are disputed'53-but there is tremendous evidence that it is inefficient.
Criticisms of the rehabilitative approach, then, are much like the crit-
icisms more generally leveled at actuarialism. I am not suggesting that ev-
idence-based practices are immune to some of the harms attributed to
them, most notably disparate impacts on people of color, but it can hardly
be claimed that our current system does not have ruinous effects on people
of color. The causes under our current system are simply harder to discern
with any exactitude, which means everyone and no one is to blame. That,
to me, is not a virtue.154 Algorithms can be audited; policies can be im-
proved. Intuition can be neither audited nor improved.
The current system is both overdetermined and too discretionary. It
is overdetermined in the sense that a given set of years is typically given
for an individual offense, including via mandatory minimums. It is too
discretionary in the sense that charging decisions are beyond review. The
alternative of evidence-based indeterminate sentences would keep discre-
tion but provide some limits, and it would ensure that there is discretion
on the back end of sentencing as well.
C. Advantages of a Value Orientation
There are several potential advantages that might result from a value-
oriented system.
The first is to generate some momentum towards a creation of a pe-
nological state of the art. Measuring outcomes and rewarding value crea-
tion will create incentives for their widespread implementation. Put an-
other way, why are there no standard criminological treatments? It could
151. See generally MARY GIBSON, BORN TO CRIME: CESARE LOMBROSO AND THE ORIGINS OF
BIOLOGICAL CRIMINALITY (2002).
152. See Ethan Blue, The Strange Career of Leo Stanley: Remaking Manhood and Medicine at
San Quentin State Penitentiary, 1913-1951, 78 PAC. HIST. REV. 210, 211 (2009).
153. For a review of the evidence generally, see Mark W. Lipsey & Francis T. Cullen, The Ef-
fectiveness of Correctional Rehabilitation: A Review of Systematic Reviews, 3 ANN. REV. L. & Soc.
Sc. 297 (2007).
154. See Jennifer L. Skeem, John Monahan & Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Gender, Risk Assess-
ment, and Sanctioning: The Cost of Treating Women Like Men 27-28 (Va. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research Paper No. 10, Jan. 18, 2016), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2718460
(noting that adjustments to risk assessments can also exacerbate disparate impact).
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be that there is insufficient research or that local populations are different,
but it is also the case that demonstrably ineffective programs (such as
scared straight) have not yet been fully eradicated.'55 Again, very little dis-
cussion in the legal academy differentiates among alternative conditions
of custody and programming in prison. The closest widespread practice on
the ground that even approximates this is probation, where judges put con-
ditions on probationers in an attempt to cure their problems. Even then
some judges think "more is better" without using the risk-needs-respon-
siveness principle-which might mean more is ineffectivel 5-or going
beyond what is effective to what is efficient, given that public safety re-
sources, like all other resources, are scarce and need to be deployed wisely.
One notable exception is pretrial practices in jurisdictions such as the fed-
eral system and New Jersey, which require judges to attach conditions of
pretrial release using the least restrictive means possible.157
Tying funding to value creation will incentivize both innovation and
diffusion. Part of the reason that change comes so slowly to criminal jus-
tice in general and prisons in particular is that there is no incentive to
change. Prisons are not penalized for doing a bad job. Another problem is
loss avoidance-the hedonic (and economic) losses of incarceration on
society, prisoners, and their families are not counted, just the speculative
(and non-falsifiable) worry about the next sensational case of a parolee on
a crime spree. Accounting for criminal justice costs is certainly doable, as
WSIPP and others have demonstrated, and one can readily think of dam-
ages that arise simply from arrest-namely, for those who cannot make
bail, the economic losses from being in jail until the time of trial, as well
as the increased likelihood of being sentenced to a harsher penalty.'5 1 Pris-
ons are a major cost center in state government and, as such, should be
targeted.59
If budgetary incentives are to be used, one size will not fit all. Paying
for improvements in outcome might be seen as punishing agencies and
institutions that already do things the right way, whereas paying for a cer-
tain standard of performance will be impossible for the lower-performing
agencies and institutions to meet. High-performing agencies, then, might
155. See Justice Department Discourages the Use of "Scared Straight" Programs, OJJDP NEWS
AT A GLANCE, https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/news at glance/234084/topstory.html (last visited
Mar. 18, 2017) ("[A] report presented in 1997 to the U.S. Congress reviewed more than 500 crime
prevention evaluations and placed Scared Straight programs in the 'what does not work' category.
Despite these findings, Scared Straight programs continue to be used throughout the United States and
abroad.").
156. See Andrews, Bonta & Hoge, supra note 6.
157. For the federal system, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2012) (release shall be granted "sub-
ject to the least restrictive further condition"), invalidated by United States v. Karper, 847 F. Supp. 2d
350, 361-62 (N.D.N.Y. 2011). For New Jersey, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 162-17(b)(2) (West 2017)
("The non-monetary condition or conditions of a pretrial release ordered by the court pursuant to this
paragraph shall be the least restrictive condition, or combination of conditions .... ).
158. CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP, MARIE VANNOSTRAND & ALEXANDER HOLSINGER,
INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT OF PRETRIAL DETENTION ON SENTENCING OUTCOMES 4 (2013).
159. See Gershowitz, supra note 70, at 53.
488 [Vol. 94:3
PA Y-FOR-PERFORMANCE IN PRISON
be rewarded for meeting a certain standard, and lower-performing agen-
cies might be rewarded based on annual improvements until they meet a
certain minimum standard, as low-performing hospitals currently are un-
der Medicare's Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program.' 6  Quality
control might even need to start where medicine did, not with outcomes,
but with training, education, and professional standards. The main lesson,
though, is that quality improvement is a continual process, not a "set it and
forget it" switch.
V. CRITICISMS OF THE APPROACH
There are a number of criticisms that can be leveled at the pay-for-
performance approach. I will discuss five. First, that it ignores important
issues: the dignitary interests of people in prison and the retributive inter-
ests in punishment, neither of which can be priced or quantified. Second,
that it cannot be operationalized since we do not know what works in
prison rehabilitation. Third, that the medical approach might expand the
scope of the criminal justice system (net widening). Fourth, that it might
lead to bargain basement incarceration ("tough 'n' cheap" in Hadar Avi-
ram's phrasing 1). Fifth, that it punishes the disadvantaged for their social
deficits. Before getting into these objections, it is important to emphasize
that the pay-for-performance approach is not intended to be exclusive of
all others. Mass incarceration has a number of things wrong with it. It is
inhumane, arbitrary, and racist, to be sure. But it is also expensive and
ineffective. There is no reason not to investigate these shortcomings in
addition to or alongside others.
Non-pecuniary interests. A first criticism is that not all interests can
be addressed via the value-creation framework, whether it is the dignitary
interest of prisoners or the public's interest in retribution. Discussions
about how to deploy social resources are, in many ways, discussions about
social priorities. As a society, we are what we fund. There is no reason that
we cannot say both that prisons violate dignity and that they do so in a way
that wastes resources, including human potential. There is also no reason
we cannot say that retributive interests might be met in a system that makes
us safer in a more effective and efficient way.
Starting with the dignity point, I would query whether it promotes
human dignity to warehouse people and do nothing for them (particularly
given how little opportunity many of them had to participate meaningfully
in society) or to spend money on prisons and not on schools or other gen-
erative endeavors. Moreover, the idea that prisoners can only be ware-
housed forecloses any redemption. Rehabilitation humanizes the offender
160. Linking Quality to Payment, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcom-
pare/linking-quality-to-payment.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
161. See AVIRAM, supra note 68, at 164.
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and has, as its starting point, the idea that she is worth saving and redeem-
able. Mercy is, after all, a part of retribution (albeit one seldom empha-
sized).
As for retribution, I will not belabor the criticisms of retributivism
here,1 62 but will only suggest that a value orientation is compatible with
notions of desert and redemption. It is, of course, difficult to summarize
the wide variety of retributive theories, and I will not attempt to do so here.
At its most basic, retributivism can be characterized as sounding in desert,
with punishment involving the imposition of suffering on the offender pro-
portional to the crime she committed.63 Pay-for-performance does not tar-
get offender suffering, but it is not incompatible with it either. For sen-
tences involving mixed theories of retribution and rehabilitation, an out-
come-orientation could simply apply to the rehabilitative part of the sen-
tence.164 To the extent that the retributive theory is a limiting one, the par-
simony imposed on punishments under the scheme dovetails nicely with
the idea that punishment should not exceed the crime. Expressive theories
of punishment, such as those espoused by Joel Feinberg'65 and Jean Hamp-
ton,166 argue that punishment serves to express society's outrage and send
a message to the offender. To the extent we want punishnient to make
someone learn a lesson, outcomes are a superior method of demonstrating
that the lesson has, in fact, been learned. A change in behavior is superior
to a mere theory that an offender will (or must) have learned her lesson
because she went to prison; it is, instead, a way of demonstrating that she
actually learned it. These changes also provide better evidence of the
"meaning of punishment[]" than claims that are always asserted-without
proof-that the legislature, judge, or public meant the message or that it
was ever received as such by the convicted.167 Finally, theories that sound
162. For an overview, see Christopher Slobogin & Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein, Putting Desert
in Its Place, 65 STAN. L. REV. 77, 82 (2013); see also Mark R. Fondacaro & Megan J. O'Toole, Ame-
rican Punitiveness and Mass Incarceration: Psychological Perspectives on Retributive and Conse-
quentialist Responses to Crime, 18 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 477, 503 (2015). For a criticism of how "lim-
iting retributivism" has failed to provide any meaningful limits in an era of mass incarceration, see
Robert Weisberg, Reality-Challenged Philosophies ofPunishment, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1203, 1227-28
(2012). For a study suggesting that white people's notion of the proper level of punishment depends
in part on how black and brown they perceive prison to be, suggesting that retribution depends on
whether it is "them" or "us" we are talking about, see Rebecca C. Hetey & Jennifer L. Eberhardt,
Racial Disparities in Incarceration Increase Acceptance ofPunitive Policies, 25 PSYCHOL. SC. 1949,
1949-51 (2014). For a discussion of CBA and retributivism, see Brown, supra note 74, at 335.
163. See Mirko Bagoric & Kumar Amarasekara, The Errors of Retributivism, 24 MELB. U. L.
REv. 124, 127 (2000).
164. For a discussion of what I have called "split purposes" sentencing, see Ball, supra note 144,
at 938.
165. Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function ofPunishment, 49 MONIST 397, 400 (1965).
166. Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39
UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1659 (1992).
167. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 593,
639 (1996) (discussing the "message of condemnation" involved in various forms of criminal sanc-
tions).
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in moral failing or poor choice-making would also be consonant with treat-
ment regimes that seek to identify and correct these failings.
Nothing works. A second criticism is perhaps the most obvious one:
that nothing works, and that there is no evidence that one approach to in-
carceration and sentencing has better results than another. I have assumed
that there is more than "nothing" that is promising, but I also would argue
that even if there is no good evidence about effective programming, pace
WSIPP, it could be that we have simply not yet found the evidence or
found the program, not that such a discovery is impossible. In medicine,
too, diagnoses and treatments change and improve all the time. There are,
of course, some legitimate concerns about throwing one's lot with science
when it comes to criminal law. The experience of phrenology, eugenics,
and race-based theories of criminality demonstrate the fallibility of the sci-
entific state of the art when viewed by later generations.'68 We have very
real evidence of the ways in which science has been used to mistreat peo-
ple, particularly those who are the most powerless in society.'69 Here
again, it will be crucial to have transparency about what is being done and
why and to include a robust system of monitoring and public comment as
we proceed.
At the same time, there is some reason to be skeptical that nothing
will be shown to work in the penological context. Is quality in prison really
harder than in medicine? Is it more difficult to research how to treat a vi-
olent person than it is to treat cancer or to improve survival rates of prem-
ature babies? Is it impossible or just not been done-or even really tried?
Even if it were true that nothing works, not all equally ineffective
programs cost the same. Some might be cheaper. Moreover, even if noth-
ing works in terms of making people better, surely some things work at
making them worse. Solitary confinement exacerbates problems with
mental health;170 it is also extremely expensive. '7 Even if it were true that
being housed in a general prison population did not make someone "bet-
ter," it certainly does not damage someone nearly as much as solitary con-
finement.
168. For a general discussion skeptical of the ability of science to correct itself, see John P. A.
Ioannidis, Why Science Is Not Necessarily Self-Correcting, 7 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SC. 645, 645-46
(2012).
169. See Allan M. Brandt, Racism and Research: The Case of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 8
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 21, 21-22 (1978) (relaying the history of a United States government experiment
on syphilis that deliberately withheld treatment from black male subjects, more than a hundred of
whom died).
170. Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and "Supermax" Confinement,
49 CRIME & DELINQ. 124, 130 (2003).
171. See Carrie Johnson & Bill Chappell, Solitary Confinement Costs $78K Per Inmate and
Should Be Curbed, Critics Say, NPR (Feb. 25, 2014, 9:44 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2014/02/25/282672593/solitary-confinement-costs-78k-per-inmate-and-should-be-curbed-crit-




Net widening. There is a fear that a focus on rehabilitation, particu-
larly using a medical model, could somehow expand the size and scope of
the carceral state or social control more generally.172 These fears are cer-
tainly worth addressing, given the most recent decades' explosion of penal
control. But net widening is a function of a lack of accountability: the net
can only widen in a system where criminal justice is subsidized and claims
about public safety are asserted without proof. In a system where efficacy
and efficiency must be demonstrated, and funding is tied to that demon-
stration, an unjustifiable widening of the net will be much more difficult,
not easier. Not every solution to a problem will be carceral-just as in
medicine, not every malady requires hospitalization (or even, as with vi-
ruses, any real medical response at all). Diagnosis does not always require
treatment, nor, certainly, does it require the most intrusive treatment. Some
criminal problems will require "inpatient" solutions, some "outpatient" so-
lutions, and some "non-patient" solutions. The key is forcing these inter-
ventions to be justified in terms of results. Programs implemented on the
basis of fiscal responsibility have often resulted in a shrinkage of the crim-
inal justice system-not just re-entry, but "non-entry."l73
It is, of course, true that not everyone gets better in the criminal jus-
tice system, particularly those with mental illnesses.174 It is the ineffective-
ness and expense ofjail and prison as a response to mental illness that have
provided the impetus for non-entry, problems more easily uncovered when
there is a systematic commitment to looking at outcomes. 175
Net widening is objectionable, in part, because it is not worth the
money and does not actually work. These are the very criteria on which
172. For a discussion of net widening in the mental health context, see Jeffrey L. Geller et al.,
Involuntary Outpatient Treatment as "Deinstitutionalized Coercion": The Net-Widening Concerns,
29 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 551, 551-52, 554 (2006).
173. See Eric Kurhi, How to Keep Menially Ill Out ofJail Is Focus ofSanta Clara County Panel,
MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 11, 2016, 8:16 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2016/03/1 /how-to-keep-
mentally-ill-out-of-jail-is-focus-of-santa-clara-county-panel (quoting County Supervisor Cindy
Chavez as asking "[W]hat does a non-entry center look like?").
174. See TORREY ET AL., supra note 7, at 1.
175. See Michael Ollove, New Efforts to Keep the Mentally Ill Out ofJail, STATELINE (May 19,
2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/5/19/new-efforts-to-
keep-the-mentally-ill-out-of-jail (reporting, inter alia, that programs to keep the mentally ill out ofjail
in Miami-Dade County cut thousands from the jail population and resulted in the closure of a jail).
The same is true for homeless people who are swept up in the system. Graves, Yu: Palantir, UCSF
Partner with Santa Clara County on Homelessness Breakthrough, MERCURY NEWS (June 28, 2016,
9:02 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2016/06/28/graves-yu-palantir-ucsf-partner-with-santa-
clara-county-on-homelessness-breakthrough (reporting on a social impact bond that targeted homeless
people who used many county resources for supportive housing, saving money and improving health
outcomes). For an analysis of risk-based pretrial that results in lower costs and lowerjail populations,
see Jane Wiseman & Stephen Goldsmith, Fairness Is Fiscally Responsible, PRETRIAL JUST. INST. (July
6, 2016), http://www.pretrial.org/faimess-fiscally-responsible. One could imagine that low-level drug
offenders-say, those primarily arrested for possession offenses-might be addicted and thus incura-
ble by being jailed. This hypothetical seems eminently likely, but it is not fatal to a pay-for-perfor-
mance approach. A focus on an effective and parsimonious use of resources would foreground the
idea that incarcerating this group of people incurs a loss of money, a loss of time, and significant
hardship to the "offender" while advancing no end. Any justification remaining would have to come
from retributive concerns, which again are not affected by this framework.
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programs would be penalized under pay-for-performance. In short, it is
much harder to justify net widening in terms of costs, benefits, and effi-
cacy than it is on other theories such as retribution. The same is true for
onerous terms of probation or heavy collateral consequences. Only when
the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the net are hidden can the net get
wider.
Tough 'n' cheap. Pay-for-performance can easily handle concerns
that systems will cut costs by worsening conditions of confinement. The
key, again, is that value creation requires not just cost-savings, but im-
proved outcomes. Cutting meal services, for example, is likely to make
prisons more dangerous,176 just as cutting rehabilitative services both un-
dermines discipline and diminishes prospects for successful re-entry.177 In
a pay-for-performance scheme, these dangers would be foregrounded. The
external harms they would impose would be resisted by other "down-
stream" agents in the system-not just public-interest lawyers, but agents
of the state who would have to devote more of their resources to cleaning
up the mess. Ultimately, the value-creation approach requires that sys-
temic resources be considered, not just local budgets. The value argument
does not replace rights-based arguments, but neither does it contradict
them. It supplements them. Appealing to economic efficiency is a way of
expanding the constituency supporting the unwinding of mass incarcera-
tion. It might even be more effective. The Eighth Amendment limit o
prison conditions leaves much to be desired in terms of speed; it was only
several years after California stipulated that it was violating the Eighth
Amendment that the Supreme Court finally forced it to address the causes
of the violation in Plata.17 8 A value focus might provide quicker feedback
and would give other actors within the system financial incentives to ad-
dress problems.
Punishing the have-nots. A final objection is that criminals with dif-
ferent social backgrounds will be punished disproportionately: that diag-
noses that take into account social deficits will just end up punishing the
poor. If there are deficits, why work on them only in prison? With this
objection, I agree. This is why efficacy and efficiency in treatment goes
only so far and why, ultimately, the wider-ranging reorganization of crim-
inal justice funding will have to include prevention. Criminal justice fund-
ing reform will have to encompass social welfare programs that are not
176. Alysia Santo & Lisa laboni, What 's in a Prison Meal?, MARSHALL PROJECT (July 7, 2015),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/07/07/what-s-in-a-prison-meal (observing that cutbacks in
meals have led to increased violence); see also Maria Godoy, Romen Noodles Are Now the Prison
Currency of Choice, NPR (Aug. 26, 2016, 12:47 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/the-
salt/2016/08/26/491236253/ramen-noodles-are-now-the-prison-currency-of-choice.
177. See Logan, supra note 96, at 28-30 ("Idleness and boredom can be seen as wrong in them-
selves, from a work ethic standpoint, or as so fundamentally related to mischief as to be undesirable
for that reason.").
178. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 507 (2011) ("After this action commenced in 2001, the State
conceded that deficiencies in prison medical care violated prisoners' Eighth Amendment rights.").
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traditionally considered public safety programs but which might, never-
theless, prevent criminal activity. Most people would surely rather pay a
few thousand dollars to subsidize poor children's day care than pay tens
of thousands to subsidize elderly prisoners' healthcare-yet our system,
through neglect and underinvestment, means those forgotten children of
yesterday become the geriatric prisoners of tomorrow. We should have a
system that incentivizes front-end investments and penalizes the misallo-
cation of resources. We should not allocate social welfare resources only
after crime and criminals have been generated. This is the argument that
must be addressed in future research.
Still, it must be noted that our current focus on incapacitation of mil-
lions of people offers no way out. Our existing system is full of poor peo-
ple and people of color-those most disadvantaged by society. At least in
a pay-for-performance system there are incentives to treat offenders, in-
centives for offenders themselves to get treatment, and incentives to re-
lease people when they are ready. Prison subsidies do none of that.179
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to lay out a vision for where criminal jus-
tice might go. It has not been intended to be overly conclusive, nor is the
social science necessarily definitive. Instead, I have sought to introduce a
goal-oriented framework into which the latest research and best practices
might fit in a way that promotes the dissemination and adoption of those
best practices. If it does no more than complement the existing work being
done on criminal justice CBA, it will have done enough.
Throughout the Article, I have focused only on the ways in which
existing treatment could be made more effective. Healthcare economics
has also pointed out another valuable lesson: prevention is much more ef-
fective and efficient than treatment. Future research should explore the
prevention model and draw heavily on work being done in criminal justice
cost-benefit analysis by the Washington State Institute for Public Policy,
the Justice Reinvestment Initiative, and others.180 The real gains in efficacy
and efficiency will only come when we realize that crime prevention out-
side the criminal justice system is less intrusive and more effective than
post facto treatments. Because this approach would require, at a minimum,
greater reorganization of government to allow for greater fungibility of
179. Regulatory capture by service providers could also potentially be an issue. The treatment
industry is big business-called by some the "treatment industrial complex"-and if there were a
greater uptake of diversion instead of prison, there could be the potential that treatment providers
might lobby and skew the distribution of sentencing alternatives. To this I will only say that prison
guards and the prison industry may have already effectively captured the state's interest in incarcera-
tion, and that some countervailing interests might serve to rescue the state from its current captors.
Moreover, the value model assumes that data will be collected on effectiveness and treatment dollars
will go only to those providers and programs that demonstrate efficacy and efficiency. This should
serve to ensure that parties who get more traffic are getting it because they do a good job.
180. See supra Part III.
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resources-including not just criminal justice, but programs such as hous-
ing, education, and income supplements-I will leave it for another time.
The ultimate goal of this project is to outline a research agenda that might
be useful for others to use as they seek to improve the administration of
criminal justice. I know I do not have all the answers; I simply hope to
have identified some of the important questions.
As I have stated in prior articles, there are many different ways to
structure and fund criminal justice systems, and many different ways have
in fact been employed in the United States, from purely local criminal jus-
tice, to unified corrections systems, and other systems in between.' 8 In
this Article, I have proposed another option for us to consider alongside
those alternatives. It is worth remembering that the system that has devel-
oped is historically contingent, not inevitable or constitutionally required.
Moving forward, it is also clear that academic and theoretical writing
are not enough to unwind the carceral state. Policymakers and practition-
ers will have to engage with the system at the process level, working with
those in the system to get their perspective, their detailed knowledge about
policies and processes, to get them to buy in, and maybe even to restructure
their own contracts and performance incentives.
There is a natural tendency to dismiss some or all of the preceding
analysis as utopian, though perhaps not as utopian as the quote from Sam-
uel Butler's novel with which I began the Article. Indeed, utopianism is a
criticism leveled at Porter's work: it cannot work in real life, costing is
difficult, there is no state of the art, diagnoses are difficult, etc.182
I would certainly not claim that restructuring the criminal justice sys-
tem along the lines I have suggested would be easy, but it would at least
take seriously the idea of public safety and make it more than a rhetorical
device to be invoked every time new ground is broken on an unproven,
inefficient prison construction project. In the end, there is nothing to be
lost by trying to re-imagine our present system. Making change happen is
always difficult, but making our present system better-given the very low
bar set-is certainly worth the attempt.
181. See KRAUTH, supra note 26, at 2.
182. See Ball, supra note 69, at 1081-82.
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CONTROLLING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM:
COLORADO AS A CASE STUDY
GABRIEL J. CHINt
ABSTRACT
Criminal justice reformers have recognized that many in the criminal
justice system have the power to incur expenses that will be paid by some-
one else; a city police officer can make an arrest, for example, that will
result in jail expenses paid for by the county, a county prosecutor can
charge a crime which will result in a prison sentence paid for by the state.
There is another, largely unexamined means by which actors in the crimi-
nal justice system can externalize cost: states have donated law enforce-
ment authority to the federal government, and vice versa. Using the exam-
ple of Colorado, this Article maps out the ways in which Colorado shares
arrest and prosecutorial power. The United States, in turn, makes it possi-
ble for Colorado law enforcement officers to make arrests for federal
crimes, and Colorado prosecutors to prosecute them. Because charging au-
thority (and therefore spending authority) has been diffused, it will be
more difficult for decision makers in one jurisdiction to establish binding
criminal justice policy, even in its own courts.
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INTRODUCTION
Contemplation of justice reinvestment requires appreciation of the
diffusion of authority in the system. A growing body of scholarship rec-
ognizes the consequences of the lack of centralization of authority in the
system, and the lack of financial accountability.' A police officer making
t Edward L. Barrett Jr. Chair & Martin Luther King Jr. Professor of Law, UC Davis School
of Law.
1. W. David Ball and others have authored recent important works. See W. David Ball, De-
funding State Prisons, 50 CRIM. L. BULL. 1060,1063-64 (2014); W. David Ball, Tough on Crime (on
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an arrest, a prosecutor charging a case, and a judge imposing a sentence
spends tax dollars which are often or usually paid for by a wholly separate
2government agency or branch. Put another way, the system gives no sug-
gestion to police, prosecutors, and judges that their decisions should be
made with awareness of the costs. If the responsible leaders of govern-
ments paying these costs had a choice, they might often conclude, for ex-
ample, that a ten-year sentence plus hiring a police officer would be a bet-
ter use of resources than a forty-year sentence, or that mental health or
drug addiction treatment for a particular offender was more likely to pro-
mote public safety than a prison sentence. But in many instances, the pros-
ecutor's options are criminal charges or nothing, a judge's options are
prison or nothing, resulting in counter-productive or suboptimal results at
great expense.
This Article addresses ome of the structural difficulties jurisdictions
will face in trying to rein in their criminal justice systems. The central ob-
servation is this: just as there can be no fire without an ignition source,
oxygen, and combustible material, there can be no criminal conviction
without someone willing and able to investigate crime and present it to a
prosecutor, someone willing and authorized to prosecute it, and a court.
Our system widely diffuses authority to investigate arrest and charge-
there are many peace officers and many prosecutors who have broad dis-
cretion about the cases they should pursue.3 The system does not widely
disseminate judicial authority; a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent
or Colorado State Patrol officer with a drug felony can pursue the case
only in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado or the state
District Court for the appropriate county.4 Yet, state and federal criminal
courts have perhaps the least discretion of any actor in the system about
charging; unlike police and prosecutors, they have almost no authority to
reject cases properly brought before them.s Accordingly, each of the many
law enforcement and prosecutorial entities in the criminal justice system
the State's Dime): How Violent Crime Does Not Drive California Counties' Incarceration Rates-
And Why It Should, 28 GA. ST. L. REV. 987, 1004 (2012); see also, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, Con-
solidating Local Criminal Justice: Should Prosecutors Control the Jails?, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
677, 678-79 (2016) ("Put briefly, prosecutors do not have to internalize the costs of their sentencing
decisions because they do not have to run and pay for the prisons and jails. That responsibility falls to
the wardens who run the prisons and the sheriffs who run the jails."); Michael Polakowski & Michael
Gottfredson, The Use of Prisons as a Commons Problem: An Exploratory Study, 33 J. RES. CRIME &
DELINQ. 70, 74 (1996) (examining common pool use of prison space and promoting the allocation of
prison space based on a jurisdiction's crime rate). Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins coined the
phrase the "correctional free lunch." FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF
IMPRISONMENT 140 (1991). The economics literature also addresses the issues. See, e.g., Kenneth L.
Avvio, The Economics ofPrisons, 6 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 143, 143 (1998).
2. See Gershowitz, supra note 1, at 678-79.
3. Id. at 677.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed. . . ."); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16.
5. See notes 53-54, infra, and accompanying text.
498 [Vol. 94:3
2017] CONTROLLING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
can attempt to implement its own criminal justice policy, seeking to per-
suade like-minded others to help carry it out. Because the criminal justice
system now widely disseminates investigating and charging power, to
make it possible to impose a unified criminal justice strategy will require
significant structural changes.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF STATE OFFICERS
One structural challenge in controlling the criminal justice system
legislatively comes from Supreme Court cases. Supreme Court cases
sometimes say that particular criminal justice actions are permitted only
when founded on a statute meeting particular constitutional criteria, for
6
example, the wiretap case of Berger v. New York. More often though, the
Court declares that certain conduct by state officers is lawful even without
an authorizing statute.7 That is, the Court reads the Constitution, essen-
tially, as granting a set of specific powers to police which are reasonable
even if unauthorized by the law of the jurisdiction empowering and paying
the police. Thus, in Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court upheld the practice
of stop and frisk9 apparently without considering whether the Ohio legis-
lature believed it to be legitimate or desirable.'0
It is not merely that the Court grants police the power to commit acts
not authorized by state law. In Virginia v. Moore," the Court held the
Fourth Amendment deemed reasonable even actions prohibited by state
law.12 Specifically, "warrantless arrests for crimes committed in the pres-
ence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the Constitution, and that
while States are free to regulate such arrests however they desire, state
restrictions do not alter the Fourth Amendment's protections.',13
6. 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967) ("[W]e have concluded that he statute is deficient on its face . . .
7. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968); id. at 31-32 (Harlan, J., concurring).
8. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring).
9. The Court's holding was as follows:
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude
in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of inves-
tigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries,
and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear
for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the
area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt
to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be introduced
in evidence against the person from whom they were taken.
Id. at 30-31 (majority opinion).
10. Id. at 31-32 (Harlan, J., concurring).
I1. 553 U.S. 164 (2008).
12. Id. at 178.
13. Id at 176. The Court reasoned that the protection of the Fourth Amendment should not vary
jurisdiction by jurisdiction, an odd and, in my view, unpersuasive reason standing alone in that officers
generally work in one jurisdiction, and the criminal law of each jurisdiction varies from state to state
and between the states and the United States. Accordingly, a well-trained officer is going to have to
know the specifics of that jurisdiction's criminal offenses and procedures.
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Of course, state legislatures and courts can pass their own laws and
rules regulating the criminal justice system and its actors.14 But here, too,
federal law imposes limits. To a significant degree, states and localities
can be subjected to federal statutory requirements." And while the princi-
ple of Printz v. United Statesl6 provides that states and their employees
cannot be "commandeered" to carry out federal legislation,17 there is some
authority that Congress can permit state employees to engage in conduct.is
A provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INS) invites govern-
ment officials-not necessarily limited to law enforcement officers-to
exchange immigration information with the INS:
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a
Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit,
or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending
to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service in-
formation regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or
unlawful, of any individual.19
Many localities have policies restricting or prohibiting their officers
from investigating immigration matters;20 one of them, the City of New
York, sued to have the policy declared unconstitutional.2' The Second Cir-
cuit held that the United States had the power to insist that state and local
employees disobey the instructions of their employers: "states do not re-
tain under the Tenth Amendment an untrammeled right to forbid all vol-
untary cooperation by state or local officials with particular federal pro-
grams."22 Federal displacement of state authority over its employees in a
regime when the federal government cannot direct and control state em-
ployees directly creates employees who, on this issue, can act unilaterally
and be answerable to no one.23 Another example of federal displacement
of state authority is the Law Enforcement Officer's Safety Act, allowing
14. See id.; McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943) (recognizing "supervisory au-
thority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts"); People v. Renander, 151 P.3d
657, 660 (Colo. App. 2006) (noting court's "supervisory authority to protect the integrity of the judi-
cial process").
15. See, e.g., Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 143 (2000); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530-31 (1985).
16. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
17. Id. at 928, 935.
18. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2012).
19. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1644 ("Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or
local law, no State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted, from sending
to or receiving from the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the immigra-
tion status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States.").
20. See Ingrid v. Eagly, Immigrant Protective Policies in Criminal Justice, 95 TEX. L. REV.
245, 256-57 (2016).
21. City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1999).
22. Id. at 35. But see Sturgeon v. Bratton, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718, 724 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (up-
holding LAPD rule restricting immigration investigations).
23. The home rule provisions of Colorado's constitution also may impose some limits on state
regulation of peace officers. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police, Colo. Lodge No. 27 v. City & Cty. of
Denver, 926 P.2d 582, 584-585 (Colo. 1996).
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specified state and local police to carry firearms nationally, without regard
to state law, or their own department's policies.24
II. BROAD DIFFUSION OF STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY
Colorado law makes many categories of persons peace officers, with
powers to arrest,25 apply for, and execute warrants26 or orders to produce
records,27 and sign a summons and complaint.28 Not surprisingly, "peace
officers" include police officers of a municipal police department,29 sher-
iffs and deputy sheriffs,30 town marshals and deputy marshals,31 reserve
32
police deputy sheriffs, deputy marshals, Officers of the Colorado State
Patrol,33 and agents of the Colorado Bureau of Investigation.34 But the fifty
or so categories listed in the Colorado Revised Statutes also include, for
example, the Commissioner of Agriculture35 and members of the Public
Utilities Commission.36
District attorneys are the principal prosecutors in the state,37 and they
may get investigative support and case referrals from the police and sher-
iffs in their counties. However, they do not need to rely on other agencies.
They may employ investigators who are peace officers.3 8 Indeed, district
attorneys, including deputy, assistant, and special assistant district attor-
neys, are themselves peace officers.39 Similarly, while the attorney general
has more constrained criminal jurisdiction, attorney general investigators
are peace officers,4 0 as are the Attorney General and deputies and assis-
tants involved in criminal enforcement or who are so designated.4 1
24. 18 U.S.C. § 926B(a) (2012).
25. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-102 (2016).
26. Id. § 16-3-305(5).
27. Id. § 16-3-301.1(5)(a).
28. Id. § 16-2-104.
29. Id. § 16-2.5-105.
30. Id. § 16-2.5-103(1).
31. Id. § 16-2.5-108.
32. Id. § 16-2.5-110(l)(b).
33. Id. § 16-2.5-114.
34. Id.§ 16-2.5-113.
35. Id § 16-2.5-118.
36. Id § 16-2.5-143.
37. People ex rel. Losavio v. Gentry, 606 P.2d 57, 62 (Colo. 1980).
38. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-2.5-133 ("A district attorney chief investigator and a district attor-
ney investigator are peace officers whose authority shall include the enforcement of all laws of the
state of Colorado and who may be certified by the P.O.S.T. board.").
39. Id. § 16-2.5-132 ("A district attorney, an assistant district attorney, a chief deputy district
attorney, a deputy district attorney, a special deputy district attorney, and a special prosecutor are peace
officers whose authority shall include the enforcement of all laws of the state of Colorado and who
may be certified by the P.O.S.T. board.").
40. Id § 16-2.5-129 ("An attorney general criminal investigator is a peace officer whose au-
thority shall include the enforcement of all laws of the state of Colorado and who shall be certified by
the P.O.S.T. board.").
41. Id. § 16-2.5-128 ("The attorney general, chief deputy attorney general, solicitor general,
assistant solicitors general, deputy attorneys general, assistant attorneys general of criminal enforce-
ment, and certain other assistant attorneys general and employees of the department of law who are
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There has been litigation about the authority of peace officers who
are off duty and with regard to those working in a limited geographical
jurisdiction. The Colorado Supreme Court has held that peace officers may
42
make arrests off duty. However, conviction of a suspect for resisting ar-
rest based on an off-duty arrest may require evidence that the arrest was
authorized by the employing agency.43
The Colorado Supreme Court has recognized that peace officers may
investigate throughout the state if they are working on crimes that may
have taken place in their jurisdiction.4 However, in People v. Wolf,45 the
Court held that officers could generally only make arrests within their ju-
risdiction, yet declined to impose an exclusionary sanction because the ar-
rest was made based on probable cause.46 Justice Quinn dissented, insist-
ing that a geographical restriction "help[s] to preserve the political auton-
omy of municipal and county subdivisions of government by limiting the
extraterritorial authority of municipal police officers to the carefully de-
fined exigencies therein described."47 The Court later stated "that in many
situations citizens of a particular community may best be served by the
requirement that local officers familiar with local neighborhoods accom-
pany peace officers from other jurisdictions seeking to arrest a defendant
allegedly present in the community."48 The legislature at least partially
disagreed, subsequently enacting a statute allowing peace officers to make
arrests for crimes taking place in their presence anywhere in the state.49
designated by the attorney general are peace officers whose authority shall include the enforcement of
all laws of the state of Colorado and who may be certified by the P.O.S.T. board.").
42. People v. Rael, 597 P.2d 584, 586 (Colo. 1979) (permitting off-duty arrests by holding
"[a]uthority for performance of the duty, service or function is not limited by the person's status as an
On-duty peace officer").
43. People in Interest of J.J.C., 854 P.2d 801, 802 (Colo. 1993) (en banc); see also COLO. REV.
STAT. § 16-3-109 (allowing off-duty arrests).
44. People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 200 (Colo. 1984), abrogated on other grounds by People v.
Begay, 325 P.3d 1026 (Colo. 2014). Similarly, the attorney general may investigate in situations where
prosecution is limited to a district attorney. People v. Corr, 682 P.2d 20, 23 n.10 (Colo. 1984) ("We
agree with the Attomey General that statutory investigative powers can exist independent of prosecu-
torial powers.").
45. 635 P.2d 213 (Colo. 1981) (en banc).
46. Id. at 217 ("Since the arrest in this case did not offend against constitutional restraints on
unreasonable seizures, we decline to impose the exclusionary rule as a remedy for the statutory viola-
tion. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979). None-
theless, we do not approve of the actions of the Denver police which were in violation of the statutes
governing their authority to arrest. Law enforcement officers hould not make excursions into another
jurisdiction to ferret out crime without first securing approval of the law enforcement authorities in
that jurisdiction, or to make an arrest when they are not in fresh pursuit.").
47. Wolf 635 P.2d at 218 (Quinn, J., dissenting).
48. People v. Hamilton, 666 P.2d 152, 155 (Colo. 1983).
49. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-110(2) (2016) ("A peace officer shall have the authority to act in
any situation in which a felony or misdemeanor has been or is being committed in such officer's pres-
ence, and such authority shall exist regardless of whether such officer is in the jurisdiction of the law
enforcement agency that employs such officer or in some other jurisdiction within the state of Colo-
rado or whether such officer was acting within the scope of such officer's duties when he or she ob-
served the commission of the crime, when such officer has been authorized by such agency to so act.").
502 [Vol. 94:3
2017] CONTROLLING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 503
Discretion is a key aspect of peace officer authority. Law enforce-
ment officers are given power to make arrests or file charges, but they are
not generally required to do so.50 Similarly, in cases recognizing both the
right to pursue or not pursue particular charges,5 ' the Court has recognized
"the prosecutorial discretion vested in the district attorney by separation
of powers principles."52 However, courts enjoy no such discretion.53 Col-
orado law provides that a sentencing judge "shall" impose a sentence as
provided by law following a conviction.54
III. SHARED STATE AND FEDERAL POWERS
A. Colorado Donation ofPowers to the United States
Several provisions of Colorado law grant law enforcement powers to
federal law enforcement officers. Of course, federal agents can act under
federal authority in the course of their jobs with no requirement of state
permission. Nevertheless, the state has invited federal agents to enforce
56
Colorado law in several provisions.
First, Colorado law provides that specified federal law enforcement
officers are Colorado peace officers, including agents and officers of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Fire-
arms, and Explosives (BATFE); U.S. Marshals Service; Federal Protective
50. Gregory Howard Williams, Police Discretion: A Comparative Perspective, 64 IND. L.J.
873, 894 (1989) ("Operational statutes with mandatory enforcement language are presently in decline
and are being replaced by provisions much like those found in [COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-102
(1986)] . . . ."); see also People v. Triantos, 55 P.3d 131, 135 (Colo, 2002) ("[T]he statute grants
arresting officers discretion to release or not, but nothing indicates the arrest cannot be a full custodial
arrest, and the release after a search incident thereto.").
51. People v. Dist. Court, 527 P.2d 50, 52 (Colo. 1974) ("The statute relating to deferred pros-
ecution, above cited, provides that prosecution is deferred upon order of the court 'with the consent of
the defendant and the prosecution.' The prosecutor's consent is a matter of prosecutorial discretion
just as is the choice of several possible charges to press or the decision to move for the dismissal of a
criminal charge." (citations omitted)).
52. People v. Storlie, 327 P.3d 243, 246 (Colo. 2014); see also People v. Weiss, 133 P.3d 1180,
1189 (Colo. 2006) ("Prosecutorial discretion to bring or not bring charges is extraordinarily wide.").
53. Annotation, Power ofCourt to Enter Nolle Prosequi or Dismiss Prosecution, 69 A.L.R. 240
(1930) ("[T]he court has no power, in the absence of statute, to dismiss a prosecution or to enter a
nolle prosequi to a good indictment, over the protest or objection of the prosecuting attorney." (citing
People v. Zobel, 130 P. 837, 838 (Colo. 1913) (further citations omitted))).
54. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401(6) ("In imposing a sentence to incarceration, the court shall
impose a definite sentence which is within the presumptive ranges . . . unless it concludes that extraor-
dinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances are present, are based on evidence in the record of the
sentencing hearing and the presentence report, and support a different sentence which better serves the
purposes of this code with respect to sentencing, as set forth in Section 18-1-102.5. If the court finds
such extraordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances, it may impose a sentence which is lesser
or greater than the presumptive range; except that in no case shall the term of sentence be greater than
twice the maximum nor less than one-half the minimum term authorized in the presumptive range for
the punishment of the offense."); see also, e.g., Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916) (ex-
plaining that "the right to relieve from the punishment fixed by law and ascertained according to the
methods by it provided, belongs to the executive department" not courts).
55. Forrest v. Jack, 294 U.S. 158, 162 (1935) (stating that a federal regulator "acts under federal
authority and . . . may not be trammeled, controlled, or prevented by state laws").
56. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-2.5-147(1), 16-2.5-151,16-3-110.
DENVER LAWREVIEW
Service; Homeland Security and Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Agents;57 and Secret Service.5 In addition, apparently even if not a peace
officer under the above sections, "[a] federal law enforcement officer who,
pursuant to federal statutes and the policy of the agency by which the of-
ficer is employed, is authorized to use deadly physical force in the perfor-
mance of his or her duties" can use force and make arrests based on a crime
committed in the officer's presence.59 The Tenth Circuit upheld a convic-
tion under the Assimilative Crimes Act for violating a Colorado statute
prohibiting hindering a peace officer.60 The Court explained that "what-
ever his status under federal law, Commander Lundy, along with his fel-
low Federal Protective Service officers, is clearly and expressly treated as
a 'peace officer' for purposes of Colorado law." 61
Colorado law also provides for broad appointment of special deputy
district attorneys.62 The function of this appointment is to allow other state
and federal prosecutors to prosecute Colorado crimes on their own, with-
out requiring the time of the regular district attorney's staff. These specials
are unpaid, and
[s]uch special deputies shall only be appointed from among those per-
sons holding office as attorney general, deputy attorney general, assis-
tant attorney general, or special assistant attorney general of the state
of Colorado, or as district attorney, assistant district attorney, chief
deputy district attorney, or deputy district attorney of another judicial
district, or as United States attorney or assistant United States attorney
for the district of Colorado, or as city attorney or assistant city attorney
of a city and county in this state, or an attorney employed by the Col-
orado district attorneys' council and actively licensed to practice law
in the state of Colorado.63
57. Id. § 16-2.5-147(1) ("A special agent of the federal bureau of investigation or the United
States bureau of alcohol, tobacco, firearms, and explosives, a deputy or special deputy United States
marshal, or an officer of the federal protective service of the United States department of homeland
security immigration and customs enforcement, in any jurisdiction within the state of Colorado, is a
peace officer whose authority is limited as provided in this section. The special agent, deputy or special
deputy, or officer is authorized to act in the following circumstances: (a) The special agent, deputy or
special deputy, or officer is: (I) Responding to a nonfederal felony or misdemeanor that has been
committed in the presence of the special agent, deputy or special deputy, or officer; (II) Responding
to an emergency situation in which the special agent, deputy or special deputy, or officer has probable
cause to believe that a nonfederal felony or misdemeanor involving injury or threat of injury to a
person or property has been, or is being, committed and immediate action is required to prevent escape,
serious bodily injury, or destruction of property; (III) Rendering assistance at the request of a Colorado
peace officer; or (IV) Effecting an arrest or providing assistance as part of a bona fide task force or
joint investigation with Colorado peace officers; and (b) The agent, deputy or special deputy, or officer
acts in accordance with the rules and regulations of his or her employing agency.").
58. Id. § 16-2.5-151.
59. Id. § 16-3-110.
60. United States v. Baldwin, 745 F.3d 1027, 1035 (10th Cir. 2014).
61. Id.
62. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 20-1-201(1)(c).
63. Id. This statute legislatively overruled People ex rel. Brown v. District Court, 585 P.2d 593
(Colo. 1978), which held that an assistant attorney general could not also be appointed as a special
assistant district attorney.
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Special deputy district attorneys serve at the pleasure of the district
attorney and, therefore, presumably could be closely supervised if such is
the desire of the agency. On the other hand, the door could also be opened
to an essentially wholesale delegation of authority to other lawyers, in-
64
cluding Assistant U.S. Attorneys. One could imagine that if a district at-
torney delegated authority to a member of another respected prosecutorial
institution, close monitoring of the cases pursued would not be a high pri-
ority. After all, the prosecutions would come at no expense to the district
attorney, and in the absence of disproportionately poor results or negative
publicity, there might seem little point.
Presumably, no Colorado law enforcement official has the authority
to supervise, instruct, or discipline the peace officers who are federal em-
ployees.65 They may act, as may all Colorado peace officers, in their dis-
-66
cretion.
B. Federal Donation ofAuthority to Colorado
Federal law also grants substantial state authority to state and local
officials. In terms of arrest authority, it was once thought that the right of
state officers to make an arrest for a federal crime turned on state law.67
More recently the Court has held that even for arrests for state crimes, state
law does not determine the validity of an arrest.68 The Tenth Circuit has
recognized the general rule that "[t]he federal constitution allows a state
law enforcement officer to make an arrest for any crime, including federal
immigration offenses."69 This is true if Colorado law fails to authorize or
even prohibits such arrests for federal crimes.7 0 In addition, state officers
64. COLO. REV. STAT. § 20-1-201(1)(c).
65. Cf Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 54 (1890).
66. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-2.5-101(1).
67. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589-90 (1948) ("[I]n [the] absence of an applicable
federal statute the law of the state where an arrest without warrant takes place determines its valid-
ity."); Marsh v. United States, 29 F.2d 172, 173 (2d Cir. 1928) ("Assuming, however, that the trooper
stopped the car for the violation of a local ordinance, and either saw the liquors or was told of them
by the defendant, we have yet to determine whether his seizure of them was lawful. This, as we view
it, is a question only of state law, unless we have recourse to some common law of federal criminal
procedure, if any there be. We think that the state law authorized what he did, and find it unnecessary
to consider the alternative." (citations omitted)); I ORFIELD'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE
FEDERAL RULES § 4:6, Westlaw (database updated June 2016) (cataloging older authorities looking to
state law).
68. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) ("We conclude that warrantless arrests for
crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the Constitution, and
that while States are free to regulate such arrests however they desire, state restrictions do not alter the
Fourth Amendment's protections.").
69. United States v. Argueta-Mejia, 615 F. App'x 485, 488 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing United
States v. Santana-Garcia, 264 F.3d 1188, 1193-94 (10th Cir. 2001)); see also United States v.
Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294, 1296 (10th Cir. 1999); cf George Bach, State Law to the Contrary?
Examining Potential Limits on the Authority of State and Local Law Enforcement to Enforce Federal
Immigration Law, 22 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 67, 67 (2012).
70. United States v. Turner, 553 F.3d 1337, 1346 (10th Cir. 2009) ("In light of Moore, whether
APD had authority under Colorado law to arrest Mr. Turner is irrelevant. Moore makes clear that if
officers have probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed in their presence, they may
arrest and search incident to that arrest without violating the Fourth Amendment, even if such police
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may actually be given the status of federal law enforcement officers, rather
than acting in their state capacities.7 Thus, they gain any specific powers
or rights beyond arrest that might be applicable to particular federal offic-
ers. Federal law also provides that attorneys who are not federal prosecu-
tors may be made Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys to participate in or pur-
72sue federal cases.
It is frequently the case that state officers make arrests that wind up
being prosecuted in federal court.7 3 By the same token, federal arrests of-
74ten result in Colorado prosecutions. There is nothing inherently wrong
with handing off arrests to a different level of government. In particular
cases, sound reasons might militate in favor of prosecution by one juris-
diction rather than another; the state may have expertise and experience
with respect to certain types of crimes, or preferable treatment or sentenc-
ing options.
Yet, this practice represents a grant of power to law enforcement;
state and local police can "shop" cases to prosecutors willing to take them.
If the local district attorney finds a case or category of cases unacceptable
or to be a low priority, perhaps it can go to a U.S. Attorney to be prosecuted
in federal court (and vice versa). It could even be prosecuted in state court
by a special deputy district attorney who is a member of the U.S. Attor-
ney's Office or another state office. In principle, this means that Colorado
(and the United States) could not remove their police and prosecutors from
action is not authorized by state law. In other words, state law does not determine the reasonableness
of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. We recently applied Moore in United States v. Gonzales,
535 F.3d 1174, 1183 (10th Cir. 2008), which is directly on point here. In that case, we held that police
officers' traffic stop of the defendant, outside of their jurisdiction and in violation of Colorado law,
did not violate the Fourth Amendment.").
71. United States v. Cook, 794 F.2d 561, 564 (10th Cir. 1986) (explaining that "the two state
police officers were deputized as Special Deputy United States Marshals" and thus were properly
permitted to see otherwise confidential federal grand jury materials).
72. Victoria L. Killion, Comment, No Points for the Assist? A Closer Look at the Role ofSpecial
Assistant United States Attorneys in the Cooperative Model of Federal Prosecutions, 82 TEMP. L.
REv. 789, 792-93 (2009); see also Susan Hoyt, Daniel P. Rubinstein Appointed District Attorney for
21st Judicial District, COLO. BAR ASS'N LEGAL CONNECTION (Oct. 7, 2015), http://cbaclelegalcon-
nection.com/2015/10/daniel-p-rubinstein-appointed-district-attorney-for-21st-judicial-district (no ing
that "[flrom 2005 to 2011, [District Attorney Daniel P. Rubenstein] was cross-designated as a Special
Assistant U.S. Attorney where he targeted cartels and organized crime").
73. See United States v. Novitsky, 58 F. App'x 432,433-34 (10th Cir. 2003) (allowing an arrest
by a state officer for possession of a firearm by person with a felony conviction to be tried in federal
court); Moreland v. United States, 347 F.2d 376, 377 (10th Cir. 1965) (allowing an arrest by a state
officer for robbery ofU.S. property); United States v. Argueta-Mejia, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1219 (D.
Colo. 2014) (allowing a state officer to arrest an individual for reentry after deportation), aff'd, 615 F.
App'x 485 (10th Cir. 2015); United States v. Paetsch, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1210-11 (D. Colo. 2012)
(allowing an arrest by state officers for bank robbery), aff'd, 782 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2015).
74. United States v. Galindo, 543 F. App'x 862, 867 (10th Cir. 2013) ("The evidence at trial
established that Officer Skelton has worked with the DEA Task Force since 2007, has been formally
deputized by the DEA, and carries DEA credentials ... investigations that are managed and controlled
by the DEA nevertheless are frequently charged in state court."); People v. Spring, 713 P.2d 865, 871
(Colo. 1985) (allowing ATF agents arrest of a murder suspect), rev'd, 479 U.S. 564 (1987); People v.
Ridley, 872 P.2d 1377, 1378 (Colo. App. 1994) (discussing a DEA investigation leading to state court
drug prosecution).
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particular fields of prosecution simply by decriminalizing the conduct. Po-
lice and prosecutors might be able pursue such cases while wearing their
other hats, just as, say New York police assisted in the enforcement of
alcohol prohibition after the repeal of state prohibition.75 In addition, po-
lice and prosecutors can avoid Colorado (or United States) procedural and
evidentiary rules by pursuing the case in the other jurisdiction.
State and federal authorities often work together. There are several
ongoing joint state-federal task forces, including the Joint Terrorism Task
Force,n the Southern Colorado Drug Task Force, and a BATFE task
75. Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310, 315 (1927) ("[F]acts of which we take judicial
notice . . . . make it clear that the state troopers believed that they were required by law to aid in
enforcing the National Prohibition Act, and that they made this arrest, search, and seizure, in the per-
formance of that supposed uty, solely for the purpose of aiding in the federal prosecution.").
76. United States v. Mosko, 654 F. Supp. 402, 405-06 (D. Colo. 1987) ("The defendants also
argue that the pen register evidence should be suppressed because the applications and court orders
failed to comply with Colorado case law holding that pen registers are a search within the meaning of
the Colorado Constitution and therefore require a search warrant supported by probable cause. People
v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 139-40 (Colo. 1983). This court has previously held that state law on this
point is irrelevant to a federal investigation and prosecution. United States v. Grabow, 621 F. Supp.
787, 794 (D. Colo. 1985)."), affd sub nom. United States v. Pinelli, 890 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir. 1989);
see also, e.g., Butterwood v. United States, 365 F.2d 380, 384 (10th Cir. 1966) ("[The McNabb-Mal-
lory Rule] was promulgated in pursuance of the federal court's supervisory power over federal prose-
cutions. It is not a Constitutional prohibition. It applies only to federal officials and an arrest under
federal law. It has no application to an arrest made under state law. Here, appellant was arrested by
state police and incarcerated by the state for suspicion of having violated a state law." (citation omit-
ted)); cf Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 306 (2009) (noting that McNabb-Mallory Rule remains
in effect).
77. United States v. Ford, 550 F.3d 975, 977 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008) ("[Colorado's Joint Terrorism
Task Force] is a law enforcement task force comprised of the FBI and other federal, state, and local
law enforcement agencies that investigate crimes involving international and domestic terrorism.");
see also Tung Yin, Joint Terrorism Task Forces as a Window into the Security vs. Civil Liberties
Debate, 13 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 1, 3 (2011) ("Other counterterrorism investigations involve coop-
erative ventures between state and federal forces, typically through a Joint Terrorism Task Force
(JTTF). In a typical JTTF arrangement, the local police department assigns a number of its officers to
work on the task force with federal agents. Although the local officers remain paid by their local
department, they are considered federal agents for most purposes, including the United States' re-
spondeat superior liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act for their tortious conduct. As of 2011,
over one hundred American cities are participating in JTTFs.").
78. See United States v. Jones, 69 F. App'x 401, 402 (10th Cir. 2003) (involving an appeal
involving a case brought by Southern Colorado Drug Task Force). There is also a Rocky Mountain
High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area. See ROCKY MOUNTAIN HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING
AREA, http://www.rmhidta.org (last visited Apr. 14, 2017); see also 21 U.S.C. § 1706(a)(2) (2006)
(repealed 2010) ("The purpose of the [HIDTA] Program is to reduce drug trafficking and drug pro-
duction in the United States by [] facilitating cooperation among Federal, State, local, and tribal law
enforcement agencies to share information and implement coordinated enforcement activities.").
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force;79 others appear to come and go.80 There is also state-federal cooper-
ation on an ad hoc basis.81 These entities, which are neither wholly state
nor wholly federal, also create room for officers to pursue their own poli-
cies with some independence from their employing jurisdiction. Thus, for
example, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado held that state
officers had no obligation to comply with Colorado law requiring the re-
turn of medical marijuana seized pursuant to a Colorado search warrant
because the officers were part of a federal task force and could rely on
federal law.82
CONCLUSION
To be sure, the United States, Colorado, and their officials have
means of carrying out criminal justice policies. If officers or prosecutors
of one jurisdiction abused their borrowed authority, their designations
79. The Pueblo Police website notes that "[flour detectives are assigned to the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration Southern Colorado Drug Task Force, 2 detectives are assigned to the Bureau of
Alcohol Tobacco Firearms Explosives (BATFE) Gun Task Force and I detective [is] assigned to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation Joint Terrorism Task Force." See Pueblo Police: Narcotics/Vice Sec-
tion, CITY OF PUEBLO COLORADO, http://www.pueblo.us/430/Narcotics-Vice-Section (last visited
Apr. 14, 2017).
80. See United States v. Zapata, 245 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1167 (D. Colo. 2003) ("Vail Police
Department continued coordinated efforts with federal agents in an investigation and sting of a sus-
pected cocaine ring in Eagle County, Colorado. The multi-jurisdictional investigators composed a drug
task force."); see also United States v. Grabow, 621 F. Supp. 787, 789 (D. Colo. 1985) (referring to
"a Denver Police Department detective assigned to the Drug Enforcement Administration Task
Force"); People v. O'Hara, 240 P.3d 283, 284 (Colo. App. 2010) ("This case arises from a joint law
enforcement task force operation based in Grand Junction, Colorado. The operation's purpose was to
target major illegal drug dealers in the area."), aff'd, 271 P.3d 503 (Colo. 2012).
81. See People v. Arapu, 283 P.3d 680, 681 (Colo. 2012) ("Federal Immigration and Customs
Enforcement ("ICE") agents sought to contact Arapu, suspecting he was in the country illegally. In
accordance with their standard protocol, ICE requested assistance from local law enforcement, in this
case, the Aspen Police Department."); see also People v. Montoya, 517 P.2d 401, 401 (Colo. 1973)
("The marijuana was seized after federal agents and local policemen had broken into defendant's home
on September 27, 1972, under an Arrest warrant."); People v. Genrich, 928 P.2d 799, 801 (Colo. App.
1996) ("Defendant's convictions arose out of three different incidents in which pipe bombs exploded
and injured one victim and killed two other victims. After a lengthy and extensive investigation that
included various suspects, law enforcement officers focused on defendant and he was ultimately
charged. The investigating officers included both local police officers and agents of the Federal Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF).").
82. In so holding, the court concluded the following:
Regarding the first element, Nord initially disputes that the Respondents were acting as
federal agents because, among other things, they confiscated Nord's property pursuant to
a state court issued warrant. However, Respondents were either federal employees
(Cortinovis) or deputized DEA agents (Hoefner, Lovin, Kelliher, Murphy, and Reece) who
worked full time for a DEA-sponsored task force supervised by DEA personnel. Courts
have consistently treated local law enforcement agents deputized as federal agents and act-
ing as part of a federal task force as federal agents. See United States v. Martin, 163 F.3d
1212, 1214 (10th Cir. 1998) (local police detective deputized to participate in federal nar-
cotics investigation is a federal officer within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B));
United States v. Torres, 862 F.2d 1025, 1030 (3d Cir. 1988) (same); Amoakohene v.
Bobko, 792 F. Supp. 605, 607 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (arrestee prohibited from bringing § 1983
suit against DEA task-force members, including deputized local law enforcement officers,
because task-force members were acting as federal agents, not state actors, even though
they arrested him on municipal charges).
People v. Nord, 377 F. Supp. 2d 945, 949 (D. Colo. 2005).
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could be revoked, or the legislature could decide to change the law, for
example, to modify or eliminate the Special Assistant U.S. Attorney pro-
gram. In addition, through institutions like Criminal Justice Coordinating
Councils, jurisdictions attempt to monitor the system as a whole.83 Never-
theless, diffusion of police and prosecutorial authority make the problem
of monitoring and controlling the criminal justice system much more dif-
ficult.
83. See Adams County Crim. Just. Coordinating Council - CJCC, ADAMS COUNTY COLO.,
https://www.adcogov.org/criminal-justice-coordinating-council-cjcc (last visited Apr. 14, 2017)
("The Adams County Criminal Justice Coordinating Council (CJCC), serves as the designated inde-
pendent advisory body within the jurisdiction to address systemic criminal justice, juvenile justice and
victim services issues informed by evidence-based practices and guided by evidence-based deci-
sion-making."); see also ROBERT C. CUSHMAN, NAT'L INST. OF CORRECTIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF




FROM SYMPOSIUM TO ACTION: FIVE WAYS FOR LAW
SCHOOLS TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN STUDENTS AND
MARGINALIZED COMMUNITIES
ALEXI FREEMANt
Justice Reinvestment: The Solution to Mass Incarceration? brought
organizers, public defenders, prosecutors, community and policy advo-
cates, social workers, and more to our law school space. Together, we
learned how organized grassroots communities have become outraged at
the massive influx of resources going towards the criminal justice sys-
tem-from prisons, to parole systems, to prosecution offices, to police
departments-instead of being invested in institutions and structures that
can bring stability and opportunity to communities. Early childhood edu-
cation, safe and affordable housing, long-term employment, and high-
quality public schools, for example, go unfunded or underfunded, leaving
communities to struggle and suffer. Failure to invest in these critical are-
as also leads to more involvement in the criminal justice system, making
communities less safe and perpetuating generational cycles of poverty,
injustice, and inequity.
Justice reinvestment-the idea of resizing and reprioritizing the
criminal justice system and redistributing funds-has become an urgent
demand of marginalized communities. Law schools, institutions whose
resources and expertise could support such efforts and make a real im-
pact, are often largely disconnected from communities and this cam-
paign. Unfortunately, this is not a surprise to many. Law schools can
often be too far removed from the real concerns of people on the ground.
We become immersed in our studies and our scholarship, transfixed by
all things "law." Even with the growth of clinics and experiential learn-
ing opportunities, which tend to provide an outlet to contribute to com-
munity needs, if we are not extremely intentional, we can easily bypass
the moral obligation we have to listen to and learn from communities.
Indeed, when we do venture out of our siloed legal world, we typically
parachute in to share our expertise and provide direction to others.
This symposium reminded us that we must do more to bridge the
gap that exists between law students and the outside world. More specifi-
cally, we must find ways to connect our students to the marginalized
communities who are demanding their voices be heard. Law students and
t Alexi Freeman, JD Harvard Law School, is Associate Professor of the Practice and Direc-
tor of Extemships and Public Interest Initiatives, at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
Thanks to students Katie Steefel and Kate Sanford for their efforts in putting together an incredibly
robust social justice focused symposium and for valuing reflection as scholarship.
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lawyers have a role to play in campaigns like the fight for justice rein-
vestment, but we have to do a far better job of preparing future lawyers
for what such a fight entails.
There are many ways to transform law schools over the long term
so that the lines between law school and community begin to blur. We
need to engage in the in-depth analysis and study that is needed to trans-
form legal education so it can become a structure that supports marginal-
ized communities and teaches students how to support communities as
lawyers. But, there are also small steps that we can take that will begin to
pave the way for such a transformation, while simultaneously connecting
students to communities, their concerns, and their campaigns.
Here are five steps law schools can take right now:
1. Expand the types of required reading for students, and align
more of the curriculum with social movements.
Cases, statutes, and law review articles all have a place, but they
cannot teach students everything there is to know about the law, let alone
social change work. Too often, we fail to provide the sociopolitical con-
text that is needed to understand complex crises and inequities and, thus,
our students leave us with a lens that is far too discrete and singular. As
students read a case, they also need to read about the corresponding so-
cial movement. As students study statutory language, they need to study
the campaign that led to the enactment of the law. We have the ability to
contextualize many, if not most, legal issues alongside historic and cur-
rent movements-now, we rarely ask students to study any. This is true
in the context of justice reinvestment as well. Numerous studies and re-
ports exist that focus on justice reinvestment from a range of perspec-
tives. Youth testimonials on their experiences with lack of investment in
their education and overinvestment in the militarization of their schools
and criminalization of their behaviors exists. Videos, news articles,
books, blog posts, and more documenting grassroots movements to fight
for justice reform exist. We must integrate these sorts of studies into our
curriculum.
2. Expand who is deemed qualified to teach and supervise our
students, and create opportunities for students to pursue sys-
tems change work.
Law schools typically train students to think like lawyers; hence,
lawyers typically think only like lawyers. Because of what we fail to do,
many have no idea how to comprehend even tackling an issue like justice
reinvestment. Organizers, youth leaders, policy advocates, social work-
ers, communications specialists, and lobbyists, among others, play inte-
gral roles in fighting for systemic social change. Our students, however,
get little to no exposure to such experts in the classroom or in the field.
We need to change this so we can better replicate their future realities
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and expand their appreciation for other necessary perspectives. We need
to allow students to pursue field placements with non-lawyers, and we
need to allow non-lawyers to teach classes within our building as well. It
is not enough to simply allow our students to enroll in courses at their
own free will in other graduate programs. We have to integrate such
voices into our existing curriculum, legitimizing those voices and valuing
them as part of the toolkit that is necessary for any lawyer seeking to
engage in systemic reform. Consider who is more qualified to teach our
students the lay of the land of justice reinvestment in Colorado and pro-
vide opportunities to impact systemic reform than Ricardo Martinez,
longtime grassroots organizer and co-founder of Padres y J6venes
Unidos, or Christie Donner, executive director of the Colorado Criminal
Justice Reform Coalition? We simply must allow such opportunities to
exist.
3. Share our physical space.
By physically opening our doors to members of the non-legal com-
munity, we can begin to break down barriers between lawyers and non-
lawyers. Inviting others to join our space demonstrates to our students
and to non-lawyers that we believe what happens in our buildings should
be accessible to those beyond our walls, and that we welcome other
voices and perspectives. Law schools can regularly host and promote
conferences, trainings, workshops, and other events dedicated to social
change and social movements, regardless of whether they include law-
yers. For example, we now know the justice reinvestment community in
Colorado. What if we regularly hosted meetings among the players at the
law school, providing them with a space to work together and gain the
benefits of law school support? Opportunities for our students would
likely result and we would play a small role in fostering social change
locally.
4. Introduce concepts of coalition building and collaboration.
The competitive nature of legal education has been widely docu-
mented. We also know that traditional litigation tactics-the tactics many
law students are regularly exposed to-are, by their nature, adversarial.
And, we know that with the exception of some experiential learning op-
portunities, students do not typically work in teams in law school. The
problem? Broad-sweeping social change-social change like what a jus-
tice reinvestment campaign aims to do and can do-essentially requires
working collaboratively with others, both fellow lawyers and non-
lawyers. If we care at all about achieving social change and preparing
our students to be able to impact such work, we must do a better job of
offering opportunities that expose students to how to use their legal skills
in a collaborative manner, and begin to allow them to study and practice
the art of effectively working with others.
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5. Establish movement lawyering clinics.
How can a lawyer play a role in a local, state, or national movement
like justice reinvestment? What value does the legal lens bring to move-
ment work? How can a lawyer navigate relationships between lawyers
and grassroots communities? Most law students have no idea how to
answer any of these questions, as few have been given the opportunity to
explore them. Law schools can offer robust, in-house clinics that provide
support to organized communities so students can experience first-hand
what lawyering in partnership with movements really looks like. Law
school clinics offer intensive and intentional instruction to the benefit of
our students. Movement lawyering demands the same level of attention.
Imagine the learning experiences that could result from a movement
lawyering clinic taught in partnership by some of the lawyers and grass-
roots organizers that attended the symposium and are actively collaborat-
ing to pursue state legislative justice reinvestment reform. All of a sud-
den, movement lawyering would no longer be a term that few and far
lawyers understand. We would have the opportunity to truly immerse
students in a real life campaign and in the concept of the practice.
If we are serious about bridging the gap between law schools and
communities, we can start with a robust, thoughtful symposium that inte-
grates movements and the law, but this cannot be where we end. Lawyers
can absolutely play a role in campaigns like justice reinvestment, but
only if we as legal institutions do better. If we fail to expand our stu-
dents' training and exposure, we not only fail them, but we also fail the
grassroots communities that can benefit from our support. To support the
social change we seek, we must change too. Just five steps begin to move
us from symposium to action. What are we waiting for?
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REPAIRING HARM FROM RACIAL INJUSTICE: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE JUSTICE REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE AND THE
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
ZACHARY NORRISt
ABSTRACT
Structural racism and racial injustice result in deep, long-standing,
and widespread harm to communities, particularly to people of color and
low-income people. To address and remedy these harms, countries and in-
stitutions have attempted to create processes for intervention and account-
ability; however, these efforts have often been limited or unsuccessful.
This Article examines two specific efforts: the Justice Reinvestment Initi-
ative in the United States and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in
South Africa. By probing the historical circumstances urrounding the cre-
ation of each process and their implementation, the Article analyzes why
neither effort achieved their stated aims. That analysis reveals that the fail-
ure of these two initiatives stems from a lack of community engagement,
narrow conceptions of harm and violence, and the dominance of institu-
tional interests. The Article concludes with examples of campaigns and
initiatives that have effectively addressed racial and economic injustices,
and the factors that played a role in the success of those efforts.
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INTRODUCTION
Both the Justice Reinvestment Initiative (JRI) in the United States
and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC or the Commission)
in South Africa demonstrate how institutional interests can subvert pro-
cesses aimed at remedying harm from past racial injustice, while also
pointing toward what success may require. The goal of this Article is to
explore the promises and limitations of two very distinct processes that
share similar aims, the JRI (United States, 2002-present) and the Com-
mission (South Africa, 1995-2003). While distinct, the desire to amelio-
rate the impacts of past racial injustice by investing in communities
harmed shaped each process's creation. Despite praise, neither process
succeeded in accomplishing the aims that catalyzed their creation. They
failed to do so because (1) neither process effectively engaged community
members' core interests; (2) both processes adopted narrow conceptions
of harm and violence; and (3) both processes came to be dominated by the
interests of established powerful institutions.
Given ongoing fissures along racial lines in the United States, it befits
us to learn from these policies to move towards the development of more
successful racial justice and healing processes that could assist in ending
structural racism. Justice-oriented policy work could be more successful
in accomplishing these aims by investing in communities utilizing a par-
ticipatory democracy process, challenging fear-based narratives directed
toward people of color, and expanding conceptions of violence and peace
toward a broader conception of human rights.
This Article will first examine the historical context of racial injustice
in South Africa and the United States, identifying commonalities between
Apartheid, slavery, and Jim Crow laws. It will build upon that historical
analysis by investigating the development of the Commission in South Af-
rica and the JRI in the United States, identifying how both were imple-
mented and the causes for their failures. The Article will offer recommen-
dations for how to challenge the neoliberal consensus and structural ineq-
uities by analyzing government efforts to serve the public, people-powered
movements to challenge neoliberalism, the impact of narrowly defining
1. See NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM 194-97,
203, 205-06, 210-12 (2007); see also JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., ENDING MASS INCARCERATION:
CHARTING A NEW JUSTICE REINVESTMENT 3 (2013), http://www.justicestrategies.net/sites/de-
fault/files/publications/Charting%20a%20New%2OJustice%2OReinvestment.pdf
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safety, and the importance of acknowledging structural violence instead of
punishing people of color. It will conclude with examples of campaigns
and initiatives that effectively challenge the status quo and racial and eco-
nomic injustices in South Africa and the United States.
I. SOUTH AFRICA HISTORICAL CONTEXT: COLONIAL RULE AND
APARTHEID
South Africa formed out of the exploitation and marginalization of
an indigenous Black majority by a White settler minority.2 The Dutch East
India Company (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie or VOC) initially set
up a settlement for sailors to rest in route to the Dutch Caribbean in pre-
sent-day Cape Town in 1652.3 Although slavery in the Cape region, the
expansion of European territory through colonization, and economic ex-
ploitation of Black South Africans occurred for hundreds of years, it was
not until the twentieth century that a formalized system of racial segrega-
tion and social control occurred in South Africa.4 The Apartheid Era in
South Africa (1948-1994) reflected a continuation of prior discriminatory
laws that existed since the beginning of Dutch rule and throughout the pe-
riod of British colonialism. Similar to the ways Jim Crow discrimination
impacted Black people in the United States, Apartheid is best understood
as both a political and an economic system of exploitation.6 It benefitted a
small White elite because the Black majority was prevented from owning
land and forced to provide labor for less than a living wage.7 South Af-
rica's transition from de jure segregation to de facto segregation also came
about because of decades of organizing, advocacy, and social movements,
both inside South Africa and internationally. The end of Apartheid did
not occur until 1994 as part of a larger project of national liberation that
began years earlier.9
Ordinary people in South Africa developed a Freedom Charter
through a deeply democratic and participatory process.'0 In 1955, nearly
forty years before the end of Apartheid, the African National Congress
sent fifty thousand volunteers across the country to collect the "freedom
demands" of the people of South Africa." These demands were collected,
2. See KLEIN, supra note 1, at 196.
3. ALAN MOUNTAIN, THE FIRST PEOPLE OF THE CAPE: A LOOK AT THEIR HISTORY AND THE
IMPACT OF COLONIALISM ON THE CAPE'S INDIGENOUS PEOPLE 47-48 (2003).
4. See A History of Apartheid in South Africa, S. AFR. HIST. ONLINE, http://www.sahis-
tory.org.za/article/history-apartheid-south-africa (last updated June 17, 2016).
5. See ROGER B. BECK, THE HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA, 87-110 (2d ed. 2014).
6. See KLEIN, supra note 1.
7. See Helena Rigotto, Apartheid in Statistics, INFOGR.AM, https://infogr.am/apartheid-in-sta-
tistics (last visited Mar. 17, 2017).
8. See LESTER R. KURTZ, THE ANTI-APARTHEID STRUGGLE IN SOUTH AFRICA (1912-1992),
at 1-4 (2010), https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/kurtz-southaf-
rica.pdf.
9. See BECK, supra note 5, at 164-67.




voted upon, and enshrined in the Freedom Charter in Kliptown, South Af-
12
rica, on June 26, 1955. The Freedom Charter was central to the organiz-
ing strategy and envisioning of a new South Africa.1 3 It reflected a broad
economic mandate including (1) "Land to ... landless people," (2) "Living
wages and shorter hours of work," (3) "Free and compulsory education,"
and (4), perhaps most fundamentally, the decree that the former Apartheid
state would redistribute land and resources of the country back to the so-
ciety as whole.14 Although written in 1955 during the Cold War Era, the
South African Freedom Charter's best chance for actualization came
nearly four decades later as Nelson Mandela became President in 1994.15
When the process for a transition to a constitutional democracy in
South Africa began, the questions the nation faced included not only which
people would be held responsible for human rights violations during the
Apartheid era and how, but also the extent to which the mandates set forth
in the Freedom Charter would be realized.16 The ideals contained in the
Freedom Charter are socialist in their orientation and reflect a broader con-
ception of human rights.17 Regrettably, the Freedom Charter's best chance
for actualization materialized at a time when leaders like Margaret
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan were solidifyiig a global neoliberal capitalist
18consensus.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, when looking at aims that animated the Free-
dom Charter, the gains it generated have been largely in the sphere of dem-
ocratic control of the government. While the importance of moving from
a colonial regime to a formal, participatory democracy cannot be underes-
timated, neither should the ongoing inequity and deprivation faced by the
vast majority of South Africans today. ' According to the measure of its
Gini coefficient (a measure of income inequality), South Africa remains
12. Id.
13. See id
14. Id. at 195-97 ("What the Freedom Charter asserted was the baseline consensus in the liber-
ation movement that freedom would not come merely when blacks took control of the state but when
the wealth of the land that had been illegitimately confiscated was reclaimed and redistributed to the
society as a whole.").
15. See id at 198, 200.
16. See id. at 197-98. South Africa's transition from Apartheid to a constitutional democracy
occurred in the 1990s after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and after
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's famous remarks: "There Is No Alternative" to capitalism.
TINA: There Is No Alternative, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tina-there-
no-altemative.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2017). This historical context is vital to a thorough under-
standing of the success and failures of South Africa's political transition and of the Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission.
17. Hugh MacLean, Capitalism, Socialism and the Freedom Charter, II S. AFR. LABOUR
BULL. 8, 8-14 (1986).
18. See BECK, supra note 5, at 184, 190; Vijay Prashad, Remembering Mandela, VIKALP:
PEOPLE'S PERSP. FOR CHANGE (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.vikalp.ind.in/2013/12/remembering-man-
dela-vijay-prashad.html ("In this context, Mandela's government had to operate. He did not take
power in 1962, when he began his prison term, nor in 2000, when the Latin American breakthrough
provided some openings for an alternative. His government took power in the 1990s, the high point of
US primacy and of neo-liberal policy making.").
19. See KLEIN, supra note 1, at 198.
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one of the most unequal nations in the world today.20 Furthermore, rates
of disproportionate police brutality against Black South Africans remain
consistent; reports of police brutality in South Africa have soared by
313%.21 In this way, there are similarities in the gains of both the South
African national liberation struggle and the Civil Rights Movement in
terms of increased access to legislative and political democratic processes
alongside ongoing structural disadvantages, inequality, and criminaliza-
tion.
II. U.S. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: SLAVERY AND JIM CROW SEGREGATION
Upon its founding as a settler colonial state, the United States estab-
lished itself as a slaveholding nation.22 The subhuman status of Black peo-
ple was written into American laws, and the economic system of enslave-
ment was maintained through acts of individual and organized violence.23
Examples of this include the various means used to terrorize enslaved
Black people-from lashings to sexual assault, the policing of the Black
body is foundational to sociopolitical cultural formation in the United
States.24 Even after the legal abolishment of slavery by the passage of the
Thirteenth Amendment post-1865, the separate and unequal status of
Black persons and other people of color were still maintained through vi-
olent acts, such as the lynching of thousands of Black men, women, and
children, from the Civil War until World War 11.25 Unjust laws-such as
the Black Codes and written and unwritten Jim Crow segregation-and
political disenfranchisement were maintained through legalized and extra-
judicial killings, incarceration, and forced labor for a hundred-year pe-
riod.26
The mid-twentieth century Black freedom struggle's deployment of
mass civil disobedience through boycotts and protests proved to be criti-
cally necessary to undermining some of the most explicit forms of state-
20. STATISTICS S. AFR., REPORT No. 03-10-06, POVERTY TRENDS IN SOUTH AFRICA: AN
EXAMINATION OF ABSOLUTE POVERTY BETWEEN 2006 AND 2011, at 13 (2014),
https://beta2.statssa.gov.za/publications/Report-03-10-06/Report-03-10-06March2014.pdf.
21. See David Smith, South Africa Reports of Police Brutality More than Tripled in the Last
Decade, GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2013, 11:1.2 AM), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2013/aug/22/south-africa-police-brutality-increase.
22. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF
RACIAL TERROR 3 (2d ed. 2015), https://eji.org/sites/default/files/lynching-in-america-second-edi-
tion-summary.pdf ("In America, there is a legacy of racial inequality shaped by the enslavement of
millions of black people.").
23. See generally RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS 8-9
(2000) (broadly describing the history of Blacks in the United States to make an argument for repara-
tions).
24. See id. at 3-4, 7-8, 49-50, 53-54.
25. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 22.
26. See id. at 9-10 ("By 1890, the term 'Jim Crow' was used to describe the 'subordination and




sanctioned racial discrimination in the United States.27 The Civil Rights
Movement's gains included the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act28
and the end of de jure (according to law) segregation, and segregation
through law and policy of public and private facilities.29 However, what is
often described as the Civil Rights Movement was also part of a larger
movement for human rights and freedom.30 For example, the 1963 March
on Washington was named the "March on Washington for Jobs and Free-
dom." 3 1 Martin Luther King, reflecting on social change following the pas-
sage of civil rights statutes, expressed his economic concerns for the future
in a speech given just weeks before his assassination on April 4, 1968:
You are going beyond purely civil rights to questions of human rights.
That is distinct. . . . Now our struggle is for genuine equality, which
means economic equality. For we know, that it isn't enough to inte-
grate lunch counters. What does it profit a man to be able to eat at an
integrated lunch counter if he doesn't have enough money to buy a
hamburger?32
The Civil Rights Movement succeeded in ending de jure segregation,
but a long history of racism and oppression continued to manifest in the
form of de facto (according to fact) segregation: informal segregation, per-
petuated through social norms.33 After the Post-World War II economic
boom began to wane and the country's manufacturing base declined, con-
servative politicians started to sell the idea that welfare programs actually
contributed to crime and poverty, shifting the function of the state from
support to control.34 By the 1970s, the "War on Poverty" had been replaced
by the "War on Drugs" and the "War on Crime," planting the seeds of
what would become the largest national prison building boom in human
history.
27. See Duke Univ. & The SNCC (Student Nonviolent Coordinating Comm.) Legacy Project,
Stories: The Story of SNCC, ONE PERSON ONE VOTE, http://onevotesncc.org/stories/story-sncc (last
visited Mar. 18, 2017) (providing a historical timeline of the Black Freedom Struggle and the non-
violent civil disobedience tactics employed heavily by SNCC).
28. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
29. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
30. See THOMAS F. JACKSON, FROM CIVIL RIGHTS TO HUMAN RIGHTS: MARTIN LUTHER KING,
JR., AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE 1 (2007) (providing analysis about the Civil Rights
Movement's call for economic justice and human rights).
31. March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, NAT'L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/ar-
ticles/march-on-washington.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
32. Martin Luther King, Jr., Address at Bishop Charles Mason Temple to Striking Sanitation
Workers in Memphis, Tennessee (Mar. 18, 1968) (transcript available at http://kingencyclopedia.stan-
ford.edu/primarydocuments/680318-000.pdf).
33. Cf RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, MODERN SEGREGATION 1-2, 4-5 (Mar. 6, 2014),
http://www.epi.org/files/2014/MODERN-SEGREGATION.pdf (researching the contemporary mani-
festations of education and residential segregation).
34. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 45-50, 52 (Cornel West & Michelle Alexander eds., rev. ed. 2012).
35. See id at 39, 45, 47, 49, 55.
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While legalized segregation is thankfully a relic of the past, de facto
segregation and organized state violence against Black people and other
people of color persists.36 The disproportionate incarceration of Black and
Brown people and the murder of Black people every twenty-eight hours
by law enforcement or vigilantes serve as stark reminders of this reality.37
Jim Crow laws and the mass incarceration of Black and Brown people
reflect an evolution of slavery toward subtler forms of discrimination ra-
ther than a departure from it.38 Still, there never has been a Truth and Rec-
onciliation process in this country.
III. SOUTH AFRICA: THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
Anti-Apartheid activists and leaders like Desmond Tutu saw the TRC
as a central lever in the shift from an Apartheid state defined by legalized
segregation, economic exploitation, and colonialism, toward national heal-
ing, democracy, and increased opportunity through transitional justice.39
In accordance with the Interim South African Constitution, the TRC Act
was formulated to (1) elucidate what violence was committed during the
Apartheid regime, (2) offer conditional amnesty to perpetrators of abuses,
and (3) secure reparations for victims. 4 0 The Commission has been touted
as extremely successful and as a major exemplar for transitional justice
processes.4' It is important, however, when analyzing policy programs
such as the TRC to ask questions such as "who is making the assessment?"
and "whose interests and values do they represent?"
The TRC focused on reinvesting resources into communities and
lessening the impacts of past racism and colonialism.4 2 Unfortunately,
36. Cf 20 Facts About U.S. Inequality That Everyone Should Know, STAN. CTR. ON POVERTY
& INEQ. (2011), http://inequality.stanford.edu/publications/20-facts-about-us-inequality-everyone-
should-know (highlighting various statistical economic, educational, and penal disproportionalities
among minority populations in the United States from the 1980s to the early 2000s).
37. ARLENE EISEN, OPERATION GHETTO STORM: 2012 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS OF 313 BLACK PEOPLE BY POLICE, SECURITY GUARDS AND VIGILANTES 3
(rev. ed. 2014), http://www.operationghettostorm.org/up-
loads/1/9/1/l/19110795/newall_14_11_04.pdf.
38. See ALEXANDER, supra note 34, at 2 ("As a criminal, you have scarcely more rights, and
arguably less respect, than a black man living in Alabama at the height of Jim Crow. We have not
ended racial caste in America; we have merely redesigned it.").
39. See Rebecca Saunders, Lost in Translation: Expressions ofHuman Suffering, the Language
of Human Rights, and the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 9 SUR - INT'L J. ON
HUM. RTS. 51, 51, 55 (2008).
40. Tshepo Madlingozi, 20 Years of TRC - Taking Stock of the South African Truth and Rec-
onciliation Commission 20 Years Later: No Truth, No Reconciliation and No Justice, KHULUMANI
SUPPORT GROUP 7 (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.khulumani.net/truth-memory/item/l151-tshepo-
madlingozi-20-years-of-trc-taking-stock-of-the-south-african-truth-and-reconciliation-commission-
20-years-later-no-truth-no-reconciliation-and-no-justice.htmi (providing access to a manuscript writ-
ten by Tshepo Mdlingozi via SlideShare, which was presented at the Third International Colloquium
of the Insttuto Humanitas at Unisinos in Brazil 2016).
41. Id The author is referencing page one of the manuscript.
42. But cf Desmond Tutu, Tutu: "Unfinished Business" of the TRC s Healing, MAIL &
GUARDIAN (Apr. 25, 2014, 00:00), http://mg.co.za/article/2014-04-24-unfinished-business-of-the-trc-
healing (outlining the intent of the TRC but then describing the proposed "wealth tax" for the transfer
of resources to reinvest in the country as "stillborn").
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global leaders with influence in institutions like the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank rendered the TRC less effective
partly because the African National Congress (ANC) undertook it in the
sociopolitical context of neoliberal capitalism, a context largely contrary
to the ANC's immediate agenda.4 3 According to Ian Haney L6pez, neolib-
eralism's basic formula is brutally simple: fear people of color, resent the
government, and trust the market.4 4 As L6pez describes, the neoliberal
consensus pushes toward an understanding that the -logic of the market
must be held as sacrosanct; we are forced to have faith in the good intent
of the market.45
There was intense and immediate pressure on South Africa's post-
46Apartheid leadership to determine the features of the new democracy.
The newly-in-power ANC-historically a Black-led, anti-apartheid polit-
ical organization-was forced to encourage investments from other na-
tions.4 7 With millions of formerly disenfranchised people now expecting
state support and resources denied to them for decades, the new democ-
racy's policies gravitated toward the hope that an influx of capital would
spur a redistribution of wealth and overall economic growth.48 The failures
of Truth and Reconciliation can only be understood in the larger context
of South Africa emerging as a new nation in the post-Soviet Union col-
lapse, as leaders like Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan and institu-
tions such as the IMF and the World Bank cemented the global neoliberal
capitalism as the only economic pathway to development.49
Various attempts to start or even speak about repairing harm and in-
equity in South Africa were met with a negative response exerted through
the political influence of global capital markets and capitalist elites.5 0 This
also impacted the reception of recommendations made by the Commis-
sion, including the decision on whether to pay for reparations and who
43. KLEIN, supra note 1, at 205-06, 216 ("There was a flurry of public investment-more than
a hundred thousand homes were built for the poor, and millions were hooked up to water, electricity
and phone lines. But, in a familiar story, weighed down by debt and under international pressure to
privatize these services, the government soon began raising prices.").
44. Heather McGhee & Ian Haney L6pez, We Must Talk About Race to Fix Economic Inequal-
ity, DEMOS (Mar. 12, 2016), http://www.demos.org/blog/3/12/16/we-must-talk-about-race-fix-eco-
nomic-inequality.
45. See id
46. See KLEIN, supra note 1, at 197, 200, 203, 206, 215.
47. Chris Webb, Selling South Africa: Poverty, Politics and the 2010 FIFA World Cup, GLOBAL
RES. (Mar. 24, 2010), http://www.globalresearch.ca/selling-south-africa-poverty-politics-and-the-
2010-fifa-world-cup/18303 ("During this period, the pressures of both domestic and foreign capital
forced the emergent African National Congress (ANC) government to follow the economic paradigms
of the past and encourage foreign investment.").
48. See GILLIAN HART, RETHINKING THE SOUTH AFRICAN CRISIS: NATIONALISM, POPULISM,
HEGEMONY 6-10 (2014).
49. See Prashad, supra note 18 (discussing the social and political context of the global econ-
omy at the time that the ANC came into power).
50. KLEIN, supra note 1, at 207 ("Every time a top party official said something that hinted that
the ominous Freedom Charter might still become policy, the market responded with a shock, sending
the rand into free fall.").
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would pay for reparations.5 1 The Commission recommended the creation
of a one-time, one-percent ax on corporate wealth to fund reparations re-
cipients identified through the Commission.52 The Commission believed
that given the way corporations reaped enormous profits under the Apart-
heid regime, they should bear some responsibility for repairing the harm
done to victims.5 3 But South African President Thabo Mbeki rejected the
proposal "fearing that it would send an antibusiness message to the mar-
ket." 54 Neoliberalism leans toward less democratic participation rather
than more.5 5
The economic system especially excludes the people who are most
impacted by systemic violence. Throughout the transition process, Thabo
Mbeki generally framed decisions on the structure of the economy as tech-
nocratic and administrative procedural issues rather than as questions fun-
damental to the realization of the Freedom Charter.56 Unlike the Freedom
Charter, which was developed through an open and participatory process,
the economic decisions made by Mbeki happened behind closed doors and
without the input of many of the people who risked their lives through
anti-Apartheid activism to bring a new South Africa into being.57 As de-
scribed by Saunders in the article Lost in Translation, the TRC's focus on
"spiritual and symbolic forms of reparation[s] . . . has . . . abetted the
ANC's embrace of neoliberal economics."5 s
IV. UNITED STATES: THE JUSTICE REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE
Though the JRI is a far more modest project than the Commission
was, there are notable similarities in terms of its animating creation and
also its failures. Susan B. Tucker and Eric Cadora at Open Society Institute
originally conceptualized the idea of justice reinvestment as one tool to
shift the ongoing dynamic of structural racism and racialized criminaliza-
tion in the United States today.59 The concept was created "as a public
safety mechanism to downsize prison populations and budgets and re-al-
51. Id. at 210-13.
52. Id. at 210.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 211 ("In the end, the government put forward a fraction of what had been requested,
taking the money out of its own budget .... ).
55. See HART, supra note 48, at 6 ("'Neoliberalism' - understood as a class project and mani-
festation of global economic forces, as well as a rationality of rule . . .
56. See Saunders, supra note 39, at 61-62.
57. Ronnie Kasrils, How the ANC's Faustian Pact Sold Out South Africa's Poorest, GUARDIAN
(June 24, 2013, 3:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/24/anc-faustian-
pact-mandela-fatal-error ("An ANC-Communist party leadership eager to assume political of-
fice . .. has bequeathed an economy so tied in to the neoliberal global formula and market fundamen-
talism that there is very little room to alleviate the plight of most of our people.").
58. Saunders, supra note 39, at 63.
59. Susan B. Tucker & Eric Cadora, Justice Reinvestment, in 3 IDEAS FOR AN OPEN SOC'Y 2,
2-3 (Nov. 2003), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/ideasreinvestment.pdf.
523
DENVER LAW REVIEW
locate savings to leverage other public and private resources for einvest-
ment in minority communities disproportionately harmed by the system
and culture of harsh punishment."60
While justice reinvestment was not defined specifically in historical
terms, its authors describe its moral and ethical component in the follow-
ing manner: due to the historical harm and neglect communities of color
and poor communities have faced, it is the duty of policy makers and po-
litical officials to initiate socioeconomic investments that serve to em-
power and restitute marginalized people.61 Although not created through a
democratic process, justice reinvestment reflected popular grassroots cam-
paigns articulated throughout the 1990s and early 2000s calling for invest-
ment in communities rather than incarceration.62 These "Books Not Bars"
and "Jobs Not Jails" campaigns found a cogent theoretical articulation in
63
justice reinvestment.
The most popular and widespread attempt to move justice reinvest-
ment from theory into practice has been the JRI.6 4 Led by the Council of
State Governments and supported by Pew Charitable Trusts,65 the JRI is
moving forward in twenty-seven states66 and has resulted in the passage of
legislation in seventeen states.67 The function of the JRI includes assis-
tance to states in criminal justice data collecting and analysis, policy iden-
tification, and program implementation, with the goal of curbing crime
rates and managing crime in a more economical manner. 68 Written by ten
researchers, analysts, and advocates dedicated to ending mass incarcera-
tion, the article Ending Mass Incarceration: Charting a New Justice Rein-
vestment details some of the failures of the JRI.69 The authors conclude
that the JRI may potentially reinforce mass incarceration as a component
of the legal system rather than end it. 70
60. AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 3.
61. See id at 5.
62. See Jakada Imani, California s Turning Tide on Youth Prisons, HUFFINGTON POST (May
25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jakada-imani/californias-turning-tide-b_808744.html.
63. See Jobs Not Jails in Alameda County, ELLA BAKER CTR. FOR HUM. RTS., http://ellabaker-
center.org/our-work/jobs-not-jails-in-alameda-county (last visited Mar. 18, 2017) (showing campaign
histories of both "[B]ooks [N]ot [B]ars" and "Jobs Not Jails").
64. See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 1.
65. NANCY LAVIGNE ET AL., URBAN INST., JUSTICE REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE STATE
ASSESSMENT REPORT 1-2, 6 (2014), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publica-
tion/22211/41 2994-Justice-Reinvestment-Initiative-State-Assessment-Report.PDF.
66. Justice Reinvestment Initiative, OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS, https://www.bja.gov/programs/jus-
ticereinvestment/index.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
67. Crime & Justice Institute: Justice Reinvestment, COMMUNITY RESOURCES FOR JUST.,
http://www.crj.org/cji/pages/justice-reinvestment (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
68. LAVIGNE ET AL., supra note 65, at 3-4.
69. See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 1.
70. Id
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Similar to some of the failures of the Commission, the JRI has not
resulted in direct reinvestment in communities.7 Furthermore, it has not
made a significant impact in shifting the punishment economy's architec-
ture.72 Instead, the JRI has moved resources from corrections spending to
other law enforcement agencies.73 According to L6pez, the general trend
in neoliberal economic thought is that the government is to be feared-
with the exception of law enforcement for the maintenance of "law and
order."74 What started as an initiative to move resources into low-income
communities of color has resulted instead in the reinvestment of resources
into police departments.75 This is not just because all government beyond
law enforcement is viewed with suspicion in the popular imagination, but
also because in this imagination the people-especially people of color-
are to be feared.76 The JRI has not engaged ordinary citizens; it has been
predominantly driven by elected officials and bureaucrats.7 7 Moreover,
JRI did not engage the grassroots organizations and constituencies it rep-
resents in helping to set the direction of the initiative.
Pew Charitable Trust and the Council of State Governments framed
JRI technocratically; it has focused on reducing incarceration rates and re-
cidivism, but not direct reinvestment.79 The JRI has come to signify any
and all justice reforms that are largely focused on decreasing rates, and not
the communities most impacted and marginalized by incarceration.so
V. CHALLENGING THE NEOLIBERAL CONSENSUS: RACIALIZED FEAR
VERSUS STRUCTURAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Both JRI and the TRC demonstrate that powerful institutional actors
will gravitate toward proposals that serve their own interests, thereby re-
inforcing the status quo. Shifting away from the status quo and neoliberal
consensus requires (1) shifting from overall resentment oward the gov-
ernment to demonstrating the impact of a government that meaningfully
71. Id. at 10 ("Increased funding for 'intensive community supervision' (i.e., closer control and
scrutiny) can result in higher rates of return to prison by widening the net of social control. Even
investment in rehabilitation services, such as drug treatment, can backfire if services are inappropriate
for the individual or sub-par since relapse (which is common among recovering addicts) can result in
revocation to prison.").
72. Id.
73. Id. ("For example, JRI in Pennsylvania in 2012 made no attempt to advance a goal of com-
munity reinvestment, and instead promoted redirecting the highest proportion of anticipated savings
to local law enforcement authorities, even though the state's overall crime rate had dropped 14 per-
cent.").
74. See IAN HANEY LdPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: How CODED RACIAL APPEALS HAVE
REINVENTED RACISM AND WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS 22, 26 (2014).
75. AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 4.
76. See McGhee & L6pez, supra note 44.
77. See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 4.
78. See id at 8.
79. Id. at 7 ("[T]he terms of JRI reform today are expressed in the language of crime control
and law enforcement, rehabilitation and treatment, recidivism reduction, and expanded, often tougher,
parole and probation supervision.").
80. Id at 9-10.
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serves its people; (2) shifting from the blaming and shaming of people of
color to a broader understanding of accountability; and (3) expanding cur-
rent definitions of violence and moving toward a new vision of safety.
A. What Are the Impacts of Government When It Is in Service of the Pub-
lic Good?
Because government institutional actors can tend toward reinforcing
their own interests rather than the interests of those most marginalized,
distrust of the government is common in many communities of color and
poor communities.8' It is important, however, to note the ways that gov-
ernment can induce positive change when policy interests reflect and am-
plify the interest of the community. When government creates clear and
simple policies with positive benefits to communities, those programs
draw widespread support (e.g., social security).82
The following are examples of attempts to restructure the incentives
of the justice system using political channels:
* The Brennan Center for Justice has advocated for a "Reverse Mass
Incarceration" Act, which would reward states that both decrease crime
and incarceration, as states like California, New York, and Mississippi
have already done.83
* In California, voters passed a mandate that directed the state to
move dollars from incarceration toward investment in the state's education
system. Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, recate-
gorized certain low-level felonies as misdemeanors and redirected the sav-
ings from that change into programs to limit dropouts and school truancy,
victims' services, drug abuse, mental health, and other programs to keep
people out of the justice system.84
* After hundreds of citizens rallied outside of former Governor of
New York David Paterson's office in Albany demanding drug law reform
81. See SHAYLA C. NUNNALLY, TRUST IN BLACK AMERICA: RACE, DISCRIMINATION, AND
POLITICS 9-11 (2012) (exploring the long-fraught relationship between Black Americans and the U.S.
Government).
82. ELISA A. WALKER, VIRGINIA P. RENO & THOMAS N. BETHELL, NAT'L ACAD. OF SOC. INS.,
AMERICANS MAKE HARD CHOICES ON SOCIAL SECURITY: A SURVEY WITH TRADE-OFF ANALYSIS 1
(2014), https://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research/AmericansMakeHardChoicesonSo-
cial_Security.pdf (noting in a survey of over 2,000 U.S. citizens aged twenty-one and over 81% of
respondents "say they don't mind paying for Social Security because they value ... the security and
stability it provides to millions of... Americans").
83. LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN & INIMAI CHETTIAR, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE REVERSE
MASS INCARCERATION ACT 1 (2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publica-
tions/TheReverseMassIncarcerationAct%20.pdf.
84. Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, 2014 Cal. Legis. Serv. Proposition 47 (West).
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in 2009,85 the Rockefeller Drug LawS86 were overturned and reformed.8 7
The 2009 reforms included both the elimination of mandatory minimum
sentences for drug offenses and the restoration of a judge's ability to send
an individual to a drug treatment program, rather than prison.88
It is not by accident that many of the most successful and transform-
ative proposals have been driven by ordinary people, from the reform of
the Rockefeller Drug Laws in New York to the passage of Proposition 47
in California.
B. Who Is Participating in the Neoliberal Consensus? How Do We
Change It?
Under this most recent era of neoliberalism in the United States and
elsewhere, resources and political and economic power have become in-
creasingly concentrated in the hands of the few at the expense of the many.
Decisions like Citizens United v. FEC8 9 and the overturning of the Voting
Rights Act 9 0 are the hallmarks solidifying a new age of corporate control-
of our democracy. People-led social movements demanding widespread
policy and cultural change, such as Black Lives Matter,9 1 have been on the
rise in the last five years and are pressing for change in the streets and
within the halls of power.9 2 In the cases of South Africa and the United
States, investigating their respective political histories leads to the conclu-
sion that the people must not demobilize, even when their champion is in
office. Both Barack Obama nd Nelson Mandela were thought to be har-
bingers of change and, unfortunately, many aspects of structural inequality
and discrimination remain in both nations.9 3
85. Jeremy W. Peters, Albany Reaches Deal to Repeal '70s Drug Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/26/nyregion/26rockefeller.html.
86. See Brian Mann, The Drug Laws That Changed How We Punish, NPR (Feb. 14, 2013, 3:04
AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/02/14/171822608/the-drug-laws-that-changed-how-we-punish (dis-
cussing a series of drug statutes introduced by former New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller in 1973
that created harsh sentences for both drug selling and possession, for example, a mandatory 15-to-life
sentence for the possession of four ounces of drugs such as cocaine, marijuana, morphine, and heroin).
87. NYCLU: Historic Reforms of New York's Draconian Drug Sentencing Scheme Imminent,
N.Y. C.L. UNION (Mar. 31, 2009), https://www.nyclu.org/en/press-releases/nyclu-historic-reforms-
new-yorks-draconian-drug-sentencing-scheme-imminent.
88. Id.
89. 558 U.S. 310, 333-34 (2010).
90. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
91. About the Black Lives Matter Network, BLACK LIVES MATTER, http://blacklivesmat-
ter.com/about (last visited Feb. 8, 2017) (describing Black Lives Matter as a chapter-based national
organization and grassroots movement "working for a world where Black lives are no longer system-
atically and intentionally targeted for demise").
92. Jelani Cobb, The Matter of Black Lives, NEW YORKER (Mar. 14, 2016),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/03/14/where-is-black-lives-matter-headed.
93. See, e.g., KLEIN, supra note 1, at 206 ("In 2005, only 4 percent of the companies listed on
the [Johannesburg Stock Engage] were owned or controlled by blacks."); On Views ofRace and Ine-
quality, Black and Whites Are Worlds Apart, PEW RES. CTR. (June 27, 2016), http://www.pewsocial-
trends.org/2016/06/27/on-views-of-race-and-inequality-blacks-and-whites-are-worlds-apart ("Ac-
cording to a new Pew Research Center analysis of data from the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2014 the




To accomplish change, people must be able to understand the govern-
ment bureaucracies that shape the world they live in. This will give them
the foundational tools to shift the levers of power toward less harm and
greater access, ultimately acting as agents in designing new systems that
reflect their own interests. In organizing for social justice, changing peo-
ple's own conceptions of the self has historically been understood as a first
critical step in the larger process of social transformation.94 As people
share with one another, they fight the isolation and shame that can come
with being a victim of violence inflicted by the state or anyone else. Com-
munity spaces and conversations are necessary for effective organizing;
by defining themselves for themselves, victims of Apartheid, state vio-
lence, or incarceration become active participation in healing themselves
and their communities.95
C. What Is Violence? What Is Safety?
Narrow understandings of violence (as only tangible harm) and of
justice (as between and upon individuals) fail to grapple with the more all-
encompassing aspects of institutional violence. Expressing racism is now
regarded as interpersonal and individualized; laws have only abolished ex-
plicitly racist practices and not the structural violence embedded in factors
such as access to physical space, housing policies, and educational qual-
ity.96 Narrow conceptions of justice limit the possibilities and the reach of
restorative justice solutions. In our current legal system, only some indi-
viduals can get a modicum of justice, and sentencing precedents (e.g.,
mandatory minimums) limit the power of mitigating circumstances and
community input in deciding how justice should be undertaken.97 On the
contrary, however, there are organizations and collectives working outside
of the legal system to promote accountability and community decision-
making.98 In addition, narrow conceptions of safety also constrain the po-
tential of policy initiatives. In the case of the JRI, its policy focus on crime
rates and recidivism automatically assumes that a decrease in rates will
coincide with an increase of safety. Rather than identifying problems in
the binary of "crime" and "absence of crime," a more robust conception
94. See Marshall Ganz, Public Narrative, Collective Action, and Power, in THE WORLD BANK,
ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH PUBLIC OPINION: FROM INERTIA TO PUBLIC ACTION 289, 301 (Sina
Odugbemi & Taeku Lee eds., 2011).
95. See id. at 295.
96. See Jeff Nesbit, Institutional Racism Is Our Way of Life, U.S. NEWS (May 6, 2015, 1:16
PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/at-the-edge/2015/05/06/institutional-racism-is-our-way-
of-life.
97. What the Experts Say, FAMM, http://famm.org/sentencing-101/what-experts-say/see-
more-experts (last visited Mar. 19, 2017) ("Mandatory minimum sentences have been studied exten-
sively and have been shown to be ineffective in preventing crime. They have been effective in dis-
torting the sentencing process. They discriminate against minorities in their application, and they have
been shown to waste the taxpayers' money.").
98. See, e.g., Danielle Sered, Common Justice, VERA INST. JUST., https://www.vera.org/cen-
ters/common-justice (last visited Mar. 19, 2017); The Harm Free Zone, SPIRITHOUSE, http://www.spi-
rithouse-nc.org/collective-sun-ii (last visited Mar. 19, 2017) (describing programing for community-
based accountability and restorative justice practices).
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of accountability is needed. First, conceptions of accountability must in-
clude captains of industry, corporate entities, and other socioeconomic ac-
tors, and second, we must move beyond carceral-minded quantifiers of
safety (e.g. decreased recidivism) and into the realm ofjustice alternatives.
D. Who Is to Blame? Punishing People of Color Versus Acknowledging
Structural Violence
In order to advance the particular kind of transformative change en-
visioned by justice reinvestment or the Commission, the issue of who is at
fault must be addressed. This should not be a simple question. In fact, the
more robust the conception of blame, fault, and accountability, the more
likely it is to give rise to a robust conception of human rights.
Slavery existed in the United States and during its colonial history for
246 years.99 As Randall Robinson describes in The Debt, the legacy of
slavery has continued through policies such as the Black Codes, Jim Crow
Segregation, and the policies that drive mass incarceration.100 People and
institutions actively developed these policies and practices and benefit*
handsomely from them.01 Those people and institutions drive home the
idea that these policies are the deliberate continuation of slavery, and,
therefore, it is entirely possible to assign fault and responsibility. For ex-
ample, the namesakes of Brown University, Nicholas and Joseph Brown,
achieved wealth in part by manufacturing and selling slave ships and in-
vesting in the transatlantic slave trade.102 However, holding institutions
accountable when harms are done to marginalized groups such as low-
income communities of color remains the exception.
Justice requires asking who is responsible for the harm, no matter
how powerful those persons may be, and then developing mechanisms o
that all of those persons might make amends. We must develop new forms
of accountability to create the conditions for former slaves to have viable
opportunity within a nation that held them captive since its founding. Oth-
erwise, changes in legal relationship may occur, but more fundamental
changes in terms of social and economic relationships do not.
Instead, we continue to see those most marginalized from political
and economic power in continued difficult no-win situations, often mir-
roring those of formerly enslaved people, of being funneled into the justice
system while they seek employment. For example, Shanesha Taylor, a
99. ROBINSON, supra note 23, at 1.
100. Id. at 101-02, 210-11, 225.
101. Id. at230.
102. See BROWN UNIV. STEERING COMM. ON SLAVERY & JUSTICE, SLAVERY AND JUSTICE 12-
14, 15-17, http://www.brown.edu/Research/SlaveryJustice/documents/SlaveryAndJustice.pdf
(providing a detailed examination of the relationship between the stablishment of Brown University
and the transatlantic slave trade).
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mother of two, left her children in the car while she went to a job inter-
view.1 03 She was sentenced to eighteen months of probation for child ne-
glect.104 Her sentence might have been longer but for public outcry.1 0 5 This
is but one example of a larger trend where poor families of color are more
likely to be involved in the justice system and to suffer worsening eco-
nomic conditions as a result.106 The findings of Who Pays: The True Cost
of Mass Incarceration on Families illustrates the experiences of low-in-
come families of color trapped in a punishing economy:
* People impacted by incarceration "are saddled with copious fees,
fines, and debt" while suffering through diminished economic opportuni-
ties that affect families for generations.107
* Women and families bear the brunt of these costs, and yet, they
"are the primary resource for housing, employment, and health needs of
their formerly incarcerated loved ones, filling the gaps left by . . . [a lack
of] reentry services.,,to
* Incarceration damages families and prevents stability, causing life-
long health impacts and perpetuating cycles of trauma and poverty that
keep families and communities from thriving.10 9
The Department of Justice Pattern or Practice Investigation of the
Ferguson, Missouri, Police Department provides an example of what this
punishing economy looks like on the municipal level."l0 According to that
report, eighty-eight percent of instances of police use of force were against
Black people, and of the 21,000 residents of Ferguson, 16,000 people had
outstanding arrest warrants."' The report documented evidence that "Fer-
guson's law enforcement practices are shaped by the City's focus on rev-
enue rather than by public safety needs."' 12 As a result, single missed court
payments were resulting in jail time, and one woman who once illegally
103. Sarah Jarvis, Shanesha Taylor Sentenced to 18 Years Probation, ARIZ. CENT. (May 15,




106. SANETA DEVUONO-POWELL, CHRIS SCHWEIDLER, ALICIA WALTERS & AZADEH ZOHRABI,
WHO PAYS? THE TRUE COST OF INCARCERATION ON FAMILIES 12-18 (2015), http://whopaysre-
port.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Who-Pays-FINAL.pdf.
107. Id at 7.
108. Id. at 9.
109. Id.
110. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 52-54 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opalpress-releases/attach-
ments/2015/03/04/fergusonpolicedepartmentreport.pdf.
111. Id at 6, 55, 62.
112. Id. at 2.
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parked her car ended up paying over $1,000 in fines and spent six days in
jail.1 13
The blame inflicted on poor people of color, who are attempting to
make ends meet and survive through these circumstances, must be chal-
lenged. People of color are regarded as deserving of punishment to a de-
gree that White Americans often are not. For instance, the "public health
concern" response to the present-day New England heroin epidemic-in
which users are predominantly White-is drastically different from the
harsh punishments served out when heroin users were disproportionately
Black.1 14
Societal examples of racialized blame include the "super predator""5
and "welfare queen""'6 stereotypes, in contrast to recognizing the culpa-
bility of institutions and systems. Fearing and criminalizing people of
color does not allow for a critical examination of the underlying reasons
for the cycles of generational poverty, limited access to social services,
and high unemployment in these communities.17 This must be done both
explicitly, through slogans like "Black Lives Matter," and implicitly,
through campaigns like "Books Not Bars" to close the California Youth
Authority prisons.1 8 From 2003 to 2012, the Ella Baker Center for Human
Rights, the Youth Justice Coalition, the W. Haywood Burns Institute, the
Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, the National Council on Crime
and Delinquency, the National Youth Law Center, and the Youth Law
Center, among others, worked to reform California's state-run youth
prison system."'9 Prior to this campaign, the perception of youth inside the
California Youth Prison system was that they were the "worst of the
113. Mark Berman & Wesley Lowery, The 12 Key Highlightsfrom the DOJ's Scathing Ferguson
Report, WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-na-
tion/wp/2015/03/04/the-12-key-highlights-from-the-dojs-scathing-ferguson-report.
114. Andrew Cohen, How White Users Made Heroin a Public-Health Problem, ATLANTIC (Aug.
12, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/08/crack-heroin-and-race/401015.
115. Hillary Clinton, First Lady of the U.S., Address at Keene State College (Jan. 28, 1996)
(video of this speech is available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4582435/full-speech-keene-
state).
116. LOPEZ, supra note 74, at 58 ("On the stump, Reagan repeatedly invoked a story of a 'Chi-
cago welfare queen' with 'eighty names, thirty addresses, [and] twelve Social Security cards [who] is
collecting veteran's benefits on four non-existing deceased husbands . . . .' (alteration in original)).
117. See generally Kristin L. Perkins & Robert J. Sampson, Compounded Deprivation in the
Transition to Adulthood: The Intersection of Racial and Economic Inequality Among Chicagoans,
1995-2013, 1 RSF: RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 35, 35 (2015) (describing a case study of the
layered effects of historical inequality on Black communities in Chicago).
118. Books Not Bars was a campaign led by the Ella Baker Center and youth advocates to close
the abusive California Youth Authority prisons. See Books Not Bars Basics, ELLA BAKER CTR. FOR
HUM. RTS., http://ellabakercenter.org/books-not-bars/books-not-bars-basics (la t visited Mar. 19,
2017) [hereinafter Basics].
119. See id; BARRY KRISBERG, REFORMING THE CALIFORNIA DIVISION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE:




worst" and that they were the "super predators."l20 Families were regarded
as uncaring or worse.121 Over an eight-year campaign, youth who were
formerly involved in the youth prison system became outspoken advocates
against a system with seventy-five percent recidivism rates and over
$100,000 per-year-per-youth price tag. Their mothers and grandmothers
were steadfast in their determination to close the youth prison system, and
through that process they challenged the conception that they didn't care
about their loved ones.122 As a result, economic arguments about the need
to close youth prisons that once fell on deaf ears were eventually well re-
ceived.123 By challenging the dehumanizing depictions of incarcerated
youth and their families, this campaign opened the eyes of legislators to
the need for and possibility of real reform.124 Additionally, through docu-
mentary films, public education, and earned media, the campaign raised
the visibility of rehabilitative programs in other states.125 The success of
these programs demonstrated that there was a better way to treat youth
involved in the justice system. By challenging the dehumanization of fam-
ilies and positioning the site of rehabilitation and accountability within
families, communities, and local programs rather than remote youth pris-
ons, the campaign succeeded in closing five youth prisons'2 6 and helping
reduce the youth prisons population by over eighty percent.127 The state
saw no increase in youth crime as a result.128 Organizations and campaigns
such as "Close California Youth Prisons" are working to shift the concep-
tion of who is to blame to a more institutionalized framework, away from
the scapegoating of youth and families.129
120. See Witness, System Failure: Violence, Abuse and Neglect in the California Youth Author-
ity, HUB (Apr. 9, 2008), http://hub.witness.org/en/SystemFailure ( xploring the experience of incar-
cerated young people in California youth prisons).
121. KRISBERG, supra note 120, at 14.
122. See Imani, supra note 62.
123. Id.
124. BARRY KRISBERG, LINH VUONG, CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY & SUSAN MARCHIONNA, A NEW
ERA IN CALIFORNIA JUVENILE JUSTICE: DOWNSIZING THE STATE YOUTH CORRECTIONS SYSTEM 2
(2010), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bccj/New Era.pdf; Yirmeyah Beckles, At Books Not Bars
Event, Family Members and the Formerly Incarcerated Share Their Stories, OAKLAND N. (Aug. 13,
2012, 4:12 PM), https://oaklandnorth.net/2012/08/13/at-books-not-bars-event-family-members-and-
the-formerly-incarcerated-share-their-stories.
125. E g., C. LENORE ANDERSON, DANIEL MACALLAIR & CELINA RAMIREZ, BOOKS NOT BARS
& CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CALIFORNIA YOUTH AUTHORITY WAREHOUSES: FAILING
KIDS, FAMILIES & PUBLIC SAFETY 13 (2005).
126. KRISBERG, supra note 120, at 2; see also Basics, supra note 119.
127. KRISBERG, VUONG, HARTNEY & MARCHIONNA, supra note 124, at 17; Katy McCarthy,
Ella Baker Has a New Boss; Meet Problem-Solver Zach Norris, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCHANGE (Oct. 3,
2013), http://jjie.org/2013/10/03/ella-baker-has-a-new-boss-meet-problem-solver-zack-norris; Ba-
sics, supra note 119.
128. KRISBERG, supra note 120, at 2-3; KRISBERG, VUONG, HARTNEY & MARCHIONNA, supra
note 124, at 8.
129. Beckles, supra note 124.
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VI. EXAMPLES & CAMPAIGNS WORKING TO CHANGE THE STATUS QUO
Some campaigns have indeed challenged the scapegoating of people
of color, sought a broader conception of safety, and engaged people as
protagonists.13 0 Successful campaigns include the following examples:
* The City of Chicago paid $5.5 million in restitution to fifty-seven
people (almost exclusively Black men) tortured by the Chicago Police De-
partment in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s.' The passage of the rep-
arations ordinance came after years of hearings, investigations, and col-
laborations between entities such as the People's Law Office, Amnesty
International USA, and We Charge Genocide."3
* The Justice Reinvestment Coalition of Alameda County is a com-
munity-driven alliance of organizations working to decrease incarceration
and our reliance on policing in Alameda County and advocating for an
increase in funding for socioeconomic resources for communities.'33 The
Coalition's successful 2015 and 2016 "50% for Jobs Not Jails" campaigns
resulted in millions of dollars to support new community services funds
instead of continued investment in the sheriff and probation depart-
ments. 134 These victories created five community funds-employment,
education, case management, pre-trial, and For Us By Us. The For Us By
Us fund alone provided $1 million in funding for organizations staffed,
managed, and operated by formerly incarcerated and systems-impacted in-
dividuals.'35 Most recently, the coalition also won a "Jobs 4 Freedom"
campaign to secure a re-entry hiring program that will provide 1,400
county jobs and offer support to formerly incarcerated individuals.'3 6
* Equal Education (EE) is a community organization in South Africa
fighting for greater access and improved quality of schools for poor and
working class South African communities.'37 Originally organized due to
130. See, e.g, Sam Jayaraman & Zachary Norris, What Does It Mean to Be Safe?, ELLA BAKER
CTR., (July 18, 2016), https://medium.com/@ellabakercenter/what-does-it-mean-to-be-safe-
2403bc91 d906#.v8sl8o649.
131. Merrit Kennedy, Decades Later, Victims of Chicago Police Torture Paid Reparations, NPR:
THE TWO-WAY (Jan. 5, 2016, 3:47 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2016/01/05/462040444/decades-later-victims-of-chicago-police-torture-paid-reparations.
132. See CHI. TORTURE JUST. MEMORIALS, http://chicagotorture.org (last visited Feb. 10, 2017)
(providing a digital archive of information related to the Chicago Police tortures and reparations pro-
cess).
133. See JUST. REINVESTMENT COALITION OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, http://www.jrcac.org (last
visited Mar. 19, 2017) (detailing the campaigns and victories of the Justice Reinvestment Coalition).
134. Sam Levin, Alameda County to Reduce Jail Funding, Prioritize Social Services, E. BAY
EXPRESS (Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.eastbayexpress.com/SevenDays/archives/2015/03/24/alameda-
county-to-reduce-jail-funding-prioritize-social-services.
135. Darris Young, Ella Baker Ctr. for Human Rights (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author) (discussing the framework and rationale for the For Us By Us fund).
136. See Justice Reinvestment Coalition Wins 1,400 Jobs for Formerly Incarcerated People in
Alameda County, ELLA BAKER CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. (June 28, 2016), http://www.ellabakercen-
ter.org/in-the-news/justice-reinvestment-coalition-wins- 1400-jobs-for-formerly-incarcerated-people-
in.
137. See EQUAL EDUC., https://equaleducation.org.za (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).
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the need of a critical mass of parents, teachers, and students in the Khaye-
litsha township of Cape Town-and with high school students holding
leadership positions in the organization-EE has now gone on to become
a nationwide organization.138 Some of the organization's policy victories
include the fixing of over 500 windows of the Luhlaza High School in
Khayelitsha in 2008 and halting the closing of over seventeen schools in
the Western Cape Province in 2012.139
* After an act of police violence in 2015, a coalition of grassroots
organizations in Minneapolis mobilized together and created a compre-
hensive "United Black Agenda" for racial and economic justice.,140 The
coalition called for justice-orientated policies such as a summer jobs pro-
gram for youth of color, fair labor practices, and voting rights restoration,
and also explicitly stated that investment in community is necessary to ef-
fectively challenge state violence.141 The coalition is using the agenda to
lobby in the state legislature for initiatives that target racial and socioeco-
nomic inequalities in the state of Minnesota;142 one of the coalition's re-
cent state legislative victories included the passage of a paid sick days
bill. 143
* Restore Oakland, a collaboration between the Ella Baker Center
for Human Rights and Restaurants Opportunities Centers United, will pro-
vide community-based, restorative economics and justice space in East
Oakland.144 Envisioning community safety and justice in a new way, the
hub will include job-training programs, a restaurant that will provide liv-
ing wage jobs for the community, restorative justice programming, and
health care and child care programs.145
138. Id.
139. See id (providing information on Equal Education's campaigns and leadership structure).
Equal Education is "a movement of learners, parents, teachers and community members working for
quality and equality in South African education, through analysis and activism." Our Movement,
EQUAL EDUC., https://equaleducation.org.za/our-movement/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2017).
140. See Patrick Condon, 'United Black Legislative Agenda' Seeks $75 Million to Create Busi-




141. Memorandum from the United Black Legislative Agenda (n.d.),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/OB2ilekXQNNGbWMyUWdfUEQyMzA/view.
142. Id.
143. Peter Callaghan, Minneapolis Approves 'Landmark' Paid Sick Leave Law, MINNPOST
(May 27, 2016), https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2016/05/minneapolis-approves-land-
mark-paid-sick-leave-law; Peter Callaghan, Minneapolis Set to Become First City in Minnesota to
Require Paid Sick Leave, MINNPOST (May 6, 2016), https://www.minnpost.com/politics-pol-
icy/2016/05/minneapolis-set-become-first-city-minnesota-require-paid-sick-leave.
144. Luke Tsai, A Nonprofit Restaurant in East Oakland Will Aim to Prioritize People over Prof-
its, E. BAY EXPRESS: WHAT THE FORK (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.eastbayexpress.com/What-
TheFork/archives/2016/02/16/a-nonprofit-restaurant-in-east-oakland-will-aim-to-prioritize-people-
over-profits.
145. See Restore Oakland, ELLA BAKER CTR. FOR HUM. RTs., http://ellabakercenter.org/restore-
oakland (last visited Feb. 10, 2017) (detailing the development of the restorative justice and restorative




Examining the JRI in the United States and the Commission in South
Africa demonstrates how institutional actors trend toward limiting concep-
tions of harm, safety, and accountability. These limitations reflect their
own conceptions of what governments are charged with doing in the
twenty-first century. Marginalized communities continue to suffer the im-
pact of the shortcomings of government systems that trade in racialized
fear and shame, rather than accountability and reparations. Those inter-
ested in truly advancing racial equity and reducing inequality must con-
tinue to pursue strategies that successfully challenge the underlying logic,
racialized rhetoric, and assumptions of these punishing systems.
A process of Truth and Reinvestment addresses ome of the gaps ex-
isting in both the JRI and the Commission. Truth means reckoning with
the reality of racial injustice in our country and talking about how we have
continuously prioritized and profited from shackles, walls, and jails in
communities of color-from slavery, to Jim Crow, to our current criminal
justice system. Reinvestment means rejecting these priorities and advanc-
ing real, long-term solutions that create opportunity for those who have
been most harmed.
Such a process would both allow us to acknowledge and wrestle with
the harms that have been systematically wrought on people of color in this
country and to channel resources into those communities. Without this in-
itial reckoning, we cannot ensure that reinvestments are truly going to
those who have been most impacted by structural racism.
Race-neutral reinvestment policies that do not take into account the
targeting of people of color by the criminal justice system could end up
replicating the exact circumstances that have brought us to a moment
where people of color make up 60% of those imprisoned, Black and Latino
people are three times more likely to be searched during a traffic stop than
Whites, and more than 70% of students involved in school-related arrests
or referred to law enforcement are Black or Latino.
Ordinary people, particularly those who have been harmed by the
criminal justice system, must be engaged in the process of Truth and Re-
investment so that people impacted by systems of punishment drive the
solutions and creation of alternatives. Community participation will help
ensure that reinvestments are directed towards people of color and low-
income communities, instead of towards law-enforcement-driven solu-
tions or top down, trickle down approaches. By connecting the truth of our
country's past to reinvestment in our future, we can effectively address
racial inequities and build a society where we prioritize growth, redemp-
tion, and support over punishment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2015, the Colorado General Assembly passed the Community Law
Enforcement Action Reporting Act (CLEAR Act).' The CLEAR Act
requires the Division of Criminal Justice (DCJ) of the Colorado
Department of Public Safety to collect data from law enforcement
agencies, the Judicial Department, and the adult Parole Board; synthesize
the data by race, ethnicity, and gender at discretionary points throughout
the criminal justice process; and issue a report on its findings.2 In
December 2016, the DCJ presented a report analyzing the data from the
over 325,000 criminal justice system contacts in the 2015 calendar year to
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees of the Colorado General
Assembly.3 According to the state demographer's office, in 2015,
Colorado's population was 5,443,608 and was comprised as follows:
White, 69.1%; Black, 4.2%; Hispanic, 22.2%; and Other, 4.6%.4 Men
made up 50.3% of the state population and women made up 49.7% of the
t Associate Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to thank the
excellent staff of the Denver Law Review for inviting me to participate in their Justice Reinvestment
Symposium. I would also like to thank Professors Christopher Lasch, Lindsey Webb, Patience
Crowder, Catherine Smith, Nantiya Ruan for their support, encouragement, and trenchant comments.
I. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-33.5-518 (2016).
2. PEG FLICK, KIM ENGLISH & LAURENCE LUCERO, COLO. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY,
SUMMARY: REPORT ON THE C.L.E.A.R. ACT: COMMUNITY LAw ENFORCEMENT ACTION REPORTING
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population.' And, in the country that has the highest incarceration rate in
the world,' Colorado does its fair share to contribute to those high rates.'
As in virtually every other jurisdiction in the country, black people
were disproportionately represented at every measured discretion point in
the criminal justice process.' Although black people comprise just 4.2%
of Colorado's population, black people received 12.4% of the over
200,000 arrests and summonses issued by law enforcement agencies in
2015.9 The DCJ's study of 105,156 case filings in county, district, and
juvenile courts combined found that black people accounted for 10.5% of
court filings.'o In district court, black people accounted for 20.9% of the
cases sentenced, were more likely than the other race or ethnicity
categories to receive initial sentences of confinement, and were less likely
to receive probation or a deferred judgment for offenses, including drug
and violent offenses, even after controlling for concurrent cases or prior
criminal history." In those drug cases where black people did receive a
more lenient sentence, probation or a deferred judgment was revoked at
the rate of 40.3%. 12 And black people convicted of violent offenses were
more likely to be revoked than people of other races or ethnicities who had
been convicted of violent offenses. ' Black people who were sentenced to
prison time were far less likely to receive the benefit of discretionary
parole than incarcerated whites and Asian Americans.1 4
5. Id.
6. Criminal Justice Facts, SENT'G PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/criminal-
justice-facts (last visited Mar. 14,2017). At 471 per 100,000 people, the United States has the highest
incarceration rate in the world. Criminal Justice Facts: State-by-State Data, SENT'G PROJECT,
http://www.sentencingproject.org/the-facts (last visited Mar. 14, 2017) (select "U.S. Total" from the
drop down bar provided for United States incarceration statistics). Over 2.2 million people are
currently held in our nation's jails and prisons. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF
INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (Jeremy Travis
et al. eds., 2014) (reporting that in the United States in 2012, "[i]n absolute numbers, the prison and
jail population had grown to 2.23 million people, yielding a rate of incarceration that was by far the
highest in the world").
7. Colorado's incarceration rate is 383 per 100,000 people. Criminal Justice Facts:
State-by-State Data, supra note 6 (select "CO" from the drop down bar provided for Colorado
incarceration statistics). By way of comparison, the average European rate of incarceration is 133.5
per 100,000; the rate for Canada is 188 per 100,000; the rate for Australia is 130 per 100,000; the rate
for New Zealand is 192 per 100,000, and the rate for Japan is 51 per 100,000. Michelle Ye Hee Lee,
Yes, U.S. Locks People up at a Higher Rate than Any Other Country, WASH. POST (July 7, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/07/yes-u-s-locks-people-up-at-a-
higher-rate-than-any-other-country.
8. African Americans and Latinos make up a disproportionate share of those incarcerated.
SENTENCING PROJECT, FACT SHEET: TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS 5 (2017),
http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US-Corrections.pdf ("More than
60% of the people in prison today are people of color. Black men are nearly six times as likely to be
incarcerated as white men and Hispanic men are 2.3 times as likely. For black men in their thirties, I
in every 10 is in prison or jail on any given day.").
9. FLICK ET AL., supra note 2, at 8.
10. Id. at 9.
11. Id. at 9-10.
12. Id. at 10.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 11.
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The disparity reached into Colorado's juvenile courts as well. Black
youth, at just five percent of Colorado's youth population, account for a
wildly disproportionate sixteen percent of cases in juvenile court. " Like
their adult counterparts, system-involved black youth were more likely to
receive an initial sentence to the Division of Youth Corrections and were
less likely to receive a deferred judgment." Black youth who received
probation or a deferred judgment were more likely than their
similarly-charged white counterparts to be revoked for drug offenses and
other crimes and were least likely to be revoked for violent offenses.'"
But even in the face of numbers like these, many key criminal justice
system stakeholders cling to the idea that the criminal justice system is no
more than the sum of its individual defendant parts, each bearing personal
responsibility. For example, in May 2016, George Brauchler,-the District
Attorney for the Eighteenth Judicial District, and the president of the
Colorado District Attorney's Council-gained prominence for
prosecuting the Aurora theater shooting trial and tweeting, "'Mass
incarceration' is a myth. Individuals with their own attorneys were
convicted and sentenced individually."" The response from the
Twitterverse was swift and damning. One person responded, "[P]lanets
too are myths. Gravity holds individual and singular rocks together."l9
Another tweeted, "There's no such thing as 'genocide,' really. Every death
is unique."20 To these two critics, mass incarceration is as solid a concept
as planets, and as obvious, targeted, and measurable as genocide. But
Brauchler disagreed. Brauchler explained that his tweet, if "inartful,"
aimed "to reject what I think this movement has become, and that is a
vehicle for people who are anti-police, anti-prosecutor, and anti[-]courts,
to shift the blame away from them and onto individual responsibility that
got those people in trouble in the first place."21 He further explained, "I
am not in favor of locking up everybody for every little thing."22 Instead,
he said, "I am in favor of personal responsibility."2 3
Brauchler's tweet distills, to ninety-six characters, the narrative that
is most threatening to systemic criminal justice reform: rejection of the




18. Corey Hutchins, Colorado DA George Brauchler Explains 'Mass Incarceration is a Myth'
Tweet, COLO. INDEP. (May 6, 2016), http://www.coloradoindependent.com/159201 (quoting George
Brauchler (@GeorgeBrauchler), TWITTER (Apr. 29, 2016, 4:47 PM),
https://twitter.com/GeorgeBrauchler/status/726196183819907072).
19. Id. (quoting Matt Ferner (@matthewferner), TWITTER (Apr. 29, 2016, 8:28 PM),
https://twitter.com/matthewferner/status/726251858205925376).







in favor of the idea that defendants are system-involved through their own
actions because the system safeguards innocence through ironclad
procedural and substantive due process protections. But this narrative is
the fable that enabling police procedurals like "Law and Order" and "The
First 48" peddle so that criminal justice system bystanders can believe the
system is fair.24 Application of narrative theory illuminates the familiar
structure. The steady state of public safety is troubled by the individual
criminal actions of the scofflaw defendant. The conflict is resolved by the
heroic actions of the police and prosecutors who investigate and try the
defendant so that the defendant is held accountable for his or her crime.
Finally, a new steady state, in which public safety is restored, is resumed.2 5
Understanding the troubling statistics that the DCJ reported to the
Colorado legislature as the result of thousands of individual cases is not
the problem; the problem is the narrative that explains the statistics that
describe these thousands of cases. Instead of being solely the result of
countless instances of personal responsibility, these cases often also result
from thousands of individual system failures, in case after case, in
courtroom after courtroom, and in county after county. This Article argues
that applications of narrative theory to criminal proceedings can help chart
a course to convert our criminal processing system into an actual criminal
justice system.
II. NARRATIVE THEORY IN ACTION
A. Narratives Behind the Myth of the Right to Counsel
Brauchler's tweet argued, "Individuals with their own attorneys were
convicted and sentenced individually." 26 But the issues surrounding the
vindication of the right to counsel are well-documented. While very state
attempts to comply with the mandate of Gideon v. Wainwright27 by
providing some type of indigent defense delivery system,28 Colorado is
24. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 59 (2012).
25. The best examinations of narrative theory in law are ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME
BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 11-13 (2000), and MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE
LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE, at xviii (1995). Other articles applying storytelling and
lawyering theory to courtroom practice include the following: Ty Alper, Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Todd E. Edelman, Randy Hertz, Rachel Shapiro Janger, Jennifer McAllister-Nevins, Sonya
Rudenstine & Robin Walker-Sterling, Stories Told and Untold: Lawyering Theory Analyses of the
First Rodney King Assault Trial, 12 CLINICAL L. REv. 1, 1-2, 4 (2005) (applying an interdisciplinary
set of legal practice criteria to analyze the defense's tactics in the stateside prosecution of the police
officers accused of using excessive force against motorist Rodney King); Richard K. Sherwin, Law
Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in a Criminal Case, 47 STAN. L. REV. 39, 41-42
(1994).
26. Hutchins, supra note 18 (quoting George Brauchler (@GeorgeBrauchler), TWITTER (Apr.
29, 2016, 4:47 PM), https://twitter.com/GeorgeBrauchler/status/726196183819907072).
27. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
28. Id. at 344.
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one of the few states with a statewide public defender system.2 9 The
Colorado Public Defender's Office is widely regarded as one of the best
in the country.30 The Office employs 488 lawyers in twenty-one regional
trial offices around the state.31 The Colorado Public Defender Office's
active cases numbered more than "140,000 in 2013-2014, including
18,000 new cases from January 2014 to July 2015" in response to an
increased mandate to represent misdemeanor defendants.32 With a budget
of about $80 million a year, the Colorado Public Defender Office's budget
averages out to sixteen dollars per resident.33 By way of comparison,
Oregon spends the most at twenty-five dollars per resident, while
Mississippi spends the least, at just five dollars per resident.34 That $80
million pays for attorneys, investigators and investigation, support staff,
forensic tests, experts, and all the costs associated with the overhead of
running an office.35 But all these state systems operate in a context in
which the average state or local public defender has a caseload of 371
cases each year, and over seventy percent of state systems report that they
are hindered from doing their jobs by a lack of funding and low salaries.3 6
In contrast, Colorado state prosecutors have a budget of just over
$157 million, almost twice as much.37 And that $157 million does not
include the separate, million-dollar budgets for police, who act as the
investigatory arm for the state, and for the Department of Human Services,
which pays for forensic testing for the government.
But the fact is that in many municipal and juvenile court cases, it is
very common for defendants and respondents to proceed without counsel.
As relatively well-resourced as the Colorado Public Defender's Office is,
the strict income requirements it has to observe necessarily mean that
many accused defendants and respondents who want a lawyer, who make
too much to qualify for a public defender, but who do not make near
29. LYNN LANGTON & DONALD FAROLE, JR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER PROGRAMS, 2007, at 1 (2010), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/spdp07.pdf
("Twenty-two states had a state public defender program that oversaw the operations, policies, and
practices.. . . In the remaining 27 states, public defender offices were county-based, administered at
a local level, and funded principally by the county or through a combination of county and states
funds.").
30. Callie Jones, Public Defenders Vital to Criminal Justice System, J.-ADVOC. (Apr. 26, 2013,
8:06 AM), http://www.journal-advocate.com/ci_23107280.






36. SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITrEE: REGARDING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE UNITED STATES CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 7 (2013), http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Race-and-
Justice-Shadow-Report-ICCPR.pdf.




enough money to afford a private attorney, end up navigating their cases
without counsel.39
For example, in a recent juvenile case, a 15-year-old girl who was
charged with assault arrived for her trial date.40 The allegations were that
she got into a fight with another girl who lived in her same apartment
building. The respondent arrived at court, which was held on a school day
during school hours, with her mother. When the case was called, the judge
asked if the government was ready for trial. The prosecutor announced
ready. The court turned to the young woman and asked if she was ready
for trial. She said that she was not because she had two witnesses, but they
were in school and their parents would not let them leave school to come
to court to testify. The judge asked her how she wanted to proceed. The
young woman said she wanted more time so that the two witnesses could
come testify that the complainant hit her first, and that she simply defended
herself The judge immediately got impatient. The court told the young
woman that she would not be able to get a continuance; that the case had
to be settled that day; and that she had to either go to trial or accept a plea.
The young woman looked at her mother for help; her mother did not know
what to do. The young woman told the judge she did not do anything
wrong. The judge insisted that the case had to be resolved that day. One
hour later, the girl and her mother were before the court again, this time
entering into a plea agreement that left the girl with a conviction for
assault. The girl and her mother left the courtroom in tears.
In another example in a different jurisdiction, a man charged with
disorderly conduct represented himself in a trial. Before the trial started,
the judge warned the man that he would be held to the same standard as
any attorney, and that he was at a disadvantage because he had no legal
training. The man said he understood, but he could not afford an attorney
and he did not do anything wrong. The trial started. It was difficult to
watch. The pro se defendant tried to give an opening statement, but was
admonished by the judge that he was discussing inadmissible or otherwise
tainted evidence. The defendant tried to object to the prosecutor's
questions on direct examination on the grounds that the witness was not
telling the truth, but was told that that was an incorrect ground for an
objection, and that he could ask questions on cross examination. Then the
defendant tried to ask questions on cross examination about how he was
actually able to hear what he testified to, and whether he actually observed
the defendant say the alleged offensive language, but was told that his
questions were beyond the scope of the direct, that he was arguing with
the witness, and that he was taking too much time with his questions.
Finally, the pro se defendant tried to give a closing argument, only to be
39. For an outline of the statutory and fiscal criteria for state-funded counsel, see OFFICE OF
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT OF COLO., APPOINTMENT OF STATE-FUNDED COUNSEL IN
CRIMINAL CASES AND FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT 1-2 (2014). The fiscal eligibility standards and
guidelines are itemized specifically in Attachment A. Id. at Attachment A.
40. The following are examples I observed when I have been in court with students.
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told that he was testifying and arguing evidence that had not been
previously introduced. The trial was over and the defendant was convicted
in a matter of minutes.
Several things were disheartening about his display. First, the
judge's participation in the fiction that the pro se defendant could comply
with the rules of procedure, evidence, and ethics without a single day of
legal training was dedicated. The judge was so frustrated with the
defendant's lack of legal training and failure to pick up in minutes what
most learn over years of practice that by the time the trial was over, the
judge was barking instructions with barely controlled annoyance verging
on anger. Second, the judge did this policing without prompting from the
prosecutor, who lodged not a single objection during the entire proceeding.
Far from protecting the defendant's rights, the judge instead positioned the
court as an ally of the prosecutor. Most importantly, throughout the
proceedings, the defendant was frustrated, humiliated, and angry. At the
close of the trial, there was no sense that the proceedings had been fair.
Of course, there is likely more to each of these stories. But they do
cast suspicion on Brauchler's tweet that mass incarceration is merely made
up of "[i]ndividuals with their own attorneys [who] were convicted and
sentenced individually." 41 The famous post-script to the Gideon case is
that, after he won his case in the United States Supreme Court, Gideon was
re-tried, this time represented by W. Fred Turner, the best criminal defense
attorney in the Panama City area.42 Turner won an acquittal after
successfully impeaching the government's star witness.43 The outcome of
the Gideon case illustrated its moral perfectly: defense attorneys make a
difference, and without them, no one else in the courtroom, neither
prosecutors nor judges, can be relied upon to protect defendants' rights.
Each of the examples above are possible pre-retrial cases, where the
accused ended up with a criminal record even though having a lawyer
might have made a critical difference in the outcome. As in the Gideon
case, well-resourced defense counsel is the best way to ensure a criminal
justice system instead of a criminal processing system. Indeed, the worst
criminal justice scandal in our country's history, in which two judges
received millions of dollars in kickbacks for each youth they sentenced to
a private juvenile detention facility in which the judges had a financial
stake, happened in a courtroom in which fifty-four percent of youth
litigants waived their right to defense counsel;44 before they set foot in the
courtroom, many of the youths and their parents were given a set of forms
41. Hutchins, supra note 18 (quoting George Brauchler (@GeorgeBrauchler), TWITTER (Apr.
29, 2016, 4:47 PM), https://twitter.com/GeorgeBrauchler/status/726196183819907072).
42. Bruce R. Jacob, Remembering Gideon's Laiwyers, CHAMPION, June 2012, at 16.
43. Id.
44. See JUVENILE LAW CTR., LESSONS FROM LUZERNE COUNTY: RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2011);
see also JUVENILE LAW CTR., LESSONS FROM LUZERNE COUNTY: PROMOTING FAIRNESS,
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, at i-ii (2010).
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to fill out and sign, and unknowingly waived their right to counsel, so there
was no defense attorney protecting their interests.
B. Narratives Behind the Myth of the Truth-Based System
Brauchler's tweet revealed a second deceptive narrative that
perpetuates the criminal justice system. Brauchler explained that his tweet
was spotlighting the "individual responsibility that got those people in
trouble in the first place."45 His underlying assumption is that we have a
truth-based system in which only people who are guilty are arrested,
charged, convicted, and sentenced.
But this assumption is also a facade. By now, the growing number of
death row exonerees has been well-documented.4 6 Since 1972, more than
156 people have been exonerated from death row.4 7 From 1973-1999,
there was an average of three exonerations each year; from 2000-2011,
there was an average of five exonerations each year.4 8 And these are only
the capital cases, which should, theoretically, represent he cases litigated
with the most care, since the defendant's very life was at stake. Beyond
the capital context, the National Registry of Exonerations, launched in
May 2012, has tracked over 1,600 exonerations nationwide.49 Of those
cases, thirteen percent of defendants pled guilty (209/1,600) and the rest
were convicted at trial, seventy-nine percent by juries (1,262/1,600) and
seven percent byjudges (114/1,600)." The National Research Council has
released meticulously documented reports assailing the reliability of all
manner of forensic evidence from bite marks, to bullet casings, to hair
samples." Similarly, the problems with eyewitness identification are
well-known.52 And the Center for Wrongful Conviction of Youth, with
Brendan Dassey's case, has brought new attention to the alarmingly high
rate of false confessions by young people interrogated by the police.53 in
45. See Hutchins, supra note 18.
46. See INNOCENCE PROJECT, 250 EXONERATED, Too MANY WRONGFULLY CONVICTED: AN
INNOCENCE PROJECT REPORT ON THE FIRST 250 DNA EXONERATIONS IN THE U.S. 2-51 (2010). For
a list of exonerations from death row from 1973-2017, see Innocence Database, DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence (last visited Mar. 14, 2017). For biographical
information on each exoneree, see Meet Our Exoneree Members, WITNESS TO INNOCENCE,
http://www.witnesstoinnocence.org/exonerees.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2017).
47. NAACP CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEP'T, DEATH PENALTY FACTSHEET (2017),
http://www.naacp.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Death-penalty-fact-sheet-I - 17-I.pdf.
48. See Innocence: List of Those Freed fom Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-list-those-freed-death-row (last visited Mar. 14, 2017).
49. THE NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH., THE FIRST 1,600
EXONERATIONS 1 (2015),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/1600_Exonerations.pdf.
50. Id. at 2.
51. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A PATH FORWARD 127, 182 (2009).
52. See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 885-89 (N.J. 2011).
53. Crystin Immel & Rebecca Palmore, 'Making a Murderer' Shines Light on False Youth
Confessions, CHI. TONIGHT (Jan. 19, 2016, 3:45 PM),
http://chicagotonight.wttw.com/2016/01/19/making-murderer-shines-light-false-youth-confessions.
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fact, seventy-five percent of the exonerations resulted from something
other than DNA testing.54
Moreover, the high rate of exonerations for defendants who have
been sentenced to prison portends an even higher rate in the hundreds of
thousands of cases in which defendants have been sentenced to jail, house
arrest, or probation. As the risk of incarceration decreases, the risk of
wrongful conviction increases, because other factors, like repeated court
appearances that threaten hourly employment, weigh more heavily in the
plea agreement calculus than the truth of what happened.51
C. Narrative as an Advocacy Tool
Narrative is the most subversive element that defense attorneys can
inject into a courtroom hearing. Using narrative is disruptive for several
reasons. First, narrative is an incredibly effective advocacy tool. It has long
been established that "[t]he attraction of narrative is that it corresponds
more closely to the manner in which the human mind makes sense of
experience than does the conventional, abstracted rhetoric of law." 6 We
make sense of the world through narrative. The books of the three great
monotheistic religions are written in parables. Children crave bedtime
stories-all the better if the story stars them. Each year we spend
thousands of hours and billions of dollars watching movies and television
shows that tell us stories.57 Against this backdrop it is hardly surprising
that research in cognitive science has shown that lawyers whose closing
arguments tell a story win jury trials against their legal adversaries who
just lay out "the facts of the case."" In other words, "[t]he story is not a
parlor trick used to draw attention away from the logic of law. It is part of
the logic itself." 59
Capitalizing on this hardwiring, structuring arguments as narratives
in intensely fact-bound determinations where the law is not contested may
help to create an atmosphere in the courtroom in which it is far more
difficult to treat the accused without compassion. A narrative that
"convey[s] the human context of stop and frisk" might be more persuasive
54. THE NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 49, at 2.
55. See Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic
Approach, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73, 77-78 (1995) ("A defendant and his or her defense lawyer may be
influenced by a host of systemic forces and individual pressures to agree to a particular plea bargain.").
56. Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agony Between Legal Power and
Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2228 (1989).
57. See John Lynch, The Average America Watches So Much TVIt's Almost a Full-Time Job,
Bus. INSIDER (June 28, 2016, 4:57 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-much-tv-do-
americans-watch-2016-6. For the most recent data on Americans' expenditures on entertainment, see
Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Consumer Expenditures - 2015 (Aug.
30, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cesan.pdf.
58. Drew Westen, What Happened to Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/opinion/sunday/what-happened-to-obamas-passion.html.
59. Ruth Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers and Merlin: Telling the Client's Story




than an argument that bloodlessly weighs Fourth Amendment factors.60 A
sentencing narrative that includes discussion of the brutal conditions of
confinement of the specific prison to which a defendant is likely to be sent
might give the sentencing judge pause before meting out a sentence at the
top of the sentencing range.6 ' For example, juvenile attorneys at the D.C.
Public Defender Service wrote and filed a motion detailing the unsanitary
and harsh conditions at the local maximum security juvenile detention
center.62 The detention center did not have air conditioning in the summer
or heat in the winter. 63 Youth were forced to wear underwear for more than
one day, and sometimes to share underwear.64 The detention center was
infested with cockroaches and rats.65 In response, one juvenile court judge
openly refused to detain any more children there until its glaring problems
had been addressed.66
Second and more mechanically, telling a narrative is counter to most
courtroom procedures, which prioritize case processing and anticipate that
arguments will come in the form of lists to maximize court time. Take the
bail determination, for example. In most jurisdictions, the court has two
overarching concerns when deciding whether to grant bail: (1) whether the
defendant is a flight risk and (2) whether the defendant is a danger to the
community.6 1 Often the court has a list of factors that it can consider in
deciding whether to detain, grant bail to, or release the accused on his or
her own promise to return to court.8 Most bail arguments last a matter of
seconds, and consist of a list: "Mr. Smith is forty-three years old, has no
prior record, lives in a home he owns, has a wife and two daughters, and
has been working as a roofer for the last ten years." But knitting those
factors into a narrative will convey to the court that Mr. Smith's life is
more than the sum of the factors on the list, and that Mr. Smith is more
than the allegations against him. It will also be more vindicating to Mr.
Smith as he listens to his lawyer fight for him. In short, use of narrative is
the best way to turn a client into a three-dimensional person who is more
than his case number and the allegations against him.
60. Nicole Smith Futrell, Vulnerable, Not Voiceless: Outsider Narrative in Advocacy Against
Discriminatory Policing, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1617 (2015).
61. Lindsey Webb, Slave Narratives and the Sentencing Court 17-18 (Univ. Denv. Sturm Coll.
Law Legal Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 16-32),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2844872.
62. Peter Slevin, D.C Juvenile Facility Begins Needed Overhaul, WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 1998),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1 998/03/16/dc-juvenile-facility-begins-needed-





67. See, e.g., United States v. Hir, 517 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2008). See also Lindsey Webb,
Slave Narratives and the Sentencing Court, - NYU Rev. of Law and Social Change - (2017),
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2844872.
68. See, e.g., id.
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D. Narrative as a Vehicle for Racial Justice
Finally, narrative has a hallowed history as an effective tool for racial
justice.6 9 In the 18th and 19th centuries, the abolitionist movement was
fueled by "slave narratives," accounts of life in slavery and escape to
freedom written by formerly enslaved people.70 Slave narratives were
transformative works, for both abolitionists, and for the authors. Slave
narratives offered bystanders a detailed, nuanced reconstruction of the
workaday horrors of enslavement in a format that was difficult to
disentangle from the story's unflinching emotional impact. In the typical
narrative construction, the hero was the enslaved person who struggled to
freedom; the villain was always an acolyte of American chattel slavery-
a slave owner, an overseer, or the like; the conflict always included a
detailed account of the unimaginable conditions of enslavement, like the
constant threats of violence and rape, the complete lack of autonomy, and
the backbreaking forced labor.72 But more than that, since these were the
words and thoughts of the slaves themselves, slave narratives included
brutal recountings of how families mourned when they were split up; how
parents ached to be able to give their children a different life; how enslaved
people yearned for freedom and self-determination; and how they resisted,
in ways large and small.73 The mere relating of these stories was disruptive
because they upended widespread fallacies about slavery as a benevolent
institution and stereotypes of black people as vacuous, dangerous, devious,
and lazy.74 In the hands of these narrators, the institution was brutal and
violent, and slaves were intelligent, courageous, industrious, and
hopeful.75
69. For a well-written and nuanced discussion of slave narratives as a model for criminal
sentencing advocacy, see Webb, supra note 61, at 5.
70. See WILLIAM L. ANDREWS & HENRY LOUIS GATES JR., THE CIVITAS ANTHOLOGY OF
AFRICAN AMERICAN SLAVE NARRATIVES 7 (1999) (defining slave narratives as stories that cast
American chattel slavery as "a condition of extreme physical, intellectual, emotional, or spiritual
deprivation," from which the author "undertakes an arduous quest for freedom that climaxes in his or
her arrival in the north"). The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill has compiled an extensive
online collection of slave narratives. See Documenting the American South: North American Slave
Narratives, U.N.C., http://docsouth.unc.edu/neh/ (last updated Mar. 18, 2017).
71. See Charles H. Nichols, Who Read the Slave Narratives?, 20 PHYLON Q. 146, 155 (1959).
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See Jason A. Gillmer, Poor Whites, Benevolent Masters, and the Ideologies ofSlavery: The
Local Trial ofa Slave Accused ofRape, 85 N.C. L. REV. 489, 535-36 (2007).
75. See Nichols, supra note 71, at 155-56 (stating that slave narratives were written to help a
white audience understand the horrors of slavery and find commonality with enslaved people with
"[s]ensitive readers of the narratives .. . would begin to see that Negroes were not unlike themselves
[and] . . . shared with them the ordinary feelings of human beings").
In 2013, the movie 12 Years a Slave, adapted from the 1853 slave narrative memoir by Solomon
Northrup, a free black man who was kidnapped and sold into slavery in Louisiana. The movie was
nominated for and won the Golden Globe Award for Best Motion Picture-Drama. At that year's
award show, co-hosts Tina Fey and Amy Poehler discussed the film with the following joke that
humorously illustrates exactly how slave narratives worked.
Amy Pochler: "One ofthe most nominated films this year is '12 Years a Slave.' I loved '12
Years a Slave', and I can honestly say that after seeing that film, I will never look at slavery
the same way again."
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Defense attorneys are uniquely suited to recognize issues of racial
injustice.76 Defense attorneys are the interface between the accused and
the court." Because of their role and ethical obligations, defense attorneys
can appreciate the full impact of involvement in the criminal justice system
on their clients' lives.7 8 How will the case affect the client's family? Or
the client's own personal goals? If there is a conviction, will the client
have to move out of or have difficulty moving into public housing? How
might a conviction affect the client's current custody arrangement? What
about the client's professional goals? How will a conviction for shoplifting
affect a client's chances of, for example, getting a security clearance to
work in a job deicing planes at the airport? Or working in a day care center,
if the client is convicted of disorderly conduct for getting into an argument
with her neighbor? Or becoming a nurse, if the client is currently
scheduled to shadow another nurse practitioner and there is no flexibility
in that schedule? Or getting a scholarship to attend college classes? Or
even enlisting in the military? And, importantly, how does the answer to
each of these questions interface with the fact of the client's race or
ethnicity? Defense attorneys, with their frontline access to the client, are
the ones who can best "confront[] and nam[e] race in the lawyering and
criminal justice process, and recast[] racial identity and narrative in the
defense of clients and communities of color."" This unique vantage point,
combined with the defense attorney's ethical obligation to represent the
client's stated interests, conspire to make the defense attorney the
courtroom actor most likely to even appreciate the racial disparity that
statistics across the country so uniformly etch.so In a 2011 study, when
asked whether minority overrepresentation in the juvenile justice system
was a problem, "[b]y a very wide margin, defense attorneys are most
inclined to strongly agree or agree... , followed by probation officers and
judges. Few prosecutors express any agreement with this statement."8t
Tina Fey: "Wait, how were you looking at it?"
Alexandra Petri, Tina Fey and Amy Poehler Explain the Problem with '12 Years a Slave' Think-Pieces
in a Single Golden Globes Monologue Joke, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/compost/wp/2014/01/13/tina-fey-and-amy-poehler-explain-
the-problem-with-I 2-years-a-slave-think-pieces-in-a-single-golden-globes-monologue-joke.
The joke may have been a nod to the reaction of Washington Post film critic Richard Cohen to the
film. In a piece published in November 2013, Cohen wrote that the movie had showed him that
"slavery was not a benign institution in which mostly benevolent whites owned innocent and grateful
blacks." Richard Cohen, Richard Cohen: '12 Years a Slave' and Art's Commentary on the Past,
WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/richard-cohen-12-years-a-
slave-and-arts-commentary-on-the-past/2013/ll/04/f~e57a92-4588-1 I e3-b6f8-3782ff6cb769_story.
76. Robin Walker Sterling, Defense Attorney Resistance, 99 IOWA L. REv. 2245, 2251 (2014).
77. See Hon. William C. Griesbach, Defending Public Defenders, WIS. LAW., May 2008, at 20,
20-21.
78. See id. at 21.
79. Anthony V. Alfieri, Objecting to Race, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1129, 1157 (2014).
80. Sterling, supra note 76.
81. Geoff Ward, Aaron Kupchik, Laurin Parker & Brian Chad Starks, Racial Politics of
Juvenile Justice Policy Support: Juvenile Court Worker Orientations Toward Disproportionate
Minority Confinement, 1 RACE & JUST. 154, 169 n.16 (2011).
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Incongruously, even though defense attorneys are in the best position
to ensure system fairness, the defense attorney's role has been limited to
vindicating legal issues associated with individual clients' cases instead of
social issues attendant to mass incarceration and isproportionate minority
contact.82 Defense attorneys have specific tools to implement concerning
the adversarial process, like rules of evidence, rules of criminal procedure,
and case law. So, for example,
If the evidence is weak, counsel have litigation weapons to attack the
government's case. If police violate the Fourth or Fifth Amendment during
an investigation, counsel have constitutional tools to eliminate the
evidence obtained. Good defense counsel [is] well-situated to uncover
government errors with respect to law, evidentiary admissibility,
guidelines calculations, and the like."
But defense attorneys have far fewer tools to police systemic
unfairness.84 Systemic unfairness leeches into the process at discretion
points like arrest, the charging decision, bail, plea negotiations, and
sentencing.85 At each of these points in the life of a typical case, there is a
courtroom actor who has an immense amount of discretion that is virtually
unreviewable. At arrest, it is the police officer; at the charging decision, it
is the prosecutor;86 at the bail hearing, it is the judge.87 But in a system
where discretion is the coin of the realm, defense attorneys are paupers.
Defense attorneys are the system actors with the least amount of
discretion. And discretion matters far more in the petty offense context:
To put it another way, when case outcomes actually depend on the
law and the evidence, defense counsel can be very powerful. But at the
bottom of the penal pyramid where offenses are petty, caseloads immense,
and litigation rare, law and evidence exert weak influences. Instead,
prosecutorial discretion and institutional habits dominate cases, and
defense lawyers are at a structural disadvantage.88
Employing narratives about mass incarceration and all its contours is
a possible response to all the cases that have foreclosed race-based
arguments in criminal proceedings. With the same goals that motivated
abolitionists to promote slave narratives, criminal defense attorneys can
promote narratives about the decimating impact of mass incarceration on
black communities and other communities of color.
82. See Sterling, supra note 76, at 2263-64.
83. Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1049, 1054 (2013)
(footnotes omitted).
84. See Sterling, supra note 76, at 2256-57.
85. See id.
86. Natapoff, supra note 83, at 1064.
87. Note, Judicial Discretion in Granting Bail, 27 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 56, 57 (1952).
88. Natapoff, supra note 83, at 1054-55 (footnote omitted).
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III. NARRATIVES AND CONCEPTIONS OF HOPE OF JUSTICE
This year marks the 147th anniversary of the passage of the 15th
Amendment, the third and last of the Reconstruction Amendments.89 In
the wake of the Civil War, Congress looked to take steps to interpose the
federal government as a shield between the newly-freed black Americans
and southern white landowners' continuing need for exploitable labor.
Congress was concerned that black Americans would be effectively
re-enslaved through state provisions that might revive all the
characteristics of slavery. The Reconstruction Amendments were meant to
be that legislative shield.
The 13th Amendment, which was ratified by three-fourths of the
states on December 6, 1865, abolished slavery except in cases of criminal
conviction.90 The 14th Amendment, which was ratified on July 9, 1868,
granted citizenship to everyone born or naturalized in the United States
and guaranteed everyone equal protection under the law,91 to protect the
new freedmen and women from the vagaries of white landowners who still
subscribed to the prevailing myths about black criminality, intellectual
inferiority, and dangerousness, and about white superiority, which had
been created to sustain American chattel slavery. 92 The 15th Amendment,
which was ratified on February 3, 1870, prohibited states from preventing
people from voting by reason of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.93 Unfortunately, the Amendment left room for the states to
impose ostensibly race-neutral voter qualifications, like poll taxes and
literacy tests, that were anything but race-neutral.94
As many historians and legal scholars have noted, periods of civil
rights advancement are almost always followed by periods of
retrenchment.95 Reconstruction is the quintessential example of that
89. The Battle Over Reconstruction: The Reconstruction Amendments, BOUNDLESS,
https://www.boundless.com/u-s-history/textbooks/boundless-u-s-history-textbook/reconstruction-
1865-1877-19/the-battle-over-reconstruction-i 39/the-reconstruction-amendments-740-2340 (last
visited Mar. 14, 2017).
90. The United States Ratifles the 13th Amendment o the Constitution, AFR. AM. REGISTRY,
http://www.aaregistry.org/historicevents/view/united-states-ratifies-I 3th-amendment-constitution
(last visited Mar. 14, 2017).
91. Primary Documents in American History: 14th Amendment o the U.S. Constitution, LIBR.
OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/ I 4thamendment.html (last updated Mar.
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premise.96 After Reconstruction, white southerners succeeded in
re-establishing legal and political dominance over blacks through brutal
violence, financial exploitation, intimidation, and, above all, the
persistence of the narratives that undergirded the peculiar institution.97
Southern white landowners and business owners first employed convict
leasing, a system by which convicts were used to fill the South's demand
for exploitable labor." Convict leasing was followed by Jim Crow, our
own American system of apartheid, an intricate latticework of laws that
relegated black people to permanent second class citizenship. 9 Jim Crow
was sustained by a spectrum of social checks, that included intimidation
and lynching on the one end and active indulgence of narratives about
black inferiority on the other."o Jim Crow put in place a strict group of
laws that reinforced social mores circumscribing how black southerners
had to act in almost every aspect of life: segregated water fountains,'0 1 not
passing white motorists, 02 and swearing on a different Bible in court.103
Colorado became the 38th state in the Union on August 1, 1876, after
the end of the Civil War and before the end of Reconstruction ended in
1877, just in time for the retrenchment that followed.104 So it is not
surprising that here in Colorado the vestiges of the debates around the
passage of those Amendments persist in protean guises.
For example, the myths about black dangerousness and criminality
seem to show up in modern-day shibboleths about black criminality and
predictably concomitant disparate arrest and imprisonment rates of people
of color."o0 And myths about black intellectual inferiority-that justified
96. See Richard Wormser, Jim Crow Stories: Reconstruction (1865-77), PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/jimcrow/stories events-reconstruct.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2017).
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https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/reconstruction/essaysreconstruction (last visited Mar.
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VIOLENCE IN WILMINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA, at xii (2005) (describing how local white populations
around Wilmington, North Carolina used a "substantially fictional white narrative
of... violence . .. to control the black population during periods of social change").
98. Convict Leasing, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/tpt/slavery-by-another-name/themes/convict-
leasing (last visited Mar. 14, 2017).





103. See Garrett Epps, The Other Sullivan Case, I N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 783, 787 (2005)
(noting that "even the Bibles were segregated").
104. See Colorado Became a State August 1, 1876, AMERICA'S STORY FROM AMERICA'S LIBR.,
http://www.americaslibrary.gov/jb/recon/jb_recon_colorado_1.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2017).
105. Nazgol Ghandnoosh, SENT'G PROJECT, RACE AND PUNISHMENT: RACIAL PERCEPTIONS OF
CRIME AND SUPPORT FOR PUNITIVE POLICIES 6 (2014), http://sentencingproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/1 /Race-and-Punishment.pdf; Brad Heath, Racial Gap in U.S. Arrest Rates:




not allowing slaves to go to school or learn to read Englishi'-seem to
manifest in disparate school funding, suspension, and expulsion rates.'0 7
In 2010, black public-school students were nearly three times as likely to
face serious discipline as their white peers, most often for subjective
reasons like disobedient behavior.'0 8
While black students make up just 5.9 percent of the student
population, they were the subject of 12.7 percent of the discipline cases,
up from 11.7 percent five years ago. White students, on the other hand,
who were about 61 percent of the population, were the subject of 46.8
percent of discipline cases.'0 9
Certainly justice reinvestment requires a reallocation of money, but
it also requires reinvestment of the emotional capital that undergirds the
money flow. The best way to re-channel that emotional capital is through
promoting new narratives of many different kinds, but in particular, a new
narrative that promotes an alternative vision of justice. Vaclav Havel, in
defining hope, also sketches an alternative vision of justice: "Hope is
definitely not the same thing as optimism. It is not the conviction that
something will turn out well, but the certainty that something makes sense,
regardless of how it turns out."I"o Described in this way, hope and justice
seem to be the two sides of the same narrative about reliable fairness. A
narrative built on hope and fairness would be an excellent place to locate
reform.
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